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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the political economy of industrial policy as defined by Laf- 
font (2000). In particular we study the effects of political economy constraints on 
industry design. Our motivation relies on the results of more than 20 years of regula­
tory reforms, where industries have been reorganised after their initial privatisation 
and/or restructure. So far, the literature has extensively studied the relationship 
between political economy and regulation (Levy k  Spiller (1997); Henisz & Benet 
(2003)). However, the study of the relationship between political economy and in­
dustry structure has received less attention. This has happened despite the fact that, 
as noted by Dana (1993), industry structure and regulation are jointly determined.
Our work contributes to the study of the effects of political economy constraints 
on industry design. At a theoretical level we build on Auriol & Laffont (1992)’s 
model of regulation by duopoly and on Dana (1993)’s model of regulating multi­
product natural monopolies. We introduce delegation to their problem and we al­
low for regulatory capture. In the first case we foind that under some circumstances 
capture biases Congress’ decision towards a more competitive structure (duopoly) 
as the optimal response. In the second case, we find that if preventing capture is too 
costly, industry design favours horizontal separation of the natural monopolies as 
the optimal response. At an empirical level, we analyse the political economy con­
straints that led the Mexican government to reform its natural gas industry while 
keeping natural gas production as a legal monopoly and organising the industry 
with a dominant integrated incumbent (transmission and retail). This chapter con­
tributes to our research by opening the “black box” of the determinants of industry 
design a little more. It also contributes to the literature that has studied Mexican 
natural gas reform. This literature has concentrated its attention on the study of 
regulatory incentives, taking industry structure as given.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 General overview
As defined by public interest theory, industrial policy explains government interven­
tion (like taxes and regulation) to solve problems of market failure, such as negative 
externalities and natural monopoly conditions. According to this theory, govern­
ment is a welfare maximiser that acts in favour of the society. A key problem that 
government has to solve to correct market failure comes from asymmetric infor­
mation, which leads to third best mechanisms (Vogelsang (1998)). Laffont (2000) 
points out that this view of government as a benevolent social welfare maximiser has 
been challenged by different schools of thought in political economy. These schools 
argue that special interest groups organise themselves to shape industrial policy. 
The motivation for these interest groups to organise and participate in the design of 
industrial policy is to capture rents. Therefore, the final form that industrial policy 
takes is affected by the relative power of these interest groups interacting in society.
10
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This thesis focuses on the political economy of one topic of industrial policy, that 
is we concentrate our attention on regulation. In particular, we study an issue that 
became more relevant after the world wide regulatory reform that started in the 
first part of the eighties, which is industry design. Therefore, what we attempt to 
do in this thesis is to study industry design under political economy constraints.
Industry design, defined for our purposes as the way in which the industry is or­
ganised as a result of regulatory reform, has captured the attention of professionals 
involved in regulation after some diflâcult experiences in several post-reform net­
work industries. The reason is that some of these network industries were privatised 
and/or their regulatory framework changed, without creating a more competitive 
environment for them to operate. This situation raised some concerns about their 
possible anti-competitive behaviour, and led to their subsequent reorganisation. Two 
examples of the above are the electricity crisis in California and the second reor­
ganisation of British Gas and British Telecom in the UK. Also, this world wide 
regulatory reform experience has shown a variety of industry structures and regu­
latory frameworks that have produced a range of outcomes, from clear success to 
failure (Levy & Spiller (1997)). For instance, in some institutional environments 
public ownership has performed well, whereas in other institutional environments 
more competitive structures have resulted in poor outcomes.
So far, the literature has extensively studied the relationship of political economy 
and regulation (Levy & Spiller (1997); Henisz & Benet (2003)). However, the study 
of the relationship between political economy and industry structure has received 
less attention. This has happened despite the fact that, as noted by Dana (1993), 
industry structure and regulation are jointly determined. Two examples of this joint 
determination are the action taken by British Gas to vertically separate its trans­
mission and retail divisions to avoid tough regulation in retail and, in Mexico, the 
call for regulation of natural gas prices and retail activities of Pemex Gas and Basic 
Petrochemicals given that natural gas production remained a legal monopoly in the
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hands of the state and the firm was integrated between transmission and retail. The 
influence of political economy on industry and market structure has been pointed 
out by Joskow (2000a) who observes that the electricity crisis in California was 
caused in part by the way in which the industry was reorganised due to the pressure 
of interest groups, and by Newbery (2000) who explains the partial liberalisation 
of some network industries around the world by the presence of political economy 
constraints.
This thesis contributes to the study of the effects of political economy constraints 
on industry design at a theoretical and empirical level. At a theoretical level, in an 
environment of asymmetric information and complete contracting, we study the 
decision taken by a social welfare maximiser about how to organise an industry 
when capture is present. At an empirical level, in a case study, we analyse the 
political economy constraints that led the Mexican government reform its natural gas 
industry while keeping natural gas production as a legal monopoly and organising 
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals as a dominant incumbent with integration 
between transmission and retail.
1.2 O utline of th e  thesis:
Chapter 2 presents our literature review. This chapter serves two main purposes. 
First, it explores more than 30 years of progress in the literature of regulation in order 
to explain the contributions of the thesis. Second, it briefly sets out the theoretical 
and technical background required to develop chapters 3 and 4. Therefore, the 
main contributions of chapter 2 are: 1) the identification of two specific issues in 
industry design of natural monopolies (regulation by duopoly and regulation of 
multiproduct industries) that have not been analysed under the scope of political 
economy constraints. 2) The presentation of the “canonical model of regulation” 
(Laffont & Tirole (1993)) together with the transformations it requires to address
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the problem of capture of the regulator by the firm(s) he attempts to regulate. 
3) The presentation of the most recent theoretical and empirical developments in 
incentives and political economy of regulation. Prom the theoretical literature we 
observed that, perhaps, the main progress has been the introduction to the canonical 
model of regulation of dynamic settings and endogenous transaction costs of capture, 
together with departures from complete contracting. On the other hand, from the 
empirical literature we observed that, in most of the cases, it has studied the results 
of the regulatory reform experience around the world, using the tools developed 
by the transaction cost and new institutional economics to explain the observed 
differences in industry structure, regulation and performance. The main findings of 
this literature have been that a) in the design of industry structures and regulatory 
frameworks a detailed micro-analysis of the new structures is required to detect the 
new set of incentives prevailing in the industry (Joskow (2000b); Newbery (2000)); 
b) the alignment between institutions and the regulatory framework could explain 
the relative success and failure of the privatisation and regulatory reform policies in 
different institutional settings (Levy & Spiller (1997)).
Chapters 3 and 4 present our theoretical models. They solve similar problems 
using the methodology developed by Laffont (2000) to study capture within the 
canonical model of regulation. Their difference relates to the kind of network indus­
tries they analyse.
Chapter 3 studies the effects of capture in Auriol & Laffont (1992)’s problem of 
regulation by duopoly. Auriol & Laffont (1992) study the case of a homogeneous 
products natural monopoly industry, the issue is that duopoly duplicates fixed costs. 
However, under certain circumstances, in spite of the duplication of fixed costs wel­
fare is improved by having a more competitive industry structure. In Auriol and 
Laffont's problem industry structure (monopoly versus duopoly) is decided directly 
by the government. In order to introduce capture to their problem we transform 
their model in two steps: first, we introduce delegation to an informed benevolent
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regulator and second, we allow for a non-benevolent or self interested regulator. 
With this procedure we solve the respective welfare optimisation problems under 
incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. Our solutions show 
that delegation to a benevolent regulator improves welfare under both industry 
structures, a non-benevolent regulator reduces welfare, however, as long as the costs 
of preventing capture are not too high, a non-benevolent regulator is still useful 
because it provides some information. Regarding the duplication of fixed costs, it 
is not straight forward to derive analytical conclusions. However, our main result is 
that under certain circumstances capture strengthens Auriol & Laffont (1992)’s find­
ings that duopoly is the welfare dominant industry structure. Numerical simulations 
confirming our observations are provided at the end of the chapter.
Chapter 4 focuses on Dana (1993)’s problem of regulating a multiproduct natu­
ral monopoly industry where the products are totally differentiated (heterogeneous 
products). In this case the decision to be made by government is that of inte­
grating or decentralising the industry. Under decentralisation comparative perfor­
mance (yardstick competition) is used to reduce rents paid to the most efficient firm, 
whereas under integration the regulator exploits informational economies of scope 
to reduce these rents. Industry structure is decided on the basis of the smaller rents 
paid to the most efficient firm. Dana (1993) found that for low levels of cost corre­
lation, informational economies of scope dominate yardstick competition, therefore 
in that case integration dominates decentralisation. The opposite result holds for 
high levels of correlation. Then the regulator’s problem is to find the threshold 
level of correlation beyond which decentralisation is the welfare dominant structure. 
We analise Dana’s problem under capture, proceeding in three steps; first, we con­
struct an asymmetric information environment by allowing “nature” to determine 
the value of the correlation parameter with some probability; second, we introduce 
delegation to an informed benevolent regulator who can see a signal of the corre­
lation parameter; third, we allow for a self-interested regulator. As in chapter 3,
Introduction__________________________________________________________ ^
we solve the social welfare optimisation problem under incentive compatibility and 
individual rationality constraints in each case. A benevolent regulator improves wel­
fare compared to asymmetric information at two levels a) by reducing rents paid to 
the most efficient firm(s) b) by providing the right information for industry struc­
ture. A non-benevolent regulator may not reduce welfare compared to a benevolent 
regulator, as long as the costs of preventing capture are smaller than the savings in 
the transfer payments given up to the most efficient firms. These is because, com­
pared to chapter 3, here the presence of capture does not reduce, consumer surplus. 
Therefore, Congress only has to balance the trade off between the cost of preventing 
capture and the reduction in rents.
The goal of chapter 5 is to illustrate the complexities of a regulatory reform pro­
cess involving industry design with a case study. We chose the Mexican natural gas 
reform partly as a result of my professional experience working at Pemex Gas and 
Basic Petrochemicals (PGPB) during the period of natural gas reform in Mexico. 
However, in addition, the Mexican case represents a good example of the liberalisa­
tion policies implemented during the eighties and nineties around the world and, in 
particular, the reform of the Mexican natural gas industry is a good example of how 
political economy constraints shape industry structure and regulation. Having said 
this, chapter 5 attempts to study Mexico’s natural gas reform using the macro and 
micro approaches developed by New Institutional Economics (Williamson (1994)). 
In our case this macro-approach looks at the role played by Mexico’s economic re­
form in the eighties and the economic crisis of 1994. This approach makes use of 
Newbery (2000)’s explanation of why partial liberalisations of network industries 
may occur. The micro-approach uses Levy & Spiller (1997)’s methodology to look 
at the matches or mismatches of the institutional and regulatory frameworks to 
analyse industry structure, regulation and performance. In this case we study the 
prevailing set of institutions to explain industry structure and regulation before and 
after liberalisation. This chapter contributes to our research in two ways. The first
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one is that it helps us to open a little more the black box of the determinants of 
industry design. That is, compared to our models of chapters 3 and 4, this chapter 
seems to contain a more complex set of parameters to be calculated. Therefore, 
an improvement of our theoretical models will require the inclusion of some of the 
interactions observed in our case study. The second contribution is to the litera­
ture that has studied the Mexican natural gas reform. This literature so far has 
concentrated its attention on the study of incentive regulatory framework taking as 
given industry structure. We hope that the study of the political and institutional 
constraints that shaped the industry structure of the Mexican natural gas industry 
after reform, would help us to understand the key issues for its future development.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. It presents our main conclusions, some lessons 
and some key issues for future research.
CHAPTER 2
Literature review
2.1 Introduction
Regulation is a multidisciplinary discipline: political science, sociology, law, man­
agement and economics have studied regulation for a long time. When settling a 
regulatory case, for instance a price cap or a rate case, it is common to see lawyers, 
managers, economists and politicians involved. This literature review focuses on 
economic regulation and the political economy of regulation, abstracting from many 
criticisms raised by other disciplines. Accordingly, it looks to pursue four main ob­
jectives: a) broadly discuss the most important developments of economic regulation 
during the last 30 years; b) look for the gap in which the next three chapters will 
build up; c) present the canonical model of regulation (Laffont & Tirole (1993); Laf­
font (1994)), along with the transformations it requires to analyse regulation under 
political economy constraints in the form of capture; and d) provide a background 
for the study of industry design and regulation under political economy constraints.
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Section (2.2) discusses the reasons for regulation from a wide perspective, pay­
ing special attention to the problems of natural monopoly and network externalities; 
section (2.3) reviews ways in which regulation could be substituted by competition, 
focusing on franchising and industry design; section (2.4) presents the canonical 
model of regulation, showing the technical aspects of introducing asymmetric in­
formation in a principal-agent framework, to the study of regulation; section (2.5) 
studies regulation under political constraints and presents the basic transformations 
to the canonical model required to analyse the problem of capture; section (2.6) 
discusses recent theoretical and empirical developments in the study of regulation 
under political economy constraints and commitment problems. It also locates this 
thesis in the context of the recent literature. Finally, section (2.7) concludes.
2.2 W hat are th e  reasons for econom ic regula­
tion?
In the classical model of perfect competition, agents in the economy interact in a 
world of perfect information —therefore everybody Icnows prices, quantities, and 
quality of inputs and outputs. There is no room for externalities, firms have incen­
tives to be efficient by reducing costs, increasing productivity and improving quality 
of the goods they produce. In the absence of externalities, with perfect and sym­
metric information and no barriers to entry, welfare in the economy is maximized.
However, the economic literature, particularly that coming from industrial orga­
nization, recognizes that there are market failures such as asymmetric information, 
externalities and market power (Armstrong et al. (1994)). Depending on the severity 
of these failures, sometimes regulatory intervention is needed.
Asymmetric information arises in many areas of economic activity depending 
on its nature. There are three types of problems related with asymmetric infor­
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mation: adverse selection, moral hazard and the winner’s curse. Adverse selection 
arises when there exists a hidden type. For instance, consider the doctor/patient 
relationship where the patient does not know if he is being attended by a good or 
bad doctor. Moral hazard is a problem of hidden action. For example, in financial 
services, a broker is better informed about the financial markets than his customers, 
who have no control over the broker’s actions, so he could invest in riskier assets. 
The winner’s curse problem arises for instance in auctions, when the winner has 
won against well informed professionals and he is left with the question of why he 
has won at all. In general, regulations try to deal with these problems; for example, 
medical standards in the health system, or security commissions in the financial sys­
tem. However, when asymmetric information exists regulation is not always needed. 
Markets could develop a system of quality and warranties, or reputation by itself can 
give incentives to the firms to operate in an efficient way (Armstrong et ai. (1994); 
Brayer (1998)).
Externalities appear when as a result of its production, a firm affects people or 
other firms in a positive or negative way. These situations often call for regulatory 
action. For example, if as a result of its production a firm also produces pollution, 
its levels could be regulated^ or a tax could be levied on a per unit basis (Nichol­
son (1995); Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). When there are positive externalities like in 
network systems, regulation does its work by rules like open access and optimal 
inter-connection prices and standards, making possible increases in the size of the 
network, serving more customers and reducing the cost of service (EC (1999); Shy 
(2001)).
Market power appears when there is ineffective competition in a given market, 
due to entry barriers, collusion, legal protection, high entry costs, very inelastic de-
 ^However, under the property rights and complete markets approach, if property rights are well 
defined and there is a market for the extenalities, it is possible to contract on the externality and 
make the agent that produces it internalize the opportunity cost of its production (Brayer (1998); 
Nicholson (1995); Mas-Colell et al. (1995)).
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maud, natural monopoly conditions etc. In an extreme case the market is supplied 
by one firm that, without any regulation, can charge a price above marginal costs 
making economic profits, and producing less output than the one that would be 
produced with competition^. The result of market power is a reduction of overall 
economic welfare through not only allocative inefficiency, but also through produc­
tive inefficiency due to the lack of incentives to reduce production costs and to 
develop new products^.
To ameliorate problems of market power there are two alternatives: a) introduce 
regulation to prevent the firm from charging the price it would like or b) find ways, 
if possible, to introduce some actual and/or potential competition, (Baumol et al. 
(1982); Armstrong et al. (1994)).
It is interesting to see that the approach that has been taken around the world 
is a mixed one. This is due to the problems involved in regulation and because 
competition is not a goal per-se"*. For instance, under natural monopoly condi­
tions^ or heavy network externalities®, competition does not produce an optimal 
outcome (Economides (1996); EG (1999)). However, the regulatory process could 
be influenced by interest groups or the regulator could align his interests with those 
of certain groups, something which is called in the economic literature “regulatory 
capture” . Also there exists the commitment problem, where the regulator cannot 
commit not to use the information given by the firm against the firm itself, increas­
ing the risk of not recovering sunk investments. Because of these problems it is also 
difficult for regulation to attain an optimal outcome (Stigler (1971); Kalt & Zupan
^Baumol et al. (1982) argues that price will not deviate from marginal cost if the market is 
contestable. See Tirole (1989) for an assessment.
I^n general, regulation is not applied to monopolies per se, what is the subject of regulation is 
the presence of anticompetitive behaviour. Comments from Paul Joskow course of Regulation II, 
MIT Spring 1999.
^This is an issue pointed out by Paul Joskow in his class of Regulation at MIT in several 
occasions. See also Armstrong et al. (1994).
G See appendix A.I.
®8ee appendix A.2.
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(1984); Laffont & Tirole (1993); Armstrong et al, (1994)).
Finally, besides the correction of market failure, the literature also recognises 
that, due to the special characteristics of some natural monopolies like network 
industries, there are other reasons for regulation. In the rent seeking literature 
(Stigler (1971); Laffont (2000)) regulation may be promoted by interest groups to 
create and retain rents in a given industry^. Income redistribution (Posner (1971); 
EC (1999)), like taxation by regulation and universal service, could be a reason for 
governments to implement regulation of certain industries®.
2.3 R egulation  and C om petition
Since regulation is far away from being a perfect solution for the natural monopoly 
problem, not only because of asymmetric information, but also because of problems 
of lack of commitment and regulatory capture, the literature has dealt with ways 
of introducing competition to such industries in order to improve the regulatory 
outcome or in a more demanding task to avoid costly regulation® (Laffont &; Tirole 
(1993); Armstrong et al. (1994); EC (1999)),
Competition has good properties for allocative and productive efficiency through 
its effects on selection, information and incentives (Armstrong et al. (1994); Klain
(1998)). However, the case for regulation in network industries is precisely the
^Notice that this is different from having a regulatory framework that is modified to favour an 
interest group. In this case special interest groups promote the regulation of a given industry to 
create and retain rents, and to foreclose another interest groups access to those rents.
®There is a wide discussion about using regulation for income redistribution instead of the tax 
system. The argument is that taxing or subsidizing by regulation could create more distortions in 
the economy than using the tax system for those purposes (Laffont & Tirole (1993); EC (1999)). 
In spite of that, in the real world it is observed that industries like telecommunications, postal 
sei-vices and electricity transmission confront universal services requirements situations which calls 
at least for cross subsidization, (EC (1999); Laffont & Tirole (2000)).
®There is a wide discussion about eliminating regulation by the introduction of market based 
mechanisms to control network industries. In that sense regulation could be substituted by compe­
tition policy, however it seems difficult to avoid regulation of the core natural monopoly (Armstrong 
et al. (1994); Klain (1998); EC (1999)).
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impossibility of introducing competition without having productive inefficiency due 
to the duplication of high sunk costs and the impossibility for the firms to break even 
with marginal cost pricing^®. Here, the advantages of competition over regulation 
have to be measured in a dynamic setting, where the welfare savings due to the 
selection of more efficient firms over less efficient ones, the reduction of asymmetric 
information^^ and the incentives for innovation have to be weighted against possible 
duplication of fixed costs and/or subsidies for cost recovery.
To see the interaction between competition and regulation it is first necessary to 
look at the ways in which competition could be introduced in network industries. 
The literature (Laffont & Tirole (1993); Laffont (1994); Green & Newbery (1997); 
Spiller & Vogelsang (1997); Helm & Jenkinson. (1998)) distinguishes two kinds of 
competition a) competition for the market, basically franchising, b) competition in 
the market which, for example, includes network competition in the form of property 
rights trade and more importantly industry design (i.e. vertical and/or horizontal 
separation, or allowing duopolistic structures in spite of the duplication of fixed 
costs). We consider each case.
2.3.1 Com petition for the market
Basically this relates to the original question posed by (Demzets (1968)): Why reg­
ulate public utilities? Exploiting competition for the market means that franchising 
(auctioning the right to be a monopolist) takes advantage of ex-ante competition 
and eliminates the need for regulation. That is, from the literature in auction the­
ory (Klemperer (1999)) it is well known that the least cost bidder typically wins 
the auction by offering the lowest price. In the natural monopoly case this means
®^The existence of high sunk costs in the network industries makes contestability arguments very 
hard to be sustained. Hit an run strategies do not operate in this kind of industry. See appendix 
A.l for the characterisation of the natural monopoly conditions.
i^In a situation of imperfect competition in network industries, regulation by yardstick competi­
tion reduces asymmetric information when there is correlation of firms’ costs, (Cremer & McLean 
(1985); Laffont & Tirole (1993); Armstrong et al. (1994)).
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that the most productive firm wins the auction, which is good for allocative and 
productive efficiency. Also there is a reduction in the rents given up to the most 
efficient firm, which is good to the extent that the regulator dislikes given up those 
rents^^ (Laffont & Tirole (1993); Armstrong et al. (1994); Laffont (1994); Klemperer
(1999)).
However, the literature also discusses several problems that limit the use of 
franchising. First, it may not be possible to calculate the costs of franchising a 
monopoly into the distant future^®, so once the monopoly has been allocated pricing 
could deviate from costs over the time. This means that a franchise must be settled 
for a certain period of time after which the franchise must be re-auctioned. If these 
periods of time become too short, then cost revision for re-auctioning the franchise 
becomes a kind of cost of service regulation (Armstrong et al. (1994)).
Otherwise, re-auctioning a franchise creates its own problems of asymmetric in­
formation and incentives. For instance the incumbent firm is better informed than 
the entrants, so winning against better informed players creates a winner’s curse 
problem. In the case of incentives, the incumbent has incentives to under-invest 
since there is a potential for not recovering investments after the franchise period 
(Williamson (1988); Laffont & Tirole (1993); Armstrong et al. (1994)). In addition 
Laffont & Tirole (1993) notice the possibility of collusion amongst franchise bidders, 
plus the possibility of capture of the auctioneer, both of which could reduce the effi­
ciency of the franchise equilibrium. Because of the difficulties of transferring assets 
at the end of the franchise period in practice, it seems that franchising works well
^^According to (Laffont (1994) (p. 521-523)) franchising results in that: “the contract obtained 
by the winning firm implements the same quantity and effort levels as if the winning firm was alone 
facing the regulator. The gain of the auction is first, to select the firm with the highest intrinsic 
efficiency and second, to pay lower rents^. The auction enables the regulator to truncate the size of 
the asymmetric of information from [ ,^/?] to where (3^ is the second lowest cost parameter...
As the number of firms grows, goes to ^  with probability one as well as pL Asymptotically, 
the auction solves both the moral hazard and adverse selection problems” .
^^ For instance, there is no way to calculate deviations from costs due to future technological 
innovations, which means that the firm could become an unregulated monopoly.
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in industries where there do not exist high sunk costs, like plates licensing for taxis, 
public transportation and trash collection and has more problems in industries with 
high sunk costs like gas and electricity transmission and distribution (Williamson 
(1988); Laffont & Tirole (1993); Armstrong et al. (1994); Klain (1998)).
2.3.2 C om petition in the market
A more general approach to introduce competition in natural monopoly industries 
has been industry design. Under this approach the participation of the government 
goes to the specific details about how the industry would work. Those details could 
be the number of firms that should operate in the industry, vertical and or horizontal 
integration versus no integration, specific market rules, etc. (Green & Newbery 
(1997); Helm & Jenkinson (1997); Joskow (2000b); Laffont (2000); Newbery (2000)).
Thus, from the old definition of natural monopoly, governments, business advi­
sors, international agencies, academics, etc., have undertaken a deeper revision of the 
industries in which they not only have separated the natural monopoly parts from 
the potentially competitive parts, but also have looked for ways in which even in the 
natural monopolistic parts competition could be used to improve the final outcome 
(Armstrong et al. (1994); Helm & Jenkinson. (1998); Newbery (1999)). An example 
of this has been the auction of property rights^^ over the network, instead of auction­
ing the complete network. Two examples of this approach are railway operations 
and gas storage in UK (Armstrong et al. (1994); Hawdon k, Stevens (1999)). Some 
examples of such detailed design of those regulated industries could be seen in the 
electricity sector in U.K. where the government had to decide about the separation 
of production and transmission, the number of firms in the production business, the 
rules for market operation and the rules for transmission (Armstrong et al. (1994);
However, problems regarding the definition of those property rights, the loosing of synergies 
of vertical integration and the possibility of monopoly brhaviour by holders of property rights in 
congestion points could arise (Armstrong et al. (1994); Alger (1998); Joskow & Tirole (2000)).
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Newbery (1999)), some other examples in the electricity sector are USA (Joskow 
(1997, 2000a)), Chile (Gilbert &; Kahn (1996)), Australia and New Zealand (Wolak 
(1997)) among other countries.
In the U.K. industry we have seen that industry design has been an issue since the 
privatization of British Gas. British Gas was first privatized as a natural monopoly 
and over time was separated into production and transmission, and competition has 
been introduced into the sector (Armstrong et al. (1994); Waddams (1997); Newbery
(1999)).
In the telecommunications sector, a particular issue in industry design is the 
decision about having one or two firms serving the market, Auriol and Laffont 
((1992) p.p.507-508) mention: “the organization of sectors once claimed natural 
monopolies in the form of duopolistic structures is becoming more frequent: MCI 
and ATT in the long-distance telecommunications in the USA, British Telecom and 
Mercury, until recently, for fixed-link public telecommunications; Telecome Securitor 
and Racal-Vodaphone for cellular networks in England; Prance Telecome and SFR 
for mobile phone in France.”
However, industry design raises some issues. As Joskow (2000b) points out, the 
opportunities for monopolistic behaviuor in product and network congestion pric­
ing after the reform of the electricity industries around the world, provides a clear 
example for the need of careful industry design as a part of the regulatory reform. 
That is, in the transformation of the industrial structure it is necessary to consider 
the new transaction costs and incentives that the new industrial structure would 
generate. According to Newbery (1999) it is difficult to generalise network compe­
tition among other things because it requires network maturity, and because it does 
not eliminate the need for regulation, since it may still be required to invigilate the 
way in which competition evolves (i.e. interconnection). Finally for Joskow (2000b) 
and Newbery (2000) political economy issues should be analysed when designing 
market and industry structures, as the electricity crises in California and the partial
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liberalisation of the electricity industry in several countries show.
2.4 O ptim al R egulation
2.4.1 Background
The problem that optimal regulation attempts to solve is to approximate prices to 
the first best outcome when natural monopoly and/or network externalities exist in 
the market^®. Over the years a large amount of literature has been written to address 
the problem. Baron (1989) presents a survey classifying exogenous and endogenous 
models of regulation, depending on the way that regulation is modelled. Exogenous 
models do not deal with problems of asymmetric information and incentives, whereas 
endogenous models do.
Up to the end of the seventies optimal regulation was developed through ex­
ogenous models, which were divided between two main paradigms “Cost of Service 
Regulation” (COS) and “Ramsey-Boiteux Regulation” (R-B) (Laffont (1994)). Both 
forms of regulation tried to address the problem of regulating a monopoly under a 
framework were asymmetric information and incentives behaviour was not an is­
sue. The result of these forms of regulation was a second best outcome, with prices 
deviating from marginal costs (Crew (1986); Braeutigan (1989); Laffont & Tirole
(1993)).
During the eighties an important amount of literature was produced analyz­
ing the benefits, drawbacks and practical applicability of both types of regulation 
(Schmalensee (1979); Baron (1989); Newbery (1999)) with a general conclusion that 
COS regulation generates low incentives for cost reduction and over-investment, 
whereas R-B regulation requires a huge amount of information for its implemen­
tation. Also during this time the endogenous approach was developed, in what is
®^See appendixes A.l and A.2.
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called the “New Economics of Regulation” that introduced the study of problems of 
asymmetric information into the regulatory process^®. With asymmetric informa­
tion, the result of optimal regulation is a “third best” in which informational rents 
have to be given up to the most efficient firms, due to their informational advantage 
(Laffont & Tirole (1993); Laffont (1994)). It is said that probably, with the intro­
duction of political and practicality constraints, in the nineties, a third generation 
in the study of regulation has appeared. Having as a result a kind of “fourth best” 
outcome due to the introduction of these new constraints (Vogelsang (1998)).
Under the endogenous approach of regulation it is possible to find the follow­
ing subdivisions: i) Bayesian and non-Bayesian models of asymmetric information 
where transfers from the regulator to the firm are allowed^®. Because transfers are 
permitted in these models they assume the presence of a benevolent regulator, ii) 
Bayesian models of asymmetric information where transfers are not allowed. Mainly 
models of price regulation with budget constraints, including price cap regulation. 
These models assume in an implicit way a non-benevolent regulator, since in gen­
eral they do not provide an explanation of the reason why regulators are prohibited 
to use transfers (Laffont & Tirole (1993); Laffont (1994)). iii) Finally, Bayesian 
models where political economy constraints are clearly specified and look for the op­
timal contract. These models are classified into complete constitution, incomplete 
constitution and endogenous coalition formation models (Laffont (2000)).
Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis are part of the endogenous approach of regulation, 
they are developed under a Bayesian framework where transfers are allowed and
®^To see a more comprehensive review of the new developments in regulation see Armstrong & 
Sappington (2003a).
^^The idea is that COS and R-B already produce a second best outcome (Vogelsang (1998)).
^®The terms Bayesian and non-Bayesisn refer to the way in which beliefs are formed. In the 
first case agents form their beliefs given the common information and beliefs of the other agents. 
In the second case, non-Bayesian models, agents’ behaviour is modelled for example according to 
past behaviour. Examples of Bayesian models are in (Baron (1989)) and (Laffont & Tirole (1993)), 
examples of non-Bayesian models could be found in (Baron (1989)), (Train (1991)) and (Armstrong 
et al. (1994)).
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political economy constraints are clearly specified. In the rest of this section we will 
summarize the main issues regarding COS and R-B, as a background for the next 
sections that will discuss more contemporary topics, where asymmetric information 
and political constraints are added into the analysis.
• COS: This kind of regulation has been implemented in many countries, its main 
feature is that it is a cost based regulation in which total costs plus a “reasonable” 
rate of return on capital are reimbursed to the firm. In this way the regulator is able 
to control the level of monopoly power, while attracting capital, since he permits 
the firm to keep a rate of return on investment.
The problem with this kind of regulation is that it produces low incentives for 
cost reduction^® and high incentives for the miss-allocation of resources, the so-called 
Averch & Johnson (1962) effect.
However, in spite of these problems, COS has some advantages. First, it con­
tains a view of the need for checks and balances in the regulatory process since its 
implementation needs cost auditing and public hearings. Second, it defines a proce­
dure that avoids any risk of bankruptcy for the utilities. Third, it offers a long run 
commitment crucial for the investments needed in the network industries®® (Laffont 
(1994); Vogelsang (1998)).
However, for Laffont (1994) from the theoretical point of view the main concern 
about COS is the total lack of normative framework. “The enormous literature 
written in cost of service regulation is a list of defects of this procedure with no clue 
whatsoever whether those defects are the outcomes of optimal trade-offs” (Laffont 
(1994) p. 508-509). For example, the rate of return is set above the market rate of
®^The incentives only come from the regulatory lag (Laffont & Tirole (1993)).
20(twith all its drawbacks rate of return regulation, in the US, has been considered a serious 
alternative to any form of incentive regulation. The reason is that (based, inter alia, on the 1944 
Hope decision by the US Supreme Court) regulated firms (and possibly customers) can always 
induce regulators or courts to revert to rate of return regulation if incentive regulation deviates 
substantially from rates of return that simply covers the cost of capital. This is something where 
other countries would differ substantially from US.” (Vogelsang (1998) p. 5).
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interest, a situation which possibly calls for the giving up of rents to the regulated 
firm. However the literature in COS does not provide any theoretical ground for 
this.
• Ramsey-Boiteux Regulation: On the other hand, Ramsey pricing®  ^comes from 
a well developed optimization programme where the firms maximize profits subject 
to a break even constraint. The famous result of such maximization programme 
is a second best outcome, in which the firm is able to price discriminate according 
to the inverse elasticity rule. That is, price deviations from marginal costs must 
be proportional to the price elasticities, where the coefficient of proportionality is 
related to the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint, which itself depends on 
demand functions and cost functions .
A wide survey of price discrimination, peak load pricing, Ramsey pricing and 
non-linear tariffs is presented by Braeutigan (1989). He discusses how Ramsey prices 
could be improved by two part tariffs and general nonlinear tariffs. Armstrong et al.
(1994) also present welfare improvements due to general nonlinear tariffs. Taking 
the multiproduct monopolist case, the idea is that once the markets have been 
differentiated it is possible to introduce nonlinear pricing in such a way that fixed 
costs are recovered through one part of the tariff, while the other part could even 
recover only the marginal costs.
In spite of its strong theoretical micro-foundations Ramsey pricing suffers from 
some problems:
(1) It is informationally demanding, because the regulator needs to know demand 
and cost functions.®®
Frank Ramsey developed the concept in the context of optimal taxation in 1927. It was later 
extended to the problem of public monopolists by Boiteux (1956). Further developments were 
done by Baumol and Bradford in (1970). See (Braeutigan (1989)).
an example see Vickers & Yarrow (1988). Cuthbertson & Dobbs (1996) develops a method­
ology for a minimal information approach in examining the sensitivity of Ramsey prices to changes 
in demand and cost parameters.
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(2) Lack of applicability, not only because of the informational requirements, but 
also because it is politically difficult to implement. Price discrimination on 
the bases of demand elasticity may be inequitable to the extent that it is more 
likely to affect low income consumers, which among other things could be 
reflected in votes®®,
(3) There exists the possiblility of cross subsidization and with this the opportu­
nity of market foreclosure. That is, a multiproduct monopolist could charge 
prices below marginal costs in markets where he confronts competition, and 
compensate his losses by deviating more from marginal cost pricing in less 
elastic markets®^.
(4) As pointed out by Laffont & Tirole (1993) and Laffont (1994) the Ramsey- 
Boiteux model exogenously rules out transfers from the government to the firm. 
So that, “the role of the firm’s budget constraint has never been theoretically 
established”, (Laffont (1994) p. 509-510). Thus there is a possible miss- 
specification of the regulator’s objective function®®.
(5) Finally, the model does not deal with incentive problems, so the regulator only 
deals with allocative efficiency, but he does not play any role in promoting 
productive efficiency.
®®As in the case of indirect taxation it is possible to include income distributions considerations 
into the model to address -partially- this point (Atkinson & Stiglitz (1976)).
®^ For optimal stand alone Ramsey prices see: Braeutigan (1989).
®®In other words, the question is why the regulator should care about the firm to break even. In 
a model with transfers if the regulator cares more about consumers, marginal cost pricing could 
be approximated.
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2.4.2 Regulation under asym metric information. (The benev­
olent regulator approach.)
Regulation under asymmetric information was first analyzed by Loeb and Magat 
(1979) and by Baron and Myerson (1982) (Baron (1989); Laffont & Tirole (1993); 
Armstrong et al. (1994)) who studied in a Bayesian principal-agent framework the re­
lation between the regulator and a monopolist producing one good. In both models, 
asymmetric information comes from the fact that the monopolist is better informed 
of its productivity parameter and/or of the amount of effort that he makes for pro­
duction to take place®®. Probably, the most comprehensive developments in the 
literature could be found in Baron (1989), Laffont & Tirole (1993), Laffont (1994) 
and Armstrong et al. (1994).
This section presents the canonical model of regulation®^(Laffont & Tirole (1993)) 
because of two basic reasons: (1) It synthesizes most of the work done in the subject 
in the last twenty years®®. (2) It provides the theoretical, analytical and technical 
framework required for the next chapters of this thesis.
Given its generality and for the benefit of Chapter 4 that deals with the reg­
ulation of multi-product industries, we present Laffont and Tirole's multi-product 
framework. The motivation is the regulation of multi-product network industries 
like rail and airlines services, telecommunications services, and gas and electricity
^®Baron and Myerson improved Loeb and Magat’s model by the introduction of the regulator’s 
distributional concerns, which reflect the costs associated with the implementation of regulatory 
policies. In their model, those costs are due to the fact that is in the regulator’s interest to serve the 
consumers in his jurisdiction. Therefore as all the consumers reside in the regulator’s jurisdiction, 
but not all the owners of the firm do, the perspective of state regulatory commissions is to favour 
consumer interests over producer interests. See Baron (1989).
®^ In their book Laffont & Tirole (1993) use their model to work out problems of procurement 
and regulation. They distinguish both terms in the following way: Procurement allows suppliers 
to get revenue both from sales of products to the public and government transfers. Regulation 
requires all revenues to come from sales of products to consumers by the regulated firms. See 
Laffont (1994) for a summary of the model.
Armstrong & Sappington (2003b) offer a synthesis of modelling regulatory policy under asym­
metric information. The difference with the synthesis offered by Laffont (1994) is that they charac­
terise the different solutions obtained by the use of different specifications according to the source 
of the asymmetric information.
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transmission and distribution®®.
According to the authors there are two kinds of issues in the regulation of (multi­
product firms): pricing and incentives. Regarding pricing, the relevant questions are: 
How to price discriminate? How to price goods under competition when they are 
substitutes or complements? For incentives, the main questions are: Should pricing 
be used to promote incentives? Should the regulator account for the firm’s allocation 
of resources? Could sub-costs observation improve the regulator’s performance? We 
deal with each question in the sections below.
The canonical model of regulation
Consider a regulated firm with aggregated cost function:
C =  C(;9,e,g) (2.1)
Where (3 is the technological parameter or firm’s “type”(C^ > 0), e is the manager’s 
cost-reducing effort (Q  < 0), q = {qi....qn) is the firm’s output vector {Cq^  > 0), 
Here p and e are one dimensional, however Laffont and Tirole show that the model 
could include multi-dimensional parameters. E{P, (7, q) denotes the effort required 
for a firm of type p  to produce q at a cost C:
C =  C(/?,E(jg,C,q),q) (2.2)
where we have the partial derivatives > 0, < 0, and Eq  ^ > 0. Laffont and
Tirole impose an accounting convention: the revenue R{q) generated by the sale 
of outputs is received by the state, the cost is reimbursed to the firm. The firm’s
®®For example, rail and airlines provides freight and passenger services, telecommunications 
provide local and long distance calls and certainly a wide range of communication services, gas 
transmission provides swing, storage, firm and interruptible services, and electricity provides peak 
and off peak services.
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objective function is:
U ~ t  — -0(e) (2.3)
here t denotes the monetary transfer from the regulator to the firm and "0(e) denotes 
the dis-utility of effort. It is assumed that ^'(e) > 0, 0"(e) > 0 and -0"'(e) > 0. The 
firm’s participation constraint is Î7 > 0. V{q) is social value associated with the 
production of vector q®°.
The social welfare function for the utilitarian benevolent regulator is given by:
-  (1 +  A)(( +  C()d, e, q)] +  U (2.4)
or substituting equation (2.3):
W =  y(q) -  (1 +  A)(0(e) 4- C(/), e, q)) -  AU (2.5)
FVom equation (2.5), W  can be decomposed into: (1) the social value V  of outputs,
(2) the total cost -0 +  C of operating the firm evaluated at the shadow price (A) of
this cost, and (3) the social cost XU of leaving rent to the firm.
A number of assumptions are required. The regulator observes the firm’s cost
C and quantities q or equivalently the vector of prices. He regulates the firm’s n
outputs. The firm has private information about its parameter /? (adverse selection
parameter), which for the regulator is drawn from a cumulative distribution F(-)
on [^,P] with density /(•). The cost reducing effort e (moral hazard parameter)
also is unobservable by the regulator. The hazard rate of the distribution 
d(—)is monotonie: > 0®^ . Communication between the firm and the regulator is
^^Laffont and Titrole define different forms of the V{q), depending on the goods being marketed 
private or non-marketed public goods. “For example, if the goods are private goods, and if S{q) 
denotes the gross consumer surplus attached to their consumption, then V{q) is equal to the 
sum of net consumer surplus (iSfqr) — R(g)} and of the social value of tax savings for tax payers 
generated by the sale of the goods, (1 + X)R{q) where A is the shadow cost of public funds. So, V{q) ~ S(q) + AR(g).”(Laffont 8c Tirole (1993) p.168-169).
^^This is a standard assumption in the literature to avoid bunching. Most probability functions
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costless. The regulator has the ability to commit to a regulatory mechanism. 
Sym m etric inform ation.
As a benchmark consider the case of symmetric information, that is, when the 
regulator knows the firm’s type and effort, so he is willing to set optimal level of 
effort without giving up rents to the firm. The regulator maximises equation (2.8), 
subject to U(P) = 0, and the solution is given by equations:
'ip'{e) =  —Ce (2.6)
V,, =  (1 +  A)C„ (2.7)
with U(g) =  0 and U(P) =  0, The marginal disutility of effort equals the marginal 
cost savings (equation (2.6)); the marginal effect of output on surplus equals the
marginal social cost of production (equation (2.7)) and no rents are given up to the
firms.
A sym m etric inform ation.
The regulator maximizes®® the expectation over P of the social welfare function given 
by equation (2.8), subject to the individual rationality (IR) and incentive compat­
ibility (IC) constraints given by equations (2.9) and (2.10) respectively. Expected 
welfare is given by:
P0
=  /  [y(q) -  (1 +  A)(\6(6) 4- C(/), e, q) -  AU]/(;d)d)g (2.8)J0
^
The incentive compatibility constraints are built using the revelation principle, (My­
erson (1979); Ihidenberg & Tirole (1993)), which says that: any regulatory mecha-
fulfill it uniform, normal, chi-square, and others. An example of the derivation of the hazard rate 
for the exponential distribution is in (Simon & Blume (1994)).
®®The maximization goes over {q{P),e{P),U{P)) or {g(/l), e(/3), i(/?)} given equation (2.3).
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nism is equivalent to a direct revelation mechanism, that induces truthful revelation 
of the firm’s costs parameter. Therefore, using this principle no firm has incentives 
to mimic the reports of a different type of firm.
Laffont & Tirole (1993) show that only the rationality constraint for the ineffi­
cient type, and the incentive compatibility constraint for the efficient type are the 
binding constraints®®. Therefore, the binding constraints are®^ :
U(g) > 0 (2.9)
Û(/)) =  (e)E^(,9, C(;d, 6, q), q) (2.10)
Equation (2.10) is the first order condition characterising the firm’s report of p\ it 
gives the rate at which the firm’s rent must grow to reveal its information.
Taking e(/3) and q{P) as control variables and U(P) as the state variable, the 
first order conditions of the regulator’s programme are given by®®:
<0'(e) =  -C e -  —  ^ [0" (e)Ep 4- 0>'(e)E^c7(7e], (2.11)
Vqk =  (1 +  X)Cqk 4- A y ^ 0 '( e ) — ( E / j )  (2.12)
Equations (2.11) and (2.12) are nothing but equations (2.6) and (2.7) affected by a 
correction factor, due to the presence of asymmetric information. According to Laf­
font & Tirole (1993) an implication of equation (2.11) is that the regulator could use 
linear contracts®®in which firms self select. Those contracts are located in between
^^Both constraints imply the incentive compatibility constraint for the inefficient type. Notice 
that U{P) = 0 implies U{P) > 0  
^^There is a thii'd constraint given by è{0) < 1 which comes from the rewriting of the second order 
condition C{P) > 0. This constraint is checked after carrying out the optimisation programme. 
See Laffont & Tirole (1993) (p.p. 64-66).
®®There are two ways of solving this problem, one is integrating the incentive compatibility 
constraint and the other is using optimal control techniques.
^®Laffont & Tirole (1993) and Laffont (1994) show that the transfer function t{p) is invertible 
-so that it can be expressed as T{C)~ and convex, reason why the regulator can achieve optimal
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cost-plus contracts that produce 0'(e) =  0 and fixed-prlce contracts that induce 
0'(e) =  ~Ce> However, equation (2.10) shows that optimal regulation entails giving 
up rents to the most efficient firm. Those rents are given up to prevent the most effi­
cient firm to mimic the less efficient one, by producing the same quantity of output, 
but executing a lower level of effort. Since rents are socially costly the regulator 
faces a trade off between rent extraction and giving up costly rents. That trade 
off is reflected in equation (2.11), since effort is distorted relative to the first best 
outcome®^. Equation (2.12) is the modified Ramsey equation that differs from the 
first best outcome (equation (2.7)) in that under asymmetric information there may 
exist an incentive correction due to rent extraction®®. Finally, rents are increasing 
in quantities, therefore increases in demand and /or increases in shares of demand, 
increase the rents given up to the most efficient firm®®.
Some applications.
Laffont & Tirole (1993) use the canonical model of regulation for the study of several 
situations such as: second degree price discrimination, third degree price discrimina­
tion, peak load pricing, verifiable quality (Laffont & Tirole (1990a)) and regulation 
of product market competition (Laffont & Tirole (1990b)) among others. It has
regulation by offering a set of linear contracts tangent to T{C) and letting the firm select itself.
®^ The term [%{)"{e)Ep 4- ij)'{e)EpcL!e\ in equation (2.11) is the size of the distortion. It is the 
derivative of |Û(/î)| with respect to e. The conditions for it to be positive are in Laffont & Tirole 
(1993). However, notice that > 0, > 0, 0'(e) > 0, E^c < 0 and Ce < 0. Therefore the
term shows: 1) That the increase in rents for all types [ ,^/3], when the effort of type is increased 
by one has a social cost A and occurs with probability F{f3). 2) That the distortion of the level of 
effort from the first best has a social cost given by (1 + A) and occurs with probability /(/?).
®^If the incentive correction is equal to zero, the incentive price dichotomy holds, and pricing is 
determined as a function of marginal costs independently of informational control problems. For 
the derivation of the price dichotomy see: Laffont & Tirole (1993) and Laffont (1994). Basically 
what is needed is the cost function to be separable in type, effort and quantities as: C{0 , e, F(g)) 
where F((g)) is a function of q alone .
^^Laffont &c Tirole (1993) present a formal proof however a sketch is as follows: Notice that rents
are given by U{0 =  Jp ip'{e)E0 {-)dp and that from equation (2.11), -0'(e) > 0 since Cg < 0 and
assuming that the second term in the equation is less than Cg. We also have that > 0 hence,
assuming that the functions are invertible, ip'{e) could be expressed as a function of q which is 
increasing in e.
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also been used to study optimal industry structure in regulated industries by Dana 
(1993), who studies the case of differentiated products and Auriol & Laffont (1992), 
who studies the case of perfect substitutes and network duplication. Riordan (1984) 
uses the canonical model to study price delegation to a regulated firm, when asym­
metric information comes from the demand side^ ®. lossa (1999) extends Dana’s and 
Riordan’s models to study the regulation of substitute and complement products. 
Armstrong & Vickers (2000) study delegation of pricing to a multiproduct monopo­
list for the cases of asymmetric information about costs and demand, when transfers 
are and are not allowed. In the context of network competition Laffont & Tirole
(2000) model inter-connection provision as an imperfect substitute of the products 
produced by the incumbent network.
In each case, the main finding is that asymmetric information forces the regulator 
to give up (information) rent to the most efficient firms. He can reduce this costly 
outcome by trading off with inefficiencies, such as accepting higher costs.
2.5 O ptim al R egulation  under P olitical Econom y  
C onstraints
2.5.1 Background
A comprehensive survey of the political economy of regulation can be found in 
Peltzman (1989) who makes a review of the principal works in the subject by the 
Chicago school and looks for an explanation of the deregulation wave during the 
seventies and early eighties in the USA; Noll (1989a,b) who provides a synthesis 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the capture theory and other political economy
^®The models mentioned before study asymmetric information about marginal costs of 
production.
Stigler (1971), Posner (1971), Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983).
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theories of regulation; Laffont & Tirole (1993) and Laffont (2000) who study different 
ways of modelling political constraints in regulation, adding explicitly asymmetric 
information in a principal-agent game theoretic framework.
According to Laffont (2000), up to the seventies the theory of economic regulation 
was divided between two main theories: the public interest theory (PIT) and the 
capture theory of regulation^® (CTR). In its pure form, PIT was built by two main 
components (1) the reasons for regulation (basically market failure) and (2) in the 
face of these reasons, the relative merits of government intervention (Noll (1989b)).
PIT assumes that regulation will be the chosen response to market failure when­
ever welfare dominates available alternatives, such as taxes, auctions or creating 
the missing markets^®. In such a pure form, PIT works in an environment with no 
transaction costs and no asymmetric information. Noll (1989b) points out that, re­
laxing these assumptions permits a more general public interest theory of regulation. 
Transaction costs make compatible the existence of interest groups and asymmetric 
information creates a role for “political entrepreneurs”^^ . In the presence of trans­
action costs and asymmetric information, the cost of government intervention has 
to be compared to the welfare loss due to the market failure^®.
According to Noll (1989b) PIT leads to a number of predictions about regulation.
the line of the capture theory it is recognized the existence of two schools: (1) The Chicago 
School and the (2) Virginia School. This section follows the analysis and criticisms of the Chicago 
School. However, from the literature it seems that the main difference between both schools is the 
more emphasis put by the Virginia School on poorly informed voters and the effect that this has 
in the selection of inefficient methods of distribution (Laffont (2000)).
These mechanisms were previously discussed in section (2.2).
^^Those politicians that are aware of the political leverage that rents can create (Laffont (2000)).
“^^Notice that the model of asymmetric information presented in subsection (2.4.2) fits into the 
public interest theory, in the sense that regulation is required to deal with natural monopoly 
problems and the regulator is a benevolent welfare maximizer. Then the comparison has to be 
done between the welfare loss of monopoly pricing, and the rent given up to the most efficient firm 
under regulation. If the welfare loss due to monopoly pricing is bigger than the socially costly 
rent, then regulation is the efficient outcome. However, notice that asymmetric information has 
a different role to play in the formulation presented in the text. Here asymmetric information 
refers to the fact that information is disperse, and political entrepreneurs could pay the cost of 
gathering it. In the model of subsection (2.4.2) asymmetric information enters in a well specified 
principal-agent framework.
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as well as two basic criticisms. Among the predictions he points out that, for 
this theory, the likelihood of government intervention -regulation- increases as time 
passes if the social costs of the market failure increase over time. This is due to the 
fact that transaction costs are independent of the scope of the market failure. He 
also observes that, according to PIT, transaction costs and imperfect information 
limit the extent to which regulation can depart from efficiency. That is to say, if 
the welfare loss due to an inefficient regulation is too big, related to the transaction 
costs of organizing a group to bid for its solution, the group will be organized and 
the efficient solution reached^®. Finally, for PIT, when regulation is adopted, it is 
the most effective means for dealing with market failure.
Regarding the main criticisms of PIT Noll (1989b) comments that it fails to 
provide a convincing explanation of why the state is involved at all. The principal 
hypothesis is that government intervention is less costly than private action. The 
theory also assumes a dichotomy between efficiency and redistribution. The problem 
is that the government may not have available policy instruments that can achieve 
distributional objectives, without causing inefficiencies.
The Chicago CTR challenged PIT, first by pointing out that interest groups 
could try to capture government decision making, because it affects industry and 
consumer welfare, and second, by studying the conditions under which departures 
from the efficient outcome are a more likely and persistent result of regulation. In 
doing that CTR looks for differences in interest groups’ power^^.
The idea is that not all organizations face the same transaction costs for political 
action. These costs depend on the size, homogeneity and set up costs of forming 
interest groups, as well as the ability to solve free rider problems. The consequences 
are that large heterogenous groups with small per-capita stakes in rents are at a dis-
Otherwise, deregulation occurs when the costs of regulation exceed the transaction costs of 
repealing it, plus the costs of the remaining market failure.
"^ T^he role of interest groups in democratic systems is that they can have influence in voting and 
they can also reduce the costs of gathering information (Noll (1989b)).
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advantage when compared to small homogenous groups with high per-capita stakes 
in rents, further groups previously organized for another purposes are at an advan­
tage compared to groups that need to be formed^® (Noll (1989b); Peltzman (1989); 
Laffont (2000)).
According to Noll (1989b) and Peltzman (1989) a number of predictions follow 
from CTR, some of the most important are summarised as follows: First, according 
to CTR, compact well organized groups will tend to benefit more from regulation 
than broad diffuse groups. According to this, regulatory policy will seek to preserve 
a politically optimal distribution of rents across the coalitions and deregulation of 
certain industries will come because the dissipation of rents in those industries makes 
interest groups to dissipate as well. Second, since firms and employees are likely to 
participate in regulation, looking to generate monopoly rents to distribute among 
them, then a relaxation of regulation ought to cause some combination of lower 
wages and harder financial times for the regulated industries. Third, for CTR, all 
forms of regulation are likely to retard entry by new firms^®. And forth, regulation 
will depart from efficiency only when it is necessary to create and divide rents among 
represented interests. That is, interest groups favor efficient pricing as long as it can 
be implemented in ways favorable to them.
The authors recognise that there are limitations for departures from efficiency 
since political entrepreneurs can pay the organization costs of an un-represented 
group. As well, technological change and rising incomes can cause previously un­
represented interests eventually to have sufficient stakes to be organized. In both 
cases, with more groups represented it is possible to approximate to the optimal 
outcome. Effectively, there is competition among the groups (Noll (1989b)).
^®Noll (1989b) -p. 1265- in his revision of the capture theory concludes that: “...the trigger 
threshold of costs that can be imposed on any group differs systematically according to how 
effectively it is organized. Unions, trade associations, religious organizations and large business 
are likely to be systematically favored.”.
®^For example, rules to entry, quality standards and the like.
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The capture theory has been challenged both empirically and theoretically. From 
an empirical point of view, the capture theory of regulation has been tested through 
applied research. Peltzman (1976) studied the wave of deregulations occurred during 
the seventies and early eighties in USA. The industries analysed were: railroads, 
trucking, airlines, long-distance telecommunications, stock brokerage, bank deposits, 
and oil. The idea was to test the above prediction of CTR that deregulation will 
occur if there is dissipation of rents, such that it is not profitable to continue with 
regulation. He concludes that, although the answers were mixed, the main industries 
analyzed followed the pattern implied by the capture theory.
In the reviewing of empirical tests Noll (1989b) looks for industry cases where 
firms tried to influence regulation of prices, costs, income redistribution and entry, as 
well as cases where regulation was used as a way to achieve political objectives (i.e. 
environmental regulation). He concludes that the studies are consistent with, but do 
not prove the capture theory. For him the major weakness of those studies are that 
they cannot unambiguously link groups action with regulatory results. Further, if 
groups with much to gain are present, this does not imply causality, when examining 
policy decisions one needs to see the underlying decision making process.
From a theoretical point of view the capture theory of regulation has been ana­
lyzed by Noll (1989a) as well, he concludes that the weakness of the Chicago theory 
is that it does not take adequately into account the lessons from other theories of 
regulation. Basically, he argues that the Chicago theory does not recognize that 
institutional arrangements matter, and does not emphasize the role of informational 
imperfections and incomplete political markets®®.
his comments on Peltzman (1989), Noll (1989a) analyzes the Chicago school of regulation 
in the light of other theories of regulation. He names the two most important for him Arrow I and 
Arrow-Downs. Under Arrow I institutional arrangements matter for the kind of regulation under­
taken, that is, previous governments set institutional locks in order to protect their constituencies 
from regulatory changes. Under Arrow-Downs the concept to apply is market incompleteness in 
the political sector and the way in which changes in information change the choice of political 
strategies and outcomes.
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Laffont (2000) argues that the Chicago school did not open the black box, that 
covers the underlying relations in complex political systems. One further step in the 
opening of that black box, is modeling regulation in a principal agent framework 
under asymmetric information. In that way rents accrue as a result of asymmetric 
information, those rents are essential to explain the stake of interest groups and 
politicians in regulation. By the introduction of asymmetric information it is pos­
sible to build a mapping from policy instruments to rents. That is, by carefully 
incorporating asymmetric information, it is possible to use the progress reached in 
contract theory and game theory to model, not only the demand side of regula­
tion, but also the supply side, the stake that politicians have in regulation and in 
regulatory instruments. In the following subsections this last approach is presented.
2.5.2 New  Economics of Regulation and Political Economy 
Ways of modeling political economy constraints
Accepting Laffont’s criticism of capture theory (Laffont (2000)), the next step in the 
literature of political economy is to use the tools coming from game and contract 
theory to model relations among organizations and institutions®^. Two points are 
important: (1) asymmetric information produces socially costly rents, as we have 
seen in section (2.4.2) and (2) the existence of those rents produces a stake not 
only for the regulated firm, but also for the regulatory agency or politician. In such 
a situation, the assumption of non-cooperative behaviour amongst the interested 
parties becomes difficult to sustain. According to Laffont (2000), what seems more 
appropriate is to analyze the case when communication and side contracting among 
the interested parties is possible.
Laffont (2000) distinguishes three approaches in modelling the political economy 
literature: (1) the complete constitution approach, (2) the incomplete constitution
®^ This section benefits from the material presented in section (2.4.2).
Literature review 43
approach and (3) endogenous coalition formation. He summarises these approaches 
as follows:
(1) The complete constitution approach: This is based on models of hierarchies; 
the basic model is a three-tier hierarchy one (Congress/regulator/firm). Congress 
needs the regulator, maybe because it is less costly for it to gather information, 
or because his specialization permits him a more efficient control of the regula- 
tee. The scope for strategic behaviour comes from the fact that the regulator 
could keep information that helps Congress to reduce costly rents given up to 
the firm, and after a bargaining process between the regulator and the firm, 
the regulator could keep part of those rents. However, under this approach it 
is always possible to apply the revelation principle and solve the optimisation 
programme to obtain the optimal contract. The optimisation process must 
incorporate the proper incentive compatibility and rationality constraints; in 
such a case an optimal collusion proof contract is signed (Laffont & Tirole 
(1993); Laffont (2000)).
This type of modelling has been extensively used in the literature. It mainly 
borrows from Tirole’s (1986) model of collusion in organizations. The basic 
problem with it is that it presumes a benevolent Congress and Court, contracts 
that are self-enforceable even if they are illegal,®  ^ as well as non-bounded 
rationality (Laffont (2000)).
(2) The incomplete constitution approach: This is based on positive models of 
political behaviour, this is basically the Chicago CTR approach. It is built 
on the assumption of the non-contractabillity of some events. The main mo­
tivations for this line of thought are non-benevolent politicians and bounded
Laffont & Tirole (1993) and Laffont (2000) comment that self-enforceability of contracts could 
be seen as a short cut for dynamic models, because, in spite of the illegality of some of the contracts, 
they assume an implicit discount factor in the loss of reputation by breaking them down (i.e. loss 
of future employment and/or opportunities or political promotions). However, to understand the 
real insights of the collusive relation one needs to carefully develop those dynamic models.
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rationality. This approach studies different institutions (i.e. voting rules) and 
the different political economy equilibria that arise from them. The politician 
is not controlled by a contract, but by the voting system. Then the politician 
has available some instruments to operate, and non-contractible events affect 
the final outcome. Under this approach Grossman &: Helpman (1996) open 
the black box of the mapping from group formation to political outcomes by 
modelling the game of bribes between interest groups. On the other hand, 
Pearson et al, (1997) focus on the feedback control of different electoral modes 
for given sets of decisions. Laffont (2000) incorporates asymmetric informa­
tion within this approach. By doing this he argues it is possible to create a 
mapping from policy instruments to rents, which defines the stakes of agents 
in policy choices. The outcome is a combination of the information based 
complete constitution approach with incomplete contracting. In this way it is 
possible to address Noll’s (1989a) criticism that the Chicago school does not 
consider institutional arrangements.
3 Endogenous coalition formation: This way of modelling looks for more complex 
relations amongst agents. It takes into consideration that beyond individual 
stakes for policy choices that can be translated into votes, groups form to 
influence politicians using a wider range of instruments. Under this approach 
asymmetric information can be brought into the analysis of group behaviour. 
The optimal constitution has to include individual and coalitional constraints.
In preparation for later chapters the following section presents the general com­
ponents of Laffont’s (2000) model of capture under the complete constitution ap­
proach.
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Laffont and T iro le’s m odel of regu la tion  under po litical constrain ts
As mentioned before the model borrows from Tirole’s (1986) model of collusion in 
organizations. It is extensively used in Laffont k  Tirole (1993) and Laffont (2000). 
This section borrows from the version presented in (Laffont k  Tirole (1993)).
There is a three-tier hierarchy: Firm/Regulator/Congress^^. The idea is that 
the regulator is useful because it reduces the costs of gathering information and/or 
he can develop specialized skills that permit him to reduce the transaction costs of 
regulation®' .^
T he firm: The firm produces a marketable output g at a cost:
C — {(3 — e)q (2.13)
As in the model of section (2.4.2), (3 represents the firm’s type and e the level of
effort. However, as a simplification, here P can take one of two values: p  with
probability v and p  with probability (1 — u). As before the firm’s utility is given by:
U = t -  '0(e) > 0 (2.14)
where t denotes the net transfer from the government to the firm.
T he regulator: The regulator receives income s from the Congress, so his utility 
is given by:
V{s) = s - s * > 0  (2.15)
where s* is the reservation income, so in any case Congress has to pay at least s*. 
The regulator is assumed indispensable.
®^ A11 parties are risk neutral
the real world what we see is a complex arrangement conformed, in general, by executive, 
legislative and judiciary powers, as well a group of agencies regulating industries at different levels.
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The regulator obtains information from a signal (cr) about /?. With probability 
(  the regulator learns the true p, so {a ~  P), with probability (1 — Ç) the regulator 
learns nothing, so (or =  0). Therefore, there are four states of nature shown in table 
2.1 below.
Table 2,1; States of nature(^)
Probability Type and observation
Cv
( 1 - O t » (/3 ,0- =  0)
( 1 - 0 ( 1 - 1 , ) (/3, cr =  0)
C(1 -  v ) (/3, cr =  p )
® Source Laffont (2000) .
The signal is hard evidence in the sense that the regulator is able to reveal the true 
technology to the Congress, that is, he cannot say that the technology is P when it 
is in fact P and vice versa. C is considered exogenous; it can be thought as being 
determined by the regulator’s budget for investigation.
The regulator reports r € {(7,0} to Congress. Therefore, the dimensions of 
discretion for the regulator are that if he has learned nothing then a  =  0 and the 
report is always r  =  0, but if the signal is cr =  /? he can either tell the truth r — p  
or lie and report r  =  0. What the model explores are the conditions under which it 
is optimal for the regulator to hide the received information, and the way in which 
the Congress optimally reacts to such behaviour.
Congress: Congress is a social welfare maximiser, so it maximizes the sum of
producer, regulator, and consumer surplus, given by the welfare function:
l y  =  [/ -f. y  =  [,9(g) _  P(g)g _  (1 +  A)(s + 1 +  (,9 _  e)g -  f  (g)g)] (2.16)
where P[q) represent prices. Substituting the firm and the regulator utilities;
l y  =  [5"(g) +  A f (g)g] -  (1 +  A)(s" +  (/) -  e)g +  V'(e)) -  AU -  AF (2.17)
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Two things are important at this point: (a) notice the link of equation (2.16) 
with equation (2.8) in section (2.4.2), they are basically the same equations, but 
for the incentive payment that Congress has to give up to the regulator, (b) As in 
equation (2.8) A is the social cost of public funds. Therefore, here as well Congress 
dislikes giving up socially costly rents to the regulator and the firm.
The following assumptions are used: Congress cannot observe the firm’s type /?, 
the information received by the regulator a and the level of effort e. However, it 
can observe the firm’s total costs C, the quantities produced g, the demand function 
P =  F(g) and the regulator report r. Congress designs incentive schemes s(C, g, r) 
and t{C, g, r) for the regulator and the firm in order to maximise expected social 
welfare. Expectations are taken over the four states of nature presented in table 
(2 .1).
The timing of the events is as follows. At “time zero” all parties learn their 
information simultaneously. Congress learns that /? belongs to {g,/3}. The firm 
learns its /?. The regulator learns a. All parties learn the probability distributions 
which are common knowledge. Congress designs incentive schemes for the regulator 
and the firm. The regulator can sign side contracts with the firms. At “time one” 
The regulator makes its report and the firm chooses its effort and price. Finally at 
“time two” transfers are implemented as specified by contracts (Laffont & Tirole 
(1993) p. 481).
In the basic model Laffont and Tirole compare the welfare effects between collu­
sion free regulation and regulation with collusion. We give a brief summary of the 
findings follows.
I. Collusion free regulation: This case corresponds to the benevolent reg­
ulator assumption. Congress offers s =  s*, and the regulator always report 
r  — cr, because being benevolent he has no incentive to mis-report the signal. 
At social cost (1 + X)s* Congress has the same information structure as the
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regulator.
There are two cases here:
(i) With probability (  Congress faces full information (o* =  p) and maximises 
social welfare®® given by :
max {î^[5(g) +  XP{q)q -  ~ -  -
(1 +  A)(s +  (^ — e)q +  0(e)) — A#(e)]
+  (1 — I)) [5(g) +  AP(g)g —
(1 +  A)(s 4- (j9 -  e)g +  0(e))]} (2.18)
Congress knows the firm’s technology parameter, so:
U(j9) =  UX/)) =  0V)9 (2.19)
Under full information Congress is able to settle the optimal levels of
e*{P), q*{p) and p*(P) for each type of firm. That is to say, for all p,
{e*{p),p*{P)} it solves:
0'(e) =  g (2.20)
and
p ~ { P ~ e )  A 1 (2.21)p 1 +  A T]{p)
Therefore, as in section (2.4.2), under full information, the marginal cost 
and the marginal benefit of effort are equal and prices are given by a 
Ramsey formula.
(ii) With probability (1 — C) Congress faces asymmetric information ((7 =  0).
®®Let (e,g,t) and (e,g,t) denote the efforts, outputs and transfers for types P and P under the 
optimal incentive scheme.
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It maximises:
max {t?[5(g) +  XP(q)q -  {g,em - -
(1 +  A)(5 * +  (^ ~  e)q +  0(e)) — A$(e)] +
(1 - 1.)[5(5) +  XP{g)q -  (1 +  A)(s* + ( f i -  e)q + V (^e))]} (2.22)
As discussed in section (2.4.2) asymmetric information requires us to add 
an incentive constraint to the full optimization programme, in order to 
prevent the efficient type from mimicking the inefficient type:
t -  0(e) > Ï  -  0 (ê -  Ap)  (2.23)
The inefficient type obtains no rent (t ~  0(e)). However, the efficient 
type’s rent®® is given by U =  $(e).
As it can be seen, the optimisation programm of equations (2.18) and (2.22) is a 
reexpression of the optimisation programm presented in sections (2.4.2) for the 
two type case. The difference comes from the way in which the probabilities of 
an efficient type v and an inefficient type (1 — u) enter in the welfare function. 
As in sections (2.4.2) and (2.4.2), the solution to this programm®^ produces 
no distortion for the efficient type’s quantity and effort so, q = q* and e = e*. 
However, the level of effort of the less efficient type is conditionally distorted 
on the information provided by the regulator.
II. Producer protect ion
Laffont & Tirole (1993) compare the above situation, with the case when the
®®Notice that the rent of the efficient type comes from U. — t — 0(e) = t — 0(e — A/3) =  
0(e) — 0(e — A/0). See Laffont k  Tirole (1993).
®^ The detailed solution is provided by the authors (Laffont & Tirole (1993)) in the appendix of 
Chapter 11.
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regulator and the firm are able to communicate with each other and can settle 
side contracts. First it is important to examine the scope of side contracting. 
For the case of an inefficient firm side contracting has no meaning, because in 
any case it receives zero rent U(/? =  0). However, for the case of the efficient 
firm there is a scope for side contracting because having a signal (a = Q  
the regulator can say that he has received no information and report r  =  0. 
By doing this the firm could keep its rent $(e), otherwise the rent is equal 
to zero. Therefore, there are strong incentives for the firm and the regulator 
to collude. The way in which rents are distributed between the firm and the 
regulator depends on the bargaining power of each of them. For the purposes 
of this model the bargaining power is allocated to the regulator.
The model considers monetary bribes from the firm to the regulator in the form 
of a transfer s, however side contracting could be interpreted in a more general 
way like favours, future employment, personal relationships, or avoiding being 
exposed by the firm, etc. The cost of these transfers is denoted by (1 -)- A/)s, 
where A/ is the shadow cost for the firms of giving up transfers to the regulator.
In solving the problem Laffont & Tirole (1993) show that: a) Congress can 
restrict attention to collusion proof schemes due that, as in section (2.4.2), 
the individual rationality and the incentive compatibility constraints for the 
firm(s) are binding; and the true telling constraint for the regulator binds as 
well, b) The regulator income depends only on his report, due to point (a) 
if the regulator does not report the truth he loses income, c) And finally, 
under the collusion proof mechanism, the cost to the firm of compensating the 
regulator by the income lost by not reporting must exceed its stake®®:
(1 +  \ f) {s,  -  s') > $(e) (2.24)
denote the regulator income when r = P,r — p,r = $. Whereas s* denotes the 
regulator income under collusion free regulation.
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As mentioned above, this constraint is binding at the optimum, since income 
given to the regulator is socially costly:
With this constraint Congress solves:
BW =  max I fW "  +  (1 -  ( )W '(e )  -  )  (2.26)e t  { l  +  Àf ) J
The results are:
(1) Collusion reduces social welfare, > 0 .
(2) The less efficient firm is given a low powered incentive scheme, e < ë, 
where e is the effort level under a non-benevolent regulator.
(3) Output is still Ramsey optimal, but lowered from q(e) to g(e), in accor­
dance with point 2.
(4) The regulator is given an incentive scheme, Si > =  Sq.
(5) The efficient type enjoys a lower rent than in the absence of collusion,
$(e) < #(ë). From point 2.
(6) e, 0(e) and g(e) increase with A/.
To reduce collusion Congress creates incentive payments to the regulator, but since 
these payments are socially costly as well, it reduces the stake of collusion by re­
ducing the effort supplied by the less efficient firm. That hurts the more efficient 
firm because it receives a lower rent. Another option for Congress is to increase the 
shadow costs of the transfer for the firm, notice that for A/ oo Congress is back 
to the benevolent regulator case.
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2.6 R ecent developm ents in incentives and polit­
ical econom y o f regulation
2.6.1 Theoretical models
According to Laffont (2000) a large volume of the literature of political intervention 
has buit up based on the model presented in the previous section. The examples 
reported by the author are: Laffont & Tirole (1993) where situations such as multiple 
interest groups, cross subsidization, cartelization by regulation, auction design and 
favoritism and regulatory institutions are addressed. Kofman & Lawarrée (1993, 
1996) where it is shown that it may be desirable for the stock holders in the firm 
to use an external supervisor, who is less informed than an internal one if the 
external supervisor is less easily captured by the manager. Also Strausz (1997) 
extends Tirole’s (1986) model by introducing an imperfect technology that allows 
the principal to detect collusion between the supervisor and the agent.
The most recent models of political interference in regulation and/or regulatory 
design present departures from the complete contract approach, and look to imple­
ment some dynamics and determine the endogenous transaction costs of capture for 
group formation. The range of topics analyzed is very wide as well, some exam­
ples are; Laffont & Martimort (1998), collusion and delegation; Boyer & Laffont 
(1999), politics of environmental policy; Martimort (1999), the life cycle of regula­
tory agencies; Laffont & Martimort (1999), separation of regulators; Laffont (2000), 
separation of powers and political systems of checks and balances; Faure-Grimaud 
& Martimort (2000) political stabilisation by an independent regulator; Aubert & 
Laffont (2002) political renegotiation of regulatory contracts and Faure-Grimaud & 
Martimort (2003), regulatory inertia.
Most of these papers deal with the design of an optimal regulatory framework 
under situations like capture and renegotiation, and the impact of independent reg­
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ulators over regulatory commitment. The theoretical models developed in the next 
two chapters of this thesis form part of this literature. However, they contribute to 
it by incorporating a new area of analysis which is industry design under political 
economy constraints. By the introduction of pressure groups, dynamics and endoge­
nous transaction costs of capture Martimort (1999), Aubert & Laffont (2002), and 
Faure-Grimaud & Martimort (2003) provide interesting extensions to the models we 
develop in the next two chapters of this thesis.
2.6.2 Empirical research
The wave of privatisation and deregulation that occurred around the world in the 
last 20 years not only produced a large amount of theoretical work, as the described 
previously, but also an important amount of empirical work. That empirical work 
-initially- was focused on studying the impact of the privatisation and deregulation 
policies on industry performance, but in a later stage it has focused with more 
emphasis on the analysis of the relationship between institutions, regulatory design 
and economic performance.
The reason why the literature has placed more emphasis in the study of the role 
played by institutions and regulatory design over performance, could be explained 
as follows. In the light of the world wide experience of the restructuring of the 
network industries, the literature (Newbery (2000); Joskow (2000b)) agrees that 
the standard reform model has been the one in which, after privatisation®®, the 
potentially competitive parts are vertically separated from the network (or naturaly 
monopolistic) parts, with an independent regulatory agency setting transmission 
and distribution tariffs as well as the required mechanisms for a competitive playing 
field. From the regulatory framework’s side, the design of regulatory institutions
the USA privatisation has not been an issue, since the majority of the firms operating in 
these industries traditionally have been privately owned. Thus, in general, the reform has taken 
the form of industry, market and regulatory design.
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has been at stake as well, theorists and practitioners have looked for regulatory 
institutions and organisations capable of avoiding problems of commitment, capture 
and the like (Estache & Martimort (2000)), Faure-Grimaud & Martimort (2000), 
Aubert & Laffont (2002).
However, in practise, in the regulatory reform of their network industries®® coun­
tries adopted a mixed approach that produced some mixed results as well (Levy & 
Spiller (1997); OECD (2001)). Some countries in the developed world have adopted 
a partial®^ liberalization approach (electricity in Scandinavia), with good results, 
some other countries have adopted full liberalization with mixed results when com­
pared internationally (USA with the electricity crisis in California, UK with a good 
performance in electricity an gas, however with problems of monopolistic behaviour 
in the electricity pool in England). In the developing world the picture has not been 
so different, for instance, in most of the cases Latin-American countries have followed 
the British model of privatisation and regulatory reform with mixed results® .^
Hence, the empirical evidence has brought two interesting questions;
1. Why have some countries decided not to go to full liberalisation of their net­
work industries?
2. Why has the performance of the network industries after reform been so dif­
ferent among countries?
To answer these questions recent empirical studies of regulation use the tools pro­
vided by the “new institutional and transaction costs economics literature”, which
®®Gas, electricity, postal services, telecommunications, rail, etc.
Newbery (2000) distinguishes partial liberalisations in the electricity sector as deviations from 
the standard model. For instance, liberalisations that do not include the private ownership of 
the industries or some parts of the industries and/or those that keep integration of the potential 
competitive parts. For him in some cases partial liberalisation could be acceptable when the 
politico-economic conditions of a given country impose strong constraints to the implementation 
of a full liberalisation programme.
®^Newbery (2000) studies this issue for the electricity industry; Levy & Spiller (1997) do it for 
the telecommunications industry.
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emphasises the impact of the institutional and political environment over the indus­
try structure, regulatory reform and performance®® Williamson (1994) and Joskow 
(2000b). In this literature institutions and processes matter as constraints over the 
possible organisation of the industry and its regulation. Once the structure of the 
industry and its regulation has been settled, institutions and processes matter for 
its performance as well (Williamson (1994)).
Some examples of these arguments can bee seen in Robinson (1998) and New­
bery (1999), argue that political times dictated the way in which the privatisation 
programme in the UK took place; Thacker (2000) draws a similar conclusion for 
the privatisation and regulatory reform in Mexico. Levy & Spiller (1997), through 
the analysis of the telecommunications industry in selected countries, developed a 
methodology to study the relationship among institutions, regulatory framework 
and performance. They find that the alignment between institutions and regulation 
has a positive impact over performance. Bergara et al. (1997) study the impact of 
political institutions over investment in electric utilities in a cross nations analysis, 
finds that the level of investment is affected by these political institutions. Newbery 
(2000) studies the transaction costs of electricity reform worldwide, makes the case 
for partial liberalisation when the political and institutional conditions put at risk 
the overall liberalisation programme. Joskow (2000b) makes a case for transaction 
costs economics as an important tool to analyse issues in competition policy and in 
the reform of the network industries, points out that a careful identification of the 
possible incentives that could arise after reform is necessary to reduce the risk of 
failure of the reform policies. And Estache & Martimort (2000) study the relation­
ship of politics, transactions costs and the design of regulatory institutions, derives 
similar results. More recently, Henisz (2002) studies the link between infrastructure 
investment and political institutions in a cross sectional analysis of 100 countries, and
®^ New Institutional Economics (NIE) and IVansaction Costs Economics (TCE), hereafter. For 
a further discussion see appendix A.3
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finds that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an im­
portant determinant of investment in infrastructure. Henisz & Benet (2003) study 
the role of interest groups and institutional structures over electricity investment 
over a sample of 78 countries, finding that political actors may direct state-owned 
firms to undertake white elephant investment projects. Wallsten (2001) performs an 
econometric analysis of telecom competition, privatization and regulation in Africa 
and Latin America in sample of 30 countries, he finds that privatisation combined 
with an independent regulator is positively correlated with telecoms performance 
measures. And Guasch et al. (2002) study the problem of renegotiation contracts 
in Latin America. They develop a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs 
due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. From it they develop a 
probit model to check for the probability of renegotiations. They find that a bet­
ter institutional framework is correlated with a lower probability of renegotiations, 
however, political cycles have a positive effect in the probability of renegotiations of 
contracts.
The final chapter of this thesis forms part of this literature, it adopts a transac­
tion costs approach to analyse the partial liberalisation of the natural gas industry 
in Mexico and attempts to study the problem of industry and regulatory design of 
the Mexican natural gas industry, putting it in the context of the wider economic 
reform pursued by the Mexican government during the eighties and nineties.
2.7 Conclusions
Following the objectives presented in the introduction, this literature review has 
broadly discussed the main developments of economic regulation during the last 
30 years. It has also presented the canonical model of regulation, along with the 
transformations required to analyse it, when regulation is affected by political econ­
omy constraints in the form of capture. Finally, in sections (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5)
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it has presented the motivation and the background required to study the problem 
of industry structure and regulation under political economy constraints. This con­
clusions will try to summarise the main findings in each section of the literature 
review.
Section (2.2) looks for the answer to the question about the reasons for economic 
regulation. It was found that from the economic point of view the reasons for regu­
lation are the problems caused by market failure and/or network externalities. The 
section concludes that in the presence of these problems regulation is not always 
required, if it is possible to build the missing markets, and/or if it is enough threat 
from potential competition. It notes that besides market failure and network exter­
nalities there is another set of reasons for regulation to take place, such as income 
redistribution and rent seeking; these reasons, however, are more related to political 
interests, rather than economic efficiency.
Section (2.3) explores the relationship between regulation and competition. It 
focuses mainly on the case of natural monopolies. Among the options analysed are: 
i) competition for the market (franchising: auctioning the right to be a monop­
olist) and ii) competition in the market (basically industry design). The section 
concludes that in spite of the good properties of auctions, franchising does not work 
well in industries with high sunk costs, like public utilities, due to the difficulties 
of anticipating the costs of the monopolist in the distant future, and because re­
franchising involves problems of asymmetric information. As for competition in the 
market, industry design in the form of vertical and horizontal separation, permiting 
duopolistic structures and the design of market rules, has been the way adopted 
by several countries to introduce competition in their network industries. However, 
in spite of its relative success, the literature points out that transaction costs and 
incentives have to be taken into account to avoid problems caused by monopolistic 
behaviour and/or political interference.
Section (2.4) studies what is called in the literature “Optimal Regulation” (Vo­
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gelsang (1998)). After a brief analysis of strengths and weaknesses of Ramsey Pricing 
and Cost of Service Regulation, the section introduces the discussion about regu­
lation under asymmetric information. The main contribution of this section is the 
presentation of the “Canonical Model of Regulation” along with its principal re­
sults. Because of the introduction of asymmetric information -in  a well specified 
agent-framework- to the study of regulation, the Canonical Model of Regulation 
is considered one of the most important achievements in the theory of regulation. 
Asymmetric information, between the regulator and the firm(s) he has to regulate, 
provides the theoretical foundation for the implementation of third best mechanisms 
in the solution of problems of market failure caused by the presence of natural mo­
nopolies and/or network externalities. Asymmetric information causes problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard in the regulatory process. For the regulator to 
solve those problems it is necessary to trade off socially costly rents in exchange of 
information about the frim(s)’ cost characteristics (adverse selection) or in exchange 
of higher levels of effort (moral hazard). The result is a deviation of Ramsey pricing 
where, when costs are non-separable, prices are used by the regulator to provide 
incentives to the firms for true telling.
Section (2.5) analyses optimal regulation under political economy constraints. As 
a background, it presents an overview of the capture theory of regulation developed 
in the 70’s, in which regulation is strongly perceived as produced from rent seek­
ing behaviour by special interest groups in the society. Later, the section discusses 
economic regulation and political economy. The main finding is that asymmetric 
information provides the theoretical foundations for the participation of interests 
groups in regulation. Asymmetric information produces socially costly rents, there­
fore, the possibility of capturing, at least, part of these rents produce the incentive 
for special interest groups to participate in the regulatory process. The section con­
tinues with an overview of the ways in which the literature has dealt with modelling 
political economy constraints in regulation. Finally, it presents Laffont and Tirole’s
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(1993) model of regulation under political economy constraints. With the presenta­
tion of the canonical model of regulation and the introduction of capture constraints 
to this model, both section (2.4) and section (2.5) cover the technical aspects re­
quired for chapters (3) and (4) of the thesis, where the problem of industry design 
and regulation under political economy constraints is studied.
Section (2.6) discusses recent developments in incentives and political economy 
of regulation. Prom the theoretical point of view it offers an overview of the way in 
which Laffont and Tirole’s model of regulation under political economy constraints 
has been used to address several issues in regulation. It also presents the most 
recent developments in the literature that integrates incentives and political con­
straints in regulation. It argues that the main progress in this literature has been 
the introduction of dynamic settings and the development of models with endoge­
nous transaction costs of capture. Departures from the complete contract approach 
have been introduced in this literature.
Prom an empirical point of view, section (2.6), also presents an overview of the 
literature that has studied the results of the privatisation and regulatory reform 
of the network industries implemented in several countries in the last 20 years. It 
suggests that the empirical studies have required the use of the tools developed 
by the transaction costs and new institutional economics to explain the success or 
failure of the privatisation and regulatory reform of those industries. The main 
finding of this literature, through the use of econometric models and/or case studies 
based on stylised facts, has been that the alignment between institutions and the 
regulatory framework could explain the success and failure of the privatisation and 
regulatory reform policies in different institutional settings. Therefore, when institu­
tions and the regulatory framework are aligned with each other, the evidence shows 
that these policies have been successful, whereas their miss-alignment explains the 
lack of investment in the reformed industries and the resulting failure of the reform 
programmes.
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With the discussion of industry design in section (2.3), the study of regulation 
under capture in section (2.5) and the presentation of the recent theoretical and 
empirical developments in the study of regulation in section (2.6), the literature 
review presented in this chapter seems to have found a small gap in the literature, 
which is industry design and regulation under political economy constraints. In 
chapters (3) and (4), this thesis will try to cover the gap. Finally, with the study of 
the Mexican natural gas industry structure regulation and performance in chapter 
(5) we aim to present an introduction of complexities involved in industry design 
with a real world case.
CHAPTER 3
Regulation by duopoly under political constraints
3.1 Introduction
In a variety of economies, the past two decades have witnessed substantial privati­
sation and regulation of previously state-owned monopolies. This has been comple­
mented by the introduction of independent regulators as a means of overseeing the 
newly created industries. An important question facing policy makers has been how 
should the post-privatisation industry be designed? Should it retain its monopoly 
status (as British Gas did) or should it face immediate competition (as British Tele­
com did)? However, the use of independent regulators immediately introduces a 
complication because the prospect of subsequent regulatory capture may influence 
the decision about how the industry should be designed.
This matter is recognised by Armstrong et al. (1994), who note that it is difficult 
to be clear about the effects of possible political interference when deciding on 
the structure of regulated industries. Real world illustrations include the way in
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which political considerations may have influenced the structure of the UK gas and 
electricity industries subsequent to their privatisation in 1986 and 1990 respectively 
(Waddams (1997); Newbery (1999); Armstrong & Vickers (2000)). According to 
Joskow (2000a), part of the current Californian electricity crisis is explained by the 
way in which interest groups influenced the structure of the industry. In Mexico, 
political restrictions have impeded the participation of private firms in natural gas 
production and the reorganization of the electricity sector (Congreso (1995)).
Similarly, as mentioned in chapter 2, the need to address concerns about the cap­
ture of independent regulators (through amendments to the regulator’s contract) has 
been recognised in a variety of regulatory settings, beginning with Laffont & Tirole 
(1993). Laffont & Martimort (1998) compare a centralized and a decentralized hi­
erarchical organization in terms of the agency costs associated with the different 
side-contracting games that agents play in these organizations. Boyer & Laffont 
(1999) consider the issue of environmental regulation via a model of incomplete con­
tracts, and find that constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental 
policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a standard eco­
nomic viewpoint. Their justification lies in the limitations they impose on the ability 
of politicians to distribute rents. Martimort (1999) studies the life cycle of regula­
tory agencies, analysing the dynamics of capture in relation to transactions costs. 
He finds that the design of regulatory institutions influences the transaction costs 
of capture. Most recently, Faure-Grimaud k  Martimort (2003) have studied the 
issue of regulatory inertia. They look at the effects of regulatory independence on 
the stability of the regulatory framework, finding that even though regulatory inde­
pendence enlarges collusive opportunities between regulated interest groups, it also 
constrains future governments and generates stability.
Given the above observations, the current chapter presents a model of industry 
design in the context of the potential for regulatory capture in the design process. 
In particular, we take Auriol k  Laffont’s (1992) model of industry design where a
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government chooses between allowing a monopoly or duopoly to produce a homo­
geneous product^. We amend this by recognising that the government may appoint 
a regulator because of the latter’s expertise in discerning the characteristics of firms 
in the industry. The regulator is intended to report this information truthfully but 
may be captured by the industry and, therefore, choose not to do so. This must be 
borne in mind when Congress decides whether the industry should be privatised as 
a monopoly or an oligopoly^. Thus, this chapter serves two purposes: it addresses 
an issue of policy-relevance in many countries, and contributes to a recent literature 
on the relationship between optimal regulation and questions of political economy.
For Auriol and Laffont the decision to choose duopoly over monopoly is deter­
mined by two effects: a “sampling effect” (5) and a “yardstick competition effect” 
(y). The former allows the regulator to drop a potentially high-cost competitor®; 
the latter permits him to benchmark the firms’ price/output decisions. These effects 
are weighed against the undesirability of duplicated fixed costs if the duopoly setting 
is chosen. The current chapter generalises Auriol and Laffont’s results to the situa­
tion where regulatory capture may occur. The introduction of political constraints 
alters the balance between Y  and S. Though general results are not available, in the 
examples chosen the balance shifts in favour of a more competitive industry as cap­
ture increases. Our results provide interesting insights into several industry design 
decisions. For example, the fact that Mexican natural gas distribution in two of the 
main cities of the country involves potentially competing duopolists despite obvious 
elements of natural monopoly^ as compared with the case of British Gas in the UK
^Dana (1993), as we will see in the next chapter, considers a similar issue in the context of 
product differentiation.
^Formally, we use a ‘complete contract’ model of capture: see chapter 2 and Laffont (2000). 
^Auriol and Laffont’s idea its that regulation by duopoly increases the sample of firms that 
would participate in the market, which reduces the expected marginal cots. That is, for a given 
marginal cots a firm would participate if it perceives itself as a low marginal cost firm. This 
produces the sampling effect which is “the higher probability of drawing a given marginal cost for 
the industry" (Auriol & Laffont (1992) p. 509)
^Monterrey city has two main distribution lines Gas de Monterrey and CFE. Mexico City was 
divided into four zones for distribution, opening the possibility for oligopolistic competition in the
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were the oposit decision was taken on privatising the industry. Further examples of 
interes include the existence of parallel transmission lines in Germany and the USA 
and the duopoly policy followed in the British telecommunications industry.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section (3.2) presents the basic model and 
Auriol and Laffont’s main results. Sections (3.3) and (3.4) show results for the 
monopoly and duopoly cases respectively. Section (3.5) compares both industry 
structures and finally section (3,6) concludes.
3.2 The m odel
3.2.1 General spécification
Consider the following structure based on Auriol & Laffont (1992). A natural 
monopoly industry is about to be reformed, and the regulator must decide whether 
it should operate as a monopoly or a homogeneous goods duopoly. The market can 
be served by one or two firms, 1 and 2, selling homogeneous output. Consumer’s 
gross surplus is defined as S{q^Pq^) for g* > 0, z =  1,2 where g =  g^  +  g^  is total pro­
duction. The inverse demand function is defined as P{q) =  S'{q) with 5(g) strictly 
increasing and concave in g. Therefore, F(g) =  S'{q) > 0, with P'{q) = S"{q) < 0 
for g > 0. Firm i faces total costs q^)-\-K = p^q'^+K for g^  > 0 with P^  G [p, p], 
and the fixed cost of production K  identical for both firms. Firms utility is given 
by U{p^) = t + P{q)q^ — G’^{P\ g^ ) — K, where t is a transfer from the government. 
C*(-, •) are common knowledge, g^  is verifiable, however, P^  is private information 
where ^  corresponds to an inefficient firm. As in chapter 2 the regulator maximizes 
Social Welfare® [W =  5(g) + XP{q)q — (1 + X){C{q)) — AU(g)) taking into account
future.
^Notice that there are two differences between the social welfare function presented in chapter 
2 and the one presented here. For instance in this specification the level of effort is not considered, 
therefore this model does not present moral hazard issues. The other difference is that the social 
value of goods V{q) of chapter 2 is defined as the sum of consumer surplus S{q) and a weighted
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the costs of public funds® A > 0. Finally, all agents are risk neutral.
The stochastic structure of the /5^ ’s , which is common knowledge is as fol­
lows: =  a 6 +  (1  — a)e^ a  e  [0 , 1] « =  1 , 2 . a is the correlation between p^
and /3^ , the 6’s are common factors affecting costs characteristics and the e’s are 
idiosyncratic effects. The common factors are located in an interval b G [6 , 6] and 
have a probability of occurrence v = prob(6 =  6). The idiosyncratic effects (e^  
and e )^ are stochastically independent with the same distribution (?(•) on [e, ë] 
with density function g(*). The common factor b and the idiosyncratic effect 
are stochastically independent. Therefore the range of p^, i =  1,2 can be writ­
ten as [g, p] = [ab -t- (1 — ope, 0:6 4- (1 — o:)e] Hence it is possible to define F{P^,p^) 
as the joint cumulative distribution function with i{p^,p‘^) as the joint density of 
{P^,P'^) G [P_iP] X [p,PY ^iP P  is the marginal cumulative distribution function of 
P^  and f(p p  is the marginal density. F,f, F, f are common knowledge.
The correlation parameter is defined as: a  =  . With this specific form of
a, when the firms discover their P they can infer the value of the common factor b. 
Therefore the P^s are located in two disjoint intervals'^ shown in figure (3.1) below. 
The firms cannot enjoy rents for their knowledge of 6. Neither the regulator can use
Figure 3.1: Disjoint productivity intervals
A, A ,
a 6 + (i — a)£ o:& 4- (i — o;)€
I _
0:6 4- (1 — o:)ë =  o6 4- (1 — a)e
measure of producer surplus XP{q),
^According to Laffont & Tirole (1993) a mean estimate for the US economy is A = 0.3.
^Since the intervals A\ and Ag are disjoint the hazard rate of substitution is discontinuous at a. See appendix B.4.
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the correlation between the P^s to extract rents on the e’s (Auriol Sz Laffont (1992)). 
However, when the firms are located in the disjoint intervals the regulator can cut 
rents in the interval (a,/?).
The above stochastic structure allows discussion of regulating the firms with 
correlated private information without extracting all the informational rents®, as 
in Cremer k  McLean (1985). Notice that p^ ’s correlation increases with a. For 
0  =  1, {P  ^ = p^ = b) we have perfect correlation and the Cremer-McLean condition 
holds. For 0  =  0, the firms characteristics are determined totally by the idiosyn­
cratic shocks {P^  =  ep. Firms and regulator share the same information about the 
competitor costs, therefore, yardstick competition is of no use.
3.2.2 Auriol and Laffont’s main results
Fi'om the general specification, Auriol k  Laffont (1992) present a model in which the 
regulator has to decide the market structure on the basis of expectations about the 
characteristics of costs. After the firms sink their fixed costs and discover their effi­
ciency parameters, the regulator proposes a set of contracts from which firms choose. 
Finally, transfers and production levels occur as defined in the agreed contracts.
Auriol and Laffont solve the model under asymmetric information and in the 
context of no delegation, with consumers and firms facing a benevolent regulator. 
Their procedure consists of comparing monopoly versus duopoly structures under 
complete and incomplete information. Under duopoly there is duplication of fixed 
costs K, However, duopoly presents the effects Y  and S  mentioned in section (3.1). 
As mentioned before Y  permits the regulator to cut rents, whereas S  gives the 
possibility of facing better p  types to serve the market. The sum of both effects 
provides the level of duplication of fixed costs that the regulator can allow (i.e. 
K  = Y  4- 5). The monopoly structure is chosen beyond this level.
®See Auriol & Laffont (1992) and appendix B.4.
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Their interest surrounds the conditions under which K  > 0—i.e. a positive range 
of fixed costs can support a preference for duopoly—and the effects of eisymmetric 
information on this range. Under full information, only S  is present as there is no 
need to reduce rents by benchmarking the firms. Using ‘F ’ for ‘Full Information’, 
we have > 0. Under asymmetric information (denote this ‘A’), we have
> 0 . As 5^ > 0 as well, we know that > 0 so a preference for duopoly can 
still be supported. The interest is now in +  5^ — 5^. The authors
show that > Q when A and the elasticity of demand are both low: in this
case, duopolistic price reductions have little effect on quantities but there is a benefit 
from being able to cut rents. When combined with Y ^  > 0, this gives a larger range 
of K  to support duopoly. They conclude that in general asymmetric information 
favours the duopolistic structure when market structure is chosen before costs are 
known®.
The objective of this chapter is to extend Auriol and Laffont’s model by intro­
ducing political economy constraints. Therefore, two basic changes are required to 
pursue that objective. The first one is to introduce delegation in the regulatory pro­
cess. That is, for some reason, maybe efficiency^®, a specialized regulator is needed 
to extract informational rents from the firms. The second change is to assume the 
possibility of facing a non-benevolent regulator.
^This chapter focuses Auriol & Laffont’s results for the “ex-ante model” as this is closest to 
modelling industry structure of regulated industries. However, Auriol & Laffont (1992) present 
an “ex-post model” that is focused on industry design for procurement, their general result for 
procurement is that monopoly may dominate duopoly in a range of circumstances.
°^For example, in another kind of environment, delegation could be required for politicians to 
avoid the political costs of a bad regulatory performance.
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3.3 D elegation  in th e m onopoly case
3.3.1 Benevolent regulator
We assume a three tier hierarchy supervision model (Congress-regulator-firm(s)) as 
in Laffont & Tirole (1993) and Laffont (2000). The supervision technology resembles 
chapter 2: the regulator observes a signal cr = p  with probability C and a signal 
O' =  0, which means no information, with probability (1 — (). For > g, <7 =  0 
always. The regulator’s utility function is m =  s. This is the reward received by 
the regulator, not necessarily monetary income, for his report. In this section we 
assume a benevolent regulator, therefore his report (r) is truthful (r =  a) and he 
receives a payment for his report which could be normalised to zero (5 =  0). With 
this supervision technology we have two cases to analyse:
1) With a benevolent regulator ii 0  — p  then a = ^  = r with probability 
Therefore, given that it is fully informed. Congress maximizes expected welfare 
subject to U{p) = 0 :
=  p l S i g m  + X P ( q m q m1-1 J3m ax"'^^  '•j(') jff
(1 +  A)(/?g(/)) +  K) -  Ai;(/;)]dF(/?) (3.1)
The solution in this case is given by the familiar Ramsey price-markup equa­
tions^:
P ( A )  1 +  A »,(*)
2) If (7 =  0 then beliefs have to be revised through Bayes law. Therefore with 
probability (1 — (), Congress has to maximize expected welfare under asym­
metric information conditional on cr =  0. In order to construct the conditional 
expected welfare under asymmetric information, we need to define a joint
s^See appendix B.l for the solution.
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distribution function /(cr,/?), a joint density function F(cr,/?), the marginal 
distribution functions h{a) and /(/?) and the conditional distribution function
9i0W) =
Therefore, the conditional expected welfare under asymmetric information 
with a benevolent regulator is given by:
Congress’ optim isation programme
With the supervision technology discussed in the previous section. Congress’ opti­
misation problem becomes:
max g(f { i  I  [S'(?M(/3)) +  AP(çM(/3))îM(/3)-(l +  A)(/Î9M(/3) +  i<')]dP(/î) 
/  [\s{qM {P )) + \P{qM(P))qM{P)JQ J0
}
0
0 r0+ (1 - 0 0 '/g
f(rr ~\'\ (3.4)-  (1 +  A)(/3çm(/3) + K ) -  \ u m j ç ^ d F ( l 3 ) d F ( l 3 )
subject to the following incentive compatibility, incentive rationality and a non­
bunching constraints:
f>(/3) =  - 9 m ( /? )  (3.5)
qM[0) < 0 (3.6)
U(P) > 0 (3.7)
^^The notation is chosen to save space, in reality these functions must be defined as cr =  0 as 
follows, /(cr =  0, /?), F{a = 0,/3), h{a =  0), g{0\a =  0) =
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qM(a~) > qM{ci^) (3.8)
Of these constraints, only (3.8) is non-standard. It stems from the discontinuity in 
the hazard rate of substitution at point^^ a . We integrate the incentive compatibility 
constraint equation (3.5), to obtain the solutionnai
0^
U{P)  — ^(/3</?|cr=:0) f  qM{P)dP —
0.
P  (3.9)Jp Jp /W i
Then, we need to integrate by parts:
Finally, substituting the constraint in the optimization programme we have^ ®:
• p0
/  [%M(/))) +  Af(gM(/)))9M(/))-Jpmax < C 9(0 ^
(l +  A)(/?9M(/?) +  ;r)]df(,9) +  ( i - C ) n 0[%M(/))) +'0 J0
^P{qM{P))qM[P) “  (1 +  ^){PqM{P) +  K)
The solution is given by the following price-markup equation: 
P { q M m - 0 _  A 1
^^ See Figure (3.1) and appendix (B.4). 
^^ See appendix (B.6).
‘«Since dP =
(3.11)
f ( * ( /3 ) )  l +  A»ï(A(^))
A FjP) 1 ( l - C ) / ( ^ , / l )
1 +  A /(/?) P(9^(/J)) C/(<t)/(/3) +  (1 -  C)/(a, f})
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Notice that the familiar solution (Laffont & Tirole (1993)) of this problem under 
asymmetric information and no delegation is given by^ ®:
P j q m - P  A 1 , A Fjfi)  1
P{q{fi))  1 +  A n{q(0)) 1 +  A m  P(g(/3)) '' '
Therefore, letting [P] be the asymmetric information outcome from Laffont and 
Tirole and q\j{P) be the outcome under a benevolent regulator, the comparison 
between equation (3.12) and equation (3.13) yields:
R esu lt 1, Monopoly quantities produced under asymmetric information with no 
regulator are less or equal to monopoly quantities produced under asymmetric infor­
mation with a benevolent regulator '^^ {qtiiP) < qïAP))-
That is, due to the fact that some P_ types are discovered with probability (, 
Congress expects less good types to exist when the signal is <j =  0, making it to 
reduce the expectation of giving up costly rents, which makes possible to distort 
less the production of less efficient types. This increase in quantities has the ef­
fect of increasing consumer and producer welfare under delegation, compared to the 
no delegation result. Therefore, for delegation to a benevolent regulator to domi­
nate asymmetric information with no delegation expected rents under a benevolent 
regulator must be less than or equal to the expected rents under no delegation.
R esu lt 2. Delegation to a benevolent regulator dominates no delegation if the fol­
lowing condition holds:
U {p)=  /  qM{0)dP>
-
(1 -  0Eq3<-mU{P) =  r I r n i P J ^ ^ m P  (3.14)
®^See also appendix B.5.
Since 0 < çf(a)f[p)l(i-Qf{cr,p) ^
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that is, if^^:
3.3.2 N on-benevolent regulator
With a self interested regulator again there are strong incentives for collusion. If 
the regulator reports r  =  0, when (r = P_ then the firm can get the rents expressed 
in equation (3.9) with probability (1 — (). Hence, the maximum amount of money 
that the firm is willing to offer to the the regulator is a bribe of U(/?) with a value 
for the regulator of:
W (p ) = k P  P  quiP) (3.16)Jp Jp /  W j
where k — and Ac is an exogenous transaction cost of the side transfer between 
the regulator and the firm.
Providing incentives to the regulator can prevent capture^^. The incentive pay­
ment that Congress has to give to the regulator in order to make him to report 
truthfully, that is, to report r  =  g  when a = p is  defined as:
5 =  kU{/3) = k [  P q,^{p)fJÇ^d!3dl3  (3.17)Jp Jp /w )
our case, from equation (3.15), it is required that j J d(3d(5 > qM{P)dp.
Reordering the integrals we have q\^{p)d0^^^dfd >  qM{0)d(3, notice that g\f{P)d/3 >
Jp qM{0)d(d since q]  ^ > qM from the solution presented in equation (3.13). Gall q\j{(5)d0 =
(^/3) and j^9M()0)d/) = Ckarfy %(/?) > X(^),
because f j ^ ^ ^ d ( 3  =  jJ^g{(3 <  ^|o-)d/3 =  1.
^®Notice that in some cases it could be very expensive to prevent capture or, for example, in an 
environment with more than one regulator it could be so cheap to have the true information from 
one of them that giving incentives to the corrupted one is worthless (Laffont (2000)).
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The expected social cost of such an incentive payment is X^s, because the payment 
occurs with probability (  and has a social cost A.
C ongress’ optim isation  program m e 
With the above setting Congress’ problem is now:
max
9(.)
| c  I ^ S i q u m  + \P (qM m qM {P ) -  (1 +  XKPquiP) + K)]dF{l3) +
+ (1 - 0 rP rPJ p  J p
— (1 +  X){pqM{P) ■{' K ) — XqM{P) 
F ( P )
S'(îm(/3)) +  XP(qM{P))qM{P)
m
pP pP
Jp Jp quiP)
m j
/(cr, P)
/(cr, P)
/((^ )/(A
(3.18)
The solution for monopoly quantities under a non-benevolent regulator q^iP) is 
given by the following price-markup equation:
_  A 11+Xv { q W )) +
1 -f- ([k — 1] (3.19)
Notice that the difference of equation (3.12) and equation (3.19) is given only by 
the capture parameter k. Therefore, we analyse the effect of k on q^{P)\
1) When the transaction costs of capture are very high A^  oo then ~  0, the 
regulator is of maximum use. For =  0 equation (3.19) is equal to equation 
(3.12) and we have the result for a benevolent regulator under asymmetric 
information. Notice that for (  =  1 (a full information signal) we get the 
first best result, so q\j = q ^  ~  qli^ where q%^ are the quantities under full 
information defined by equation (3.2).
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2) When the transaction costs of capture are very low Ac 0, then A; ~  1. For 
k — 1 equation (3.20) below is obtained and the final result still depends on
C-
A 1 ,
A F m  1
i+\m)p{qt{p)ru{<y)}{0)+(^-Cif{<^.idy  ^ ’
For C =  0 equation (3.20) reduces to that of monopoly under asymmetric 
information and Qm — Qm == Qm i from equations (3.13) and (3.12). However, 
comparing the same set of equations, plus equation (3.2), (  =  1 brings q%j = 
q\i — q ^  ^  q tl' This is due to the fact that for (  =  1 Congress is fully 
informed even in the presence of a non-benevolent regulator^®. This intuition 
implies that monopoly quantities with delegation to a benevolent regulator fall 
as capture rises. In fact we can prove the follwing:
R esult 3. Monopoly quantities under a non-benevolent regulator decrease with 
the level of capture. To see this we take the partial derivative of monopoly 
quantities with respect to capture, and we obtain^^:
9 q ^^_ F {l3 ), S M )  ) C < 0  f3 2 ndk fipyu{T)m)+{i-C}f{<^,pyp'{qt)-  ^ ’
Further, we can prove that a non-benevolent regulator could be useful for 
society, relative to asymmetric information:
R esult 4. A non benevolent regulator is useful as long as he provides the right 
information, that is as long as q\^ > q\i > q ^  > qf/^ The condition for this
^^Notice that if cr =  ^ always, then C =  !• la such a case the first best is attained due to F{p) =  0.^^ See appendix B.22.
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to happen is given by:
^ -  1)1 < 1 (3.22)
If equation (3.22) holds, in spite of facing a completely captured regulator, the 
probability of facing a good type makes Congress distort production less than 
under asymmetric information with no delegation. If the constraint is not ful­
filled^ ,^ then q M > q M >  ^  9^, which means that, the optimal contract 
produces quantities under a non-benevolent which are less than quantities un­
der asymmetric information. The non-benevolent regulator could be harmful 
if an extra transfer payment is required to obtain quantities below asymmetric 
information levels.
Our results are consistent with Laffont & Tirole (1993) and Laffont (2000). Dele­
gation to a benevolent regulator improves the information set about the firm’s types 
received by Congress. This situation permits Congress to increase quantities and 
reduce rents (results 1 and 2) which increases welfare overall. As a response to the 
possibility of capture. Congress adopt two mechanisms^^: The firts gives incentives 
to the regulator with a positive expected social cost and the second reduces the stake 
of collusion. The reduction in the stake of collusion is done by increasing price and 
reducing quantities [q'^ < g^), due that rents are increasing in quantities, the firm 
suffers from collusion as well. Finally, result 4 shows that under some circumstances 
preventing collusion could be too expensive relatively. Therefore, the best response 
for Congress would be to let collusion happen^^ (Laffont (2000)).
section (3.5.2) we present a numerical simulation where we work with the exponential and 
uniform distribution functions, we have found that in both cases C c / ( could be 
bigger than 1 as grows, see appendix B.21.
third mechanism could be to increase the costs of collusion Ac, but they have been considered 
exogenous in this model.
Again under these circumstances increasing the transaction costs of collusion Ac, play a more
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3.4 D elegation  under duopoly
We will now analyse the situation when two firms are allowed to compete in the 
market. Under the duopoly structure Auriol & Laffont (1992) assume that the 
regulator is able to observe a  (the correlation of /? types), and consider three cases: 
1) For a = 1 the Cramer-McLean (1985) condition^® holds and no rents are given 
up to the most efficient firm. 2) For 0 <  k < 1 the regulator is able to cut rents 
provided that /?* G A 2  (see figure 1). 3) For a: =  0 there is no correlation between 
types and it is not possible to cut rents. In this situation, under duopoly only the 
sampling effect takes place^®.
In this section we abandon the assumption of perfect information about the 
correlation parameter a  and we consider the case in which Congress requires an 
informed regulator to have information about the correlation of types. Under this 
assumption, with no regulator, asymmetric information entails Congress giving up 
(for % =  1,2) expected rents equal to^^:
U'ip')dF{p‘) = g i { B ) ^ d P ( B )  (3.23)
And the same for firm^ ® 2. Therefore, the only motivation for Congress in regulating 
by duopoly with no delegation comes from the sampling effect. However, with the 
use of an informed regulator Congress is able to cut expected rents subject to the
important role due that the incentive payments do not provide the desired information.
^®The Cramer-McLean (1985) condition permits to extract all the rents with the presence of any 
correlation different from zero. The reason is that any deviation of true telling could face extreme 
penalties that solve the asymmetric information problem. In mathematical terms Laffont (2000) 
shows an example where the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints form 
a system of linear equation. He shows that for any correlation different from zero the system is 
invertible. Therefore, it is possible to find the required penalties for true telling.
®^See appendix B.IO and B.12.
^^The idea is that with no regulator, although Congress can expect some correlation to exist, 
firms can always argue (in court) that correlation is zero, and Congress has no information to build 
a counterargument. Some difficulties for yardstick competition to be implemented come from this 
issue.
285 = (/?L ^ 2).
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information technology available, and the scope for discretionary behaviour from 
the regulator.
Following Laffont (2000), we define the supervision technology as follows. Congress 
requires an informed regulator, in this case the regulator is not able to see the types 
of firms directly but, instead sees a hard signal of the correlation of these types. 
Then he observes the following:
1. With probability ^ the regulator observes a = a  and (0 < a  < 1) with 
probability z.
2. With probability (1 — ^) the regulator observes a  =  0 and with probability 
(1—z) the correlation parameter is equal to zero (a =  0) and only the sampling 
effects takes place. If a  =  0 then cr =  0 always^®.
As we can see, the information technology resembles the one used for the monopoly 
case. However, in this case information is provided about an instrument that could 
be used to extract rents from the firms’ types and not about the firms’ types them­
selves.
3.4.1 Benevolent regulator
If the regulator is benevolent, with probability (^z) Congress is fully informed about 
a  being between 0 and 1, therefore, with probability (1 — ^z) it is not informed. 
Notice that in our context, full information means the ability of the regulator to 
observe a signal about the correlation between /?* and report it. Hence, in this 
context, full information is more limited than under the monopoly case, since the 
regulator is not able to see the exact level of correlation, he can observe only an
^®Note that when cr =  0 we assume that the regulator is unable to present any information that 
Congress can use to cut rents. This is consistent with the judicial approach process in the U.S. 
(which tends to place the burden of proof on the regulator). Though it may not always be accurate 
in Europe. Allowing assumptions about the correlation parameter would only amend equations to 
include a conditional probability instead of an unconditional probability.
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interval of it, in particular he is not able to see whether ct =  1 in which case he 
would be able to extract all the rents. Notice that, as long as 0 < a  < 1, in this 
context first best under duopoly corresponds in reality to a second best. As before 
we have two cases:
1. Under full information welfare is defined as:
[ \ s { q \ B )  + q \B )}  +
h
P {q \B ) + ,P{B)){q\B) + q \ B ) ) -  
(1 +  A)[/3^g^(a) +  iC +  ^^q^{B) +  K] —
XU U iP ^) -  XU^^^{/d^)]dF{B) (3.24)
where we define, for {i ~  1,2), the utility given up to the most efficient firm 
as:
j y U „ { 0 ') d F { f i )  =  ÿ (B ) ~  lA ,{^n{B ))F (a)]
(3.25)
where as in Auriol & Laffont (1992) (min(B)) =  1 when firm 1, respectively 
firm 2, is in A2  and (min(B)) =  0 otherwise^®. This event happens with 
probability ^z.
2. Under asymmetric information there is no need to revise expectations since 
Congress is not able to cut rents according to expectations about the corre­
lation parameter^^. Therefore, rents in this case are given by equation (3.23)
The intervals are defined in figure (3.1). 
^ S^ee foot note (29).
Regulation by Duopoly under Political Economy Constraints 79
and expected welfare under asymmetric information is^ :^
S (q \B )  + q \B ))  +W ''’ =
'Ê
P{q^{B) + ^{B )){q yB ) + ^ {B ))
(1 +  A)[;0igi(B) + K  + f q \ B )  + K]
-  XU!^{I3^) dF{B) (3.26)
We make t/(/9‘) =  !7^_0(^') to write equation (3.23) as:
UU(J3')dF{^') =  q‘( B ) ^ d F { B )  (3.27)
This event happens with probability (1 — ^z).
Therefore, for Congress, total expected welfare under delegation to a benevolent 
regulator is given by:
+  (1 -  (3.28)
hence the difference between delegation and asymmetric information under the
duopoly structure is given by:
(z W "  +  (1 -  -  W "  =  ^z[W ‘"  -  W ^‘] =
■ff rfi
'0 J0
_2fD\^A;(min(B))F(q)
9 /(^2)
Thus we have that
f m
|< iF (S )) > 0 (3.29)
R esult 5. Under duopoly, delegation to a benevolent increases welfare compared to 
asymmetric information^^.
®^ See appendix B .l7.the solution in appendix B.16.
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Notice the difference between result (5) and result (2). In result (2) we require 
à qualifying condition^^ for the benevolent regulator to be welfare improving com­
pared to asymmetric information. However, in the case above there is no need for 
any extra condition for delegation to a benevolent regulator to be welfare improving. 
The difference in both results comes from the way in which Congress sets the optimi­
sation programmes in both cases (monopoly-duopoly). Under monopoly Congress 
is able to make expectations about the firms’ types whereas in the duopoly case no 
expectations about the correlation parameter are allowed.
As discussed in section (3.2), equation (3.29) shows that when the most efficient 
firms are in Ai the regulator is neutral to the yardstick competition effect, because 
there is no way to cut rents, due to the fact that there is no truncation of the hazard 
rate (/^g =  0). For the most efficient firms being in Ag, we have 1^2 =  1, then 
delegation is always usefuU® provided that 0 < < 1, since the regulator gives
information about correlation and it permits Congress to cut rents^® from a to p.
For .^2; =  0 both rents under delegation to a benevolent regulator and asymmetric 
information are equal to each other, since ^ =  0 means cr =  0 (no information) and 
z =  0 means that prob(a — 0) =  1 (no correlation and no possibility to cut rents). 
They are also equal to each other for p^ G Ai since in that case there is no truncation 
of the hazard rate.
similar qualifying condition is also required in Laffont (2000).
88Notice that delegation is useful as long as it provides information about cost correlation of 
firms, however the sampling effect exist independently of delegation and/or correlation.
88 Another way to see the utility of having a benevolent regulator is ffiat under asymmet­
ric information Congress has to give up rents: C/*_0(/3 )^dF(/?*) =  Jp Jp
and with delegation rents are: Jp U^ a^{P^ )dF{/3^ ) +  (1 -  (z) j f  U^ ç^^ {p^ )dF{0^ ) =
Therefore, we have that >
since ^
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C ongress’ op tim isa tion  program m e
With a benevolent regulator Congress’ optimization problem is^ :^
max +  (1 — —QH-Wi-y
max /  /  +  g'(B)) +  AP(gXB) +  g"(B))(gXB) -b g'(B))
-  (1 +  \ ) { f q \ B )  + K  + P W B )  +  K)]dF(B)
f  fF
Jp Jp J\H )
and the solution of the programme is given by the price-markup equation:
-  (min(B)) ^  A 1 A F(min(B)) -  W ^,(m m (B))F(n)
l^ \r]{q ] j)  1 +  A /(m in(B))
Where stands for duopoly quantities under a benevolent regulator. Notice that 
for =  0 we are as with no regulator, whereas for =  1 we are back in the 
situation in which Congress can observe 0 < o: < 1 as in Auriol & Laffont (1992), 
which for us is full information about the correlation parameter.
Therefore, we have the following result:
R esu lt 6. Duopoly quantities under delegation to a benevolent regulator are greater 
than or equal to duopoly quantities under asymmetric information q]p > q ÿ . The 
reason is that with no delegation (" =  0 with probability one.
At this stage we can make a direct comparison between the monopoly and the 
structures under a benevolent regulator to obtain:
8'^ This problem is solved under the same incentive compatibility and incentive rationality con­
straints presented in section 3.3.1. We integrated the incentive compatibility constraint and sub­
stitute it in the welfare function. See appendices B.12 and B.18.
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R esu lt 7. The relationship between monopoly quantities and duopoly quantities de­
pends on the parameters. In both cases the first best quantities could be attained 
when ^ = 1 (for monopoly) and a  =  1 (for duopoly). However, over the range of 
possible values of the probability parameters and for 0 < a  < 0, -we have that 
(Qd ~  ^m)  could be greater or smaller than zero.
This result differs from Auriol & Laffont (1992) result in which q^^ > qf(f, the 
reason is that under their assumptions, compared to our assumptions, they deal 
with asymmetric information about the firms’ types and full information about the 
correlation parameter. In Our framework we have asymmetric information over both 
variables. Comparing the price-markups of monopoly equation (3.12) and duopoly 
equation (3.31), under delegation to a benevolent regulator, we can see that under 
monopoly the information provided by the regulator enters in a multiplicative way, 
whereas under duopoly it enters in an additive way. The difference comes from the 
way in which Congress can react to the signals that the regulator can provide. In the 
first case. Congress can still cut rents under asymmetric information by adapting 
expectations about the firms’ types, whereas in the second case, Congress cannot 
adapt expectations about the correlation parameter, therefore it cannot cut rents 
under asymmetric information. Hence, in our framework the relationship of both 
quantities depends on the probabilities, the p  types and the correlation parameter^®.
88Attending at the the mathematics of the price-markup equations, for Auriol & Laffont (1992) 
the firms being in A\, whereas for one of the firms being in Ag. In our case
if both firms are in A\ monopoly an d duopoly quantities are equal only if ^ / ( g ) p) = 1- 
Other wise, monopoly quantities are greater for the same 0 type. For one of the firms being in Ag 
the relationship still depend on the parameters. From our simulations at the end of the chapter we 
have found that for a benevolent regulator and the exponential distribution function with (  = 0.5, 
$z =  0.5 and a =  0.5 and for the uniform distribution function < q\f.
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3.4.2 Non-benevolent regulator
Once again, however, there is scope for collusion when the regulator receives the
signal about a. If cr =  a  and 0 < a  < 1 then Congress can cut rents^®: from
the ones paid in equation (3.27) to the ones paid in equation (3.25). Hence, for 
0 < a  < 1 there are incentives for the regulator to report r  =  0 when he has 
observed a — By doing this, if for example 0^ G Ag, then the firm is able to 
keep:
and the same for firm two. Under these circumstances the firm can pay^^ the regu­
lator up to; _ _
" =  (3.32)
For the regulator, the value of the bribe is ks, where, as before, k =  and Ac is 
the the transaction cost parameter of the bribe. In order to avoid collusion Congress 
can give a transfer to the regulator which has expected social value of \E,zks, since 
A is the social cost of the transfer and is the probability of the transfer taking 
place.
Congress maximizes expected social welfare subject to the incentive compatibility 
and incentive rationality constraints presented in section (3 .3 ,1):
max ^zW ^‘ +  (1 -  ^z)W ^ ' -  >4zks (3.33)
8^ For a  =  1 rents are zero.
8^Notice that the observation of the correlation parameter is still hard information for Congress 
in the sense that the regulator cannot change the information received, in particular if he has 
observed cr = 0, he cannot say that she has observed a — ol.
Sp Ip s ‘ (B)
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and the result is^ :^
) -  (min(B)) A 1
P(qÿ) 1A-Xr]{qÿ) +
•V F(m in(B)) ^  A
l 4-A /(m in (B ))f(9ÿ )  ' 1 +  A /(m in(B ))f(gÿ)
We study two extreme cases:
1. When the transaction costs are very large, for example in the extreme case that 
Ac “  oo, then, k — 0, Congress is as if it were facing a benevolent regulator, 
equation (3.34) is equal to equation (3.31).
2. In the other extreme if Ac =  0 there are no transaction costs of capture, then 
we have A: =  1. It is too easy for the firm to capture the regulator that it could 
be better for Congress not to avoid capture. In this case the solution is as 
that with monopoly under asymmetric information and no regulator, equation 
(3.34) equals equation (3.13).
As with result (3), the above analysis provides the intuition for the following 
result:
R esu lt 8 . Duopoly quantities decrease with the level of capture. This is confirmed
(z /A 2F(g) 1
dk /(min(B)) P'{qÿ) ~
Finally, from equation (3.34) and the extreme cases above we obtain result:
R esu lt 9. Under duopoly structure, a totally captured regulator (k = 1) does not 
reduce quantities beyond asymmetric information levels.
^^ See appendix B.19. 
^^See appendix B.22.
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If we compare result (9) to result (4), we can see that in result (4) an extra 
condition for > q ^  is required . Prom the comparison we can see that, in the 
limit, when facing a totally captured regulator, delegation under the duopolistic 
structure still provides information for Congress to cut rents, whereas under the 
monopolistic structure delegation could be harmful.
This section resembles section (3.3.2). As in the monopoly case, in response to 
collusion Congress: 1) Gives, at an expected social cost, incentives to the regulator 
to avoid collusion. 2) Reduces the stake of collusion by reducing qiy due to the fact 
that rents are increasing in quantities. Therefore, consumers and firms are damaged 
by the risk of collusion.
3.5 C om parison
3.5.1 Level of duplication of fixed costs
Auriol &; Laffont (1992) obtained four pricing equations shown in table (3.1). Taking 
these equations and looking at the quantities produced under each industry structure 
and informational environment, they were able to determine the level of duplication 
of fixed costs that the regulator could permit, due to the reduction in rents under 
duopoly structure.
Introducing delegation in an asymmetric information environment we also ob­
tained four pricing equations shown in table (3.2). We now follow Auriol and Laf­
font’s procedure to determine the level of duplication of fixed costs that Congress 
is able to permit under a non-benevolent regulator. Therefore, we study the quan­
tities produced in each industry structure. Through this procedure we expect to 
determine the effects that delegation and capture have on the level of permissible 
duplicated fixed costs, and with that the likelihood of Congress selecting duopoly 
over monopoly when capture is present.
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Table 3.1: Auriol and Laffont equations.
TVfpTa _  A 1
MAT*^ _  A 1 I A Fjp) 1P M  “  (1+A) nim) ^  (1 +A) m  p{qM)n P F  PiQn)-{rain(B)) _  1 1
P M  “  l + A ^r \  ATd P(«7J3)-(m in (n )) _  1 1 , 1 F (m in(B ))-lA ,,(m m (g))F (a)
________ P(Qn) ~  1 +A p(qn) 1 +A f(mm(B))P(qn)
 ^ Monopoly Full Information.
8  Monopoly Asymmetric Information.
 ^ Duopoly Full Information.
8  Duopoly Asymmetric Information.
Table 3.2: Delegation equations.
lyi R R a  P(9m(/^))~^ _  A 1 ,___A P(/3)_________ ( l - Q f ( < T , g )p M m  1+A nMm) ^  1+A m  < M m H i - o f M P M m
M -N B R ^  _  A 1_____ , _A _____P ( 0 )  (  (i+([&-i])y(cr,/?) \
P(«^(/3)) 1+A g(g%^(j8)) ^  1+A m P M i f i y < M f W W - < ) f M )  ^
n  R R C  P ( 9 p )-(m in (B )) _  A 1 . A P(m in(B ))-gz/y ta(m ln(B ))F (q)
p M  I+A^IÜE) 1+A /(m in (B ))P (g ^ )
n  N R R d  P ( 9 n^)-(m in(B )) _  A 1 , A F(m in(B)) , A W A 2 (m in(B ))P(o) r , ..
J J - lN P r t  P(g%") ~ 1+A77(g?^fa) l+A/(;iffn(B))P(g?,<’) 1+A /(m in(B))P(g?.^) 1^ J
 ^ Monopoly Benevolent Regulator .
8  Monopoly Non-benevolent Regulator.
Duopoly Benevolent Regulator.
8  Duopoly Non-benevolent Regulator.
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Prom our discussion in section (3.2.2) we know that the threshold level of K  
beyond which the regulator prefers monopoly is given by Â  =  P  +  5. Fi’om Auriol 
& Laffont (1992) we calculate that Y  is given by:
y  =  ( /3 ) ) y ^ | | |c iB ( m in ( B ) )  (3.35)
Here {qo^iP)) — q^iP ))  represents the regulator’s ability to benchmark the firms. 
For the sampling effect S  we have:
s = j ^ [F(min(B)) -  F{P)]dp (3.36)
where [F(min(B)) — F{P)] represents the regulator’s ability to sample for the two 
duopolists.
The sampling effect is divided in two parts S  — Qe+Fe, where Qe is the quantity 
effect and Re the rent effect as defined below:
r0Q e=  /  îâ'(/3)[B(min(B))-B(/3)]d/3 (3.37)J0
and
0  X
Ae =  /  j  -  m ] d ^  (3.38)
We know from section (3.2.2) that Auriol and Laffont’s main conclusion is that, in 
general, asymmetric information favours the duopolistic structure when the market 
structure is chosen ex-ante.
In our case the level of duplication of fixed costs under asymmetric information
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and a non-benevolent regulator is defined as**^  We have:
V"" =  J \ < S  -  &‘) j ^ ^ d F ( m m ( B ) )  (3.39)
Prom result (7) together with result (9), we know that the benchmark part 
could be greater/lesser than or equal to zero. And for the sampling effect we have:
J  [9m {P) + 1 + A VC/(<^ )/(/3) + (1 -  C) /(<^,^))
( F(l9)s
d0 ^ S W \ l(F(min(B)) -  F{0))dp (3.40)
In our case the sampling effect under a non-benevolent regulator is also expressed 
as the sum of a quantity effect and a rent effect == + Re"^ ,^ where:
Qe’“’ =  f  q tm {F {m rn(B )) -  F{P))dl3 (3.41)Jp
and
Be"‘ = ■F(0)'A|1 +  ([& -!]]  f{a,P)
Jp 1 +  A VC/W /(/5) +  ( l -
‘^ ^uw)m+'i?-<)n<r.0)hF{P)s 
dP U W \
dp (ff)W i-C)/(<^,/9).
(F(min(B)) -  F{p))dp (3.42)
As we can see, P"^ is affected indirectly and is affected both directly and 
indirectly by the value of the parameters, in particular by k, /?, and A. Therefore, 
to study the effect of capture on the duplication of fixed cots that is acceptable for 
Congress, we need to analyze not only the direct change of 5”  ^for changes in k, but
■^*See appendix B.20.
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also the effect of the change in quantities on and 5'"*’ when k changes.
Begining with the yardstick competition effect, and from equation (3.39) we can 
see that capture has only an indirect effect affect on P ’^ ;^ i.e. capture only affects 
the yardstick competition effect through changes in quantities. From results (3) and 
(8 ) we have that < 0 and < 0. This achieves the result described:
R esu lt 1 0 , Since both quantities are decreasing in k, the effect o fk  on the yardstick 
competition effect under a non-benevolent regulator is positive/negative if capture 
has a higher/lower impact on monopoly quantities than on duopoly quantities.
Continuing to the sampling effect, we know that the change in the sampling 
effect as k changes is . We have:
dQe
dk
nb
I dk dp (3.43)
and
dRe-^^
H —Jq \1  +  A
AC^ M +  +  C(fc
dp U{<p)f{P) +  (1 -  0 /(^>  P) ) +
d{ f(cr,0) ) F(/?) ][F(min(B)) -  F(/?) d/? (3.44)
We have that the quantity effect given by equation (3.43) is negative due to < 0 
from equation (3.21). However, the rent effect (equation (3.44)) is ambiguous^®. The
^^ For instance the term positive, it could be considered as an informational effect,
since an increase in k could give information about the likelihood of facing 0. Hence, permitting a 
positive effect over the duplication of fixed costs. Also the term in big brackets could be negative
d <  . .  ,   ■)as — coul d be less than zero. Notice that the term in big brackets for the 
sampling effect is the derivative of the hazard rate, which is positive by assumption, times the
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Table 3.3: Changes in the 
duplication of fixed costs 
with respect to capture
dK ^  ggnbcih. dk ddk
+ + +
+ + > -
+ - < +
ambiguity of the rent effect is produced by the increase in probability of facing a 
P as capture increases. Effectively higher capture increases the rent that would be 
paid to the regulator if /? =  g, of course this effect will be tempered as is reduced 
(the negative effect in (3.44)), As a consequence, obtaining a definitive solution for 
this derivative is not a straightforward calculation.
Table (3.3) presents the possible signs of In general we cannot determine 
the effects of capture over the range of fixed costs for which duopoly is preferred. 
However, we can evaluate this derivative for different values of A. We observe that 
as A decreases the value of is reduced as well. In the limit when A -+ 0, we have 
- 4  0 combined with < 0 and ^  —> 0. Notice that for A =  0 the level 
of duplicated fixed costs is given completely by since =  0 and Re^^ — 0 . 
Therefore, we can conclude:
R esu lt 11. The effect of capture on is ambiguous, but monopoly is more likely 
to be favoured as capture rises when A is “low”.
It is interesting to consider the relationship between A and k as presented in
weighted conditional probability g{0 < 0\a =  0) plus the derivative of the conditional probability 
with respect to 0 times the hazard rate. The derivative ( may be negative as
0 ^ 0  given the conditional probability g{0 < 0\a — 0) may decease as 0 increases. This could 
make the rent effect to be negative since the hazard rate grows very fast. We have checked this 
effect for the uniform and exponential distribution functions (see appendix B.25) we have found 
that in both cases the derivative is positive.
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result (11). To the extent that less developed economies may be more prone to 
regulatory capture and distortionary taxation it may be optimal for them to use 
regulation by duopoly. Finally, having seen that, as in Auriol &: Laffont (1992), 
general results are difficult to derive for this model, we now provide some numerical 
simulations to illustrate our results.
3.5.2 Num erical simulation
We pursued a numerical simulation assuming a linear demand function (P =  c—dq), 
with this assumption the quantity equations become:
1 . Monopoly
^1 +  2X > J^^d ^^Ç h {< r)m  + (1 -
2. Duopoly
.1 , ,  A , -  IKaz-P(a) _  F(m in(^)).
' ' d )h  +  x ’  ^ f {mm{P))  f { r m n {0 ) y
We also assume two probability distribution functions (pdfs), exponential and uni­
form, for the firms’ types. From the pdfs we derive the required conditional g(a =  
0|/? < P) and marginal h{cr) distribution functions^®. We present our results in the 
following sections.
See appendix B.24 for the determination of the pdfs and appendix B.26 for the quantity 
equations.
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Table 3.4: (Exponential pdf)^
A =  0.5 A =  0.3 A =  0.1
7  =  0.5 7  =  0.75 7  =  1 .5 7  =  0.5 7  =  0.75 7  =  1 .5 7  =  0.5 7  =  0.75 7  =  1.5
k=0 3,880.5 6,034.0 43,375.0 3,879.2 5,650.4 34,570.0 3,876.5 5,007.3 19,101.0k=0.2 4,077.2 6,569.0 50,645.0 4,026.9 6,052.6 40,239.0 3,942.2 5,186.7 21,752.0k=0.4 4,237.6 7,103.0 57,745.0 4,174.4 6,454.4 45,820.0 4,007.9 5,365.9 24,387.0k=0.6 4,470.0 7,637.0 64,675.0 4,321.9 6,855.8 51,312.0 4,073.6 5,545.1 27,007.0k=0.8 4,666.2 8,169.0 71,435.0 4,469.3 7,256.8 56,716.0 4,139.2 5,724.3 29,611.0k=l 4,862.3 8,701.0 78,024.0 4,616.7 7,657.4 62,031.0 4,204.9 5,903.3 32,200.0
“ The parameter k represents the level of capture. For the simulation F(0) is assumed to be exponential, so
higher 7  the lower the marginal cost.
Exponential pdf
The probability distribution function for the firms’ types is given by /(/?) =  ae~°‘^ , 
for (0 < a  < 0 0 ) and (0 < /? < oo). The conditional distribution function is given 
by g{cr =  0|/? < p) = Pe~°‘^ ^, for (0 < a  < oo), (0 < /? < oo) and <t > 0. Prom 
the above, we obtain the marginal distribution function of a  as h{cr) = for
(0  < (7 < oo) and 0 < a.
We solve for S ”-^ , and Re'”'^  using matlab. We assume the specific
demand function P = 1000 — 0.5ç. The probabilities Cj & and z are fixed at 0.5. 
To ensure enough differentiation between the firms’ types we fix the correlation 
parameter at a ~  0.25. With these assumptions we look for the effects of changes 
in k, the average of p  and A on the duplication of fixed costs as follows.
Table (3.4) presets for different values of k, A and 7 , where 7  is the parameter 
of the exponential distribution function and I / 7  is the average of p. Prom the 
table, we can observe that the the threshold level of fixed costs increases as capture 
increases for a given level of 7  and A. Thus, higher levels of capture increase the 
range of fixed costs for which duopoly is preferred. In the face of higher capture 
Congress seeks to reduce the stake of collusion by encouraging competition through 
the benefits of a favourable yardstick competition and sampling effects' '^ .^ On the
interesting way to think about this result is to note that, in our setting, the regulator has 
more information under monopoly than under duopoly (the monopoly signal is more rewarding).
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Table 3.5: (Exponential pdf)^
A =  0.5 A =  0.3 A =  0.1
7  =  0.5 7  =  0.75 7  =  1.5 7  =  0.5 7  =  0.75 7  — 1.5 7  =  0.5 7  =  0.75 7  =  1.5
k=0 -0.9 1 .0 70.0 -0.7 0.7 52.0 -0.3 2.3 23.0k=Q.2 0.9 5.0 119.0 0.7 3.9 89.0 0.3 5.5 40.0k=OA 2.7 9 169.0 2 .0 7.1 126.0 0.9 8.7 56.0k=0.6 4.5 14.0 218.0 3.4 1 0 .2 163.0 1.5 11.9 73.0
fe=0 .8 6.3 18.0 267.0 4.7 13.4 2 0 0 .0 2 .1 15.0 89.0
/ü=l 8 .1 2 2 .0 317.0 6 .1 16.6 237.0 2.7 18.2 106.0
The parameter k represents the level of capture. For the simulation F{/3) is assumed to be exponential, 
so 7  is the parameter of the exponential cumulative distribution function, ^ is the average marginal cost. 
The higher 7  the lower the marginal cost.
other hand, fixing the level of capture, we can see the role that the productivity 
parameter plays. We observe that for a given level of capture and A when the 
firms become more productive on average, the acceptable level of duplication of 
fixed costs is increased as well. Congress is more likely to favour duopoly because 
more productive firms imply larger quantities, resulting in a larger sampling effect. 
Finally, we observe the level of duplication increases with A for the chosen parameter 
values. In terms of result (11) A is to high for the sampling effect to go to zero. 
Therefore, this dominates Congress’ decision.
Tables (3.4) to (3.8) help to confirm these remarks focusing on the components of 
the choice of -namely and 5^^ =  +  Ré^^, Thus, tables (3.5) and (3.6)
show Y"^ and 5 ”  ^ increasing in k. Confirming that increases in k. Similarly, 
tables (3.7) and (3.8) show that > 0 is due to the increasingly significant rent 
effect in the presence of capture.
Thus when capture increases Congress prefers to employ a less informed regulator.
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Table 3.6: 5”  ^ (Exponential pdf)®^
A =  0,5 A =  0.3 A =  0 .1
7 = 0.5 7  = 0.75 7  = 1.5 7  =  0.5 7  = 0.75 7  = 1.5 7  = 0.5 7  = 0.75 7  = 1.5
fc=0 3,381.4 k^ O.2 4,076.2 
A=0.4 4,270.9 
k=0.6 4,465.5 
fc=0.8 4,659.9 
W 1  4,854.2
6.033.0
6.564.0
7.094.0
7.623.0
8.152.0
8.679.0
43.305.0
50.526.0
57.577.0
64.457.0
71.167.0
77.707.0
3879.9
4,026.2
4.172.4
4.318.5
4.464.6
4.610.6
5.649.6
6.048.7
6.447.3 
6,845.5
7.243.4
7.640.8
34.518.0
40.150.0
45.694.0
51.149.0
56.516.0
61.764.0
3.876.8
3.941.9
4.007.0
4.072.1
4.137.1
4.202.2
5.007.0 
5,184.9 
5,362.8 
5,540.6 
5,718.3
5.896.0
19.078.0
21.712.0
24.331.0
26.934.0
29.522.0
32.094.0
“ The parameter k represents the level of capture. For the simulation F{P) is assumed to be exponential, so 
7  is the parameter of the exponential cumulative distribution function, ^ is the average marginal cost. The 
higher 7 the lower the marginal cost.
A = 0.5
Table 3.7: (Exponential pdf) 
A = 0.3
a
A = 0.1
7  = 0.5 7  = 0 .7 5 7  = 1.5 7  = 0.5 7  = 0.75 7  = 1.5 7  = 0.5 7  = 0.75 7  = 1.5
ft=0 2,901.7 
A:=0.2 2,901.0 
&=0.4 2,900.3 
fc=0.6 2,899.5 
fc=0.8 2,898.8 k—1 2,898.1
3.362.0
3.360.0
3.359.0
3.358.0
3.357.0
3.355.0
4.621.0
4.617.0
4.612.0
4.608.0
4.604.0
4.600.0
3,144.8
3,144.2
3,143.7
3,143.1
3,142.6
3,142.0
3,643.9
3.643.0
3.642.0
3.641.1
3.640.2
3.639.2
5.013.0
5.010.0
5.007.0
5.004.0 
5,000.0
4.997.0
3.549.8
3.549.6 
3,549.3 
3,549.1
3.549.8
3.549.6
4.114.2 
4,113.8 
4,113.4 
4,113.0 
4,112.6
4.112.2
5.667.0
5.666.0
5.664.0
5.663.0
5.661.0
5.660.0
 ^The parameter k represents the level of capture. For the simulation F{P) is assumed to be exponential, 
so 7 is the parameter of the exponential cumulative distribution function,  ^ is the average marginal cost. 
The higher 7 the lower the marginal cost.
A = 0.5
Table 3.8: Re^^ (Exponential pdf) 
A = 0.3
a
A = 0.1
7 = 0.5 7 = 0.75 7  = 1.5 7  = 0.5 7  = 0.75 7  = 1.5 7  = 0.5 7  = 0.75 7  = 1.5
k=Q 979.7 
fc=0.2 1,175.2 
fc=0.4 1,370.6 k=0.8 1,565.9 k~0.8 1,761.1 
fc=l 1,956.1
2.671.0
3.203.0
3.735.0
4.265.0
4.795.0
5.324.0
38.684.0
45.909.0
52.964.0
59.849.0
66.564.0
73.107.0
735.1
882.0
1,028.7
1,175.4
1,322.0
1,468.6
2.005.7
2.405.7
2.805.3
3.204.4 
3,603.2 
4,001.6
29.504.0
35.140.0
40.687.0
46.145.0
51.515.0
56.797.0
326.9
392.3
457.6 
523.0
588.3
653.6
892.8
1,071.1
1,249.4
1.427.6
1.605.7
1.783.8
13.411.0
16.047.0
18.667.0
21.272.0
23.861.0
26.435.0
“■ The parameter k represents the level of capture. For the simulation F{0) is assumed to be exponential, so 
7  is the parameter of the exponential cumulative distribution function, ^ is the average marginal cost. The 
higher 7  the lower the marginal cost.
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U niform  p d f
In this case, the probability distribution function for the firms’ types is given by 
/(/?) =  1, for (0 < /3 <  1). The conditional distribution function is given by 
g{a = $\(3 < p) ~  for 0  < o' < 1). Prom the above, we obtain the marginal 
distribution function^^ of a as h{a) ~  — log(l — a), for (0 <  a  < 1). The specific 
demand function^® is given by f  =  1.5 — 0.5g, we also assume the probabilities (, 
and z are fixed at 0.5. To ensure enough differentiation between the firms’ types we 
fix the correlation parameter at a  — 0.5 in this case. As in the previous example, we 
look for the effects of changes in k, the average of p  and A on 
and In this example (1-/0) is the probability of facing a firm with P<P', thus, 
increasing p  implies a lower average productivity as did 7  in the previous example.
Tables (3.9) to (3.13) present similar information to that in tables (3.4) to (3.8). 
Thus, once again we see that a more captured regulator leads Congress to favour 
duopoly more often. While a higher average productivity (lower P) also makes 
duopoly “more likely”. Again the value of A is too high to reproduce result (11), so 
costly public funds favour duopoly. From tables (3.12) and (3.13) we see that the 
rent effect becomes relatively more dominant than the quantity effect as k increases.
®^See appendix B.24,
^®This demand function differs from the one we chose in the previous example because of the 
different nature of the two pdfs.
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Table 3.9: (Uniform pdf)^
_________ __________A =  0.5 ____________________A =  0.3 ____________________A =  0.1 _______
_________P =  0.25 =  0.5 p=: 0.75 0 =  0.25 =  0.5 /3 =  0.75 f3 =  0.26 /3 =  0.5 /? =  0.75
T 5Ô  ÔÏ379 0 3 2 Ô  51271 0.1414 Ô1366 0.1326 53440 51416 0.1397k=Q.2 0.1491 0.1425 0.1370 0.1507 0.1451 0.1405 0.1487 0.1458 0.1435
fc=0.4 0.1596 0.1524 0.1463 0.1596 0.1533 0.1482 0.1533 0.1500 0.1474
fc=0.6 0.1695 0.1618 0.1553 0.1682 0.1613 0.1557 0.1578 0.1541 0.1511
fc=0.8 0.1786 0.1706 0.1638 0.1764 0.1690 0.1629 0.1623 0.1582 0.1549
fc=l 0.1871 0.1790 0.1719 0.1842 0.1764 0.1699 0.1667 0.1622 0.1586
The parameter k represents the level of capture. For the simulation F{P) is assumed to be uniform, so (1 —/S) 
is the probability of facing p. The lower 0 the higher the probability of facing 0.
Table 3.10: (Uniform pdf)^
A =  0.5 A =  0.3 A =  0.10 =  0.25 /3 =  0.5 =  0.75 0 = 0.25 jg =  0.5 0 -  0.75 0 =  0.25 0 =  0.5 0 -  0.75 '
fc=0 0.0176 0.0129 0.0090 0.0132 0.0097 0.0068 0.0059 0.0043 0.0030
fc=0.2 0.0284 0.0227 0.0181 0.0213 0.0171 0.0136 0.0095 0.0076 0.0060
t= 0 .4  0.0392 0.0326 0.0272 0.0294 0.0244 0.0204 0.0131 0.0109 0.0091k=Q.e 0.0500 0.0425 0.0363 0.0375 0.0318 0.0273 0.0167 0.0142 0.0121
fc=0.8 0.0608 0.0523 0.0454 0.0456 0.0392 0.0341 0.0203 0.0174 0.0151
fc=l 0.0716 0.0622 0.0545 0.0537 0.0466 0.0409 0.0239 0.0207 0.0182
 ^The parameter k represents the level of capture. For the simulation F{0) is assumed to be uniform, so (1  — 0) 
is the probability of facing 0. The lower 0 the higher the probability of facing 0.
Table 3.11: (Uniform pdf)^
A =  0.5 A =  0.3 A =  0 .1
_________0 =  0.25 0 = Q.S 0 = 0.75 0 =  0.25 0 = 0,5 0 = 0.75 0 =  0.25 0 = 0.5 0 = 0.75
T^O ÔI2Ô3 â ïÎ 9 Î  â l ïS Ï  0.1282 Ô7Ï269 ÔJ258 Ô0382 ÔTÎSrâ ÔÔ367
fc=0.2 0.1208 0.1197 0.1188 0.1294 0.1280 0.1269 0.1392 0.1383 0.1376
A:=0.4 0.1205 0.1198 0.1191 0.1302 0.1289 0.1278 0.1402 0.1391 0.1383
fc=0.6 0.1195 0.1193 0.1189 0.1307 0.1295 0.1284 0.1412 0.1400 0.1390
fc=0.8 0.1179 0.1183 0.1183 0.1308 0.1298 0.1288 0.1420 0.1407 0.1397
fc=l 0.1155 0.1168 0.1173 0.1306 0.1298 0.1290 0.1428 0.1415 0.1404
“ The parameter k represents the level of capture. For the simulation F{0) is assumed to be uniform, so (1 — ^ ) 
is the probability of facing 0, The lower 0 the higher the probability of facing 0.
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Table 3.12: (Uniform pdf)^
A =  0.5 A =  0.3 A =  0 .10 =  0.25 *3 =  0.5 0 =  0.75 0 =  0.25 *3 =  0.5 *3 =  0.75 0 =  0.25 0 =  0.5 0 =  0.75
k=Q 0.0867 0.0889 0.0906 0 .1 0 1 0 0.1027 0.1040 0.1249 0.1256 0.1262
fc=0 .2 0.0825 0.0850 0.0872 0.0978 0.0998 0.1014 0.1235 0.1243 0.1251
fc=0.4 0.0782 0.0812 0.0837 0.0946 0.0969 0.0988 0 .1 2 2 1 0.1231 0.1239
fc=0 .6 0.0739 0.0774 0.0802 0.0915 0.0940 0.0962 0.1206 0.1218 0.1227
ft=0 .8 0.0697 0.0736 0.0767 0.0883 0.0912 0.0936 0.1192 0.1205 0.1216k=l 0.0654 0.0697 0.0733 0.0851 0.0883 0.0909 0.1178 0.1192 0.1204
The parameter k represents the level of capture. For the simulation F{0) is assumed to be uniform, so (1 — 0)
is the probability of facing 0. The lower 0 the higher the probability of facing 0,
Table 3.13: Re^^ (Uniform pdf)®'
A =  0.5 A =  0.3 A =  0.1
*3 =  0.25 /? =  0.5 0 =  0.75 0 =  0.25 *8 =  0.5 0 ~ 0.75 0 =  0.25 0 =  0.5 0 =  0.75
fc= 0 0.0036 0.0303 0.0275 0.0272 0.0242 0.0219 0.0133 0.0117 0.0105
fc=0 .2 0.0383 0.0347 0.0317 0.0316 0.0283 0.0255 0.0158 0.0139 0.0124
fc=0.4 0.0423 0.0386 0.0354 0.0356 0.0320 0.0290 0.0182 0.0161 0.0144
fc=0 .6 0.0456 0.0419 0.0387 0.0392 0.0354 0.0323 0.0205 0.0182 0.0163
fc=0 .8 0.0482 0.0447 0.0416 0.0426 0.0386 0.0353 0.0228 0 .0 2 0 2 0.0181
A:=l 0.0501 0.0470 0.0441 0.0455 0.0415 0.0381 0.0250 0 .0 2 2 2 0 .0 2 0 0
The parameter k represents the level of capture. For the simulation F(0) is assumed to be uniform, so (1 — *3)
is the probability of facing 0. The lower 0 the higher the probability of facing 0.
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3.6 C onclusions
In this chapter we have studied regulation by duopoly under political economy con­
straints. Our analytical model was built on Auriol and Laffont’s model of regulation 
by duopoly and Laffont’s model of regulatory capture. We have introduced dele­
gation to Auriol and Laffont’s model and we have allowed for the existence of a 
non-benevolent regulator.
We have found that delegation to a benevolent regulator increases welfare under 
monopoly and duopoly structures. The increase in welfare is due to the fact that, 
a benevolent regulator provides information to allow increases in quantities and 
reductions in expected rents given up to the most efficient firm under both structures.
Under a non-benevolent regulator there is a reduction in welfare in both industry 
structures compared to the benevolent case. This is because Congress has to give in­
centives to the regulator to deliver true information. The reduction in welfare comes 
from the social cost of the incentive payments to the regulator and the reduction in 
consumer surplus due to the reduction in quantities. Firms suffer from capture as 
well because of the reduction in rents paid to the most efficient firms. Therefore, 
both consumers and firms suffer from capture.
It is not straightforward to derive analytical conclusions about the overall effects 
of capture on the desirable level of duplication of fixed costs. As it was shown in 
table (3.3) presented in section (3.5.1), there are different combinations of and 
that produce to be either negative or positive.
To illustrate our results we presented two numerical simulations, in the first one 
we assumed an exponential pdf for the P types and in the second one we assumed 
a uniform pdf. The numerical simulations showed that higher levels of capture, 
productivity and social costs of public funds all led Congress to favour duopoly. 
Therefore, on the bais of our assumptions, we can conclude that political economy 
strengthens Auriol and Laffont’s findings that duopoly is welfare-dominant when
Regulation by Duopoly under Political Economy Constraints 99
the market structure is chosen ex-ante.
The model abstracts from a number of issues and, as such, raises several ques­
tions for future research. For instance, why have countries like England and France 
allowed duopolistic structures in their telecommunication sectors, or Germany^° and 
USA allowed for duplication of fixed costs in some natural gas transmission lines? 
Does it mean that there is more capture in those countries than, for example, in 
some developing economies that preserved monopolistic structures in those sectors?
One interesting possibility is that the ‘stake of collusion’ is higher in more de­
veloped countries. Alternatively, perhaps governments of these countries are more 
constrained by their constituencies, so that they face more pressures to set the opti­
mal contract. In less developed countries, governments with less pressures are more 
discretionary and are able to avoid the optimal contract.
As it was pointed out in the 2004 INFRATRAIN at the Technical University of Berlin, Germany 
has allowed the duplication of fixed costs in pipeline transmission relying only in the supervision 
of the competition authority. This is an interesting feature in the light of our delegation model. 
In this case the use of "light” regulation could be seen as a way to reduce the bargaining power of 
the regulator to reduce the stake of collusion, whereas at the same time implementing the optimal 
contract trough the duplication of fixed costs. It rest to see, as in the other cases, if the optimal 
level of duplication of fixed costs has been attained.
CHAPTER 4
Regulation of multi product industries under political 
constraints
4,1 Introduction
Chapter 3 studies the effects of political economy constraints on the design of an 
industry producing homogeneous output. It shows that a self interested regulator 
can affect the choice taken by Congress between monopoly or duopoly, as the optimal 
way to serve the market. The reason is that political economy constraints in the 
form of capture may strengthen Auriol and Laffont’s (1992) findings that under 
certain circumstances duopoly dominates monopoly in spite of the duplication of 
fixed costs.
The set up of the previous chapter ignores many important questions, such as the 
effect of endogenous transaction costs of capture, the dynamics of industry design, 
asymmetric information from the demand side, and so on. Rather than exploring 
the possible answers to those questions this chapter focuses on a parallel question
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of the effects of capture in the context of heterogeneous products.
To pursue our goal the chapter follows Dana (1993)’s model of industry design, 
which analyzes the way in which a political principal (Congress in our setting) should 
organize a multiproduct industry, in which each of the products are considered 
natural monopolies in their own markets. That is, should Congress opt for an 
industry structure allowing only one firm to operate in all markets, or should it opt 
for an industry structure where several firms, each producing one good, operate in 
the market?
Basically, Dana (1993) studies the choice between horizontal integration versus 
separation of firms operating in a two-product natural monopoly industry^, in which 
firms have private information about their marginal cost of production. He compares 
two different organizational structures: a decentralized organization in which each 
product is allocated to a separate firm, and an integrated organization in which con­
trol of both products is given to a single multiproduct firm. According to Dana the 
crucial difference between these organizational structures is that private information 
is divided between two agents in the decentralized organization while a single agent 
learns both pieces of private information in the integrated one.
What Dana explores in his paper is the existence of informational economies of 
scope that occur when production is assigned to one firm and the regulator has to 
deal only with one agent possessing private information about the cost of produc­
tion, rather with two agents each one possessing one piece of private information. 
These informational economies of scope appear because, when markets are decen­
tralized, the regulator has to pay to prevent unilateral deviations in cost reports in 
each market. Whereas under integration the optimal mechanism does not need to
^Dana considers strictly differentiated products between which no substituability nor comple­
mentarity exists; one example could be natural gas high pressure transmission and electricity high 
voltage transmission, natural gas distribution and electricity distribution and electricity transmis­
sion and fixed link telecommunications. lossa (1999) studies the case for asymmetric information 
in demand and analyzes substitutes and complements.
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compensate the firm for both unilateral deviations. It only compensates the firm 
for a simultaneous deviation in both markets^. In this case, if the firm deviates 
in a single market it still earns a rent equal to what it could have earned having 
chosen to deviate in the second market as well. Dana shows that under low cor­
relation the transfers given up to the firm to prevent deviations under integration 
are smaller than under decentralisation. Therefore, the regulator can increase wel­
fare by awarding both monopoly franchises to a single firm. In his framework, the 
optimal industry organization depends on whether the benefit of relative perfor­
mance incentives (i.e. yardstick competition) is larger or smaller than the benefit of 
informational economies of scope.
This chapter analyzes the optimal organization of a multi-product natural monopoly 
industry, by incorporating political economy constraints in the form of capture. As 
in the previous chapter, the extension is borrowed from Laffont & Tirole (1993) and 
Laffont (2000).
The chapter proceeds as follows: section (4.2) settles the general model and 
introduces the delegation technology, section (4.3) solves the asymmetric information 
case, section (4.4) solves the problem for the benevolent regulator case, section (4.5) 
solves the non-benevolent regulator case and finally section (4.6) concludes.
4.2 T he m odel
4.2.1 General specification
Consider the following problem based on Dana (1993). There is an industry produc­
ing two different goods; Congress may choose to have one firm producing both goods
^“Mathematically this result arises because the constraints imposed on the mechanism design 
problem under integration are different and are relaxed relative to the non-integration cases when 
correlation is sufficiently low” (Dana (1993) p. 290). We will explain this result in the next pages 
when we analyse the constraints of the regulator’s optimisation problem.
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or two firms, each producing one good. Each of the products is assumed to be a 
natural monopoly, so at most one firm produces each product. Each firm is assumed 
to have private information about the marginal cost of the products it produces, but 
not that of the other firm. There are no economies of scope or other commonalities 
in the production of the two goods, except that the marginal costs are possibly 
correlated. Congress maximizes expected social welfare: S{q) — T  +  a{T — C{q)) 
where S{q) ~ T  is the total consumer surplus, T  is the total revenue of the firm^, 
G{q) is total cost and 0 < a  < 1 is the weight of profits for Congress. Therefore, as 
in the previous two chapters, welfare is a weighted sum of the consumer surplus and 
producer surplus. However, as mentioned by Dana, this welfare specification differs 
slightly from the one we have used previously. In our previous specification we use a 
tax distortion A, whereas in the present one a is only a distributional parameter^ that 
represents Congress’ preference for income in the hands of consumers rather than in 
the hands of firms. According to Armstrong et al. (1994) both welfare specifications 
give similar results, therefore, for simplicity we follow Dana’s specification. The two 
goods are produced at constant marginal costs, ci and cg, where ci G {c^, c^} and 
C2 G {cg,c^. The realization of each good’s cost (high, low) is only observed by 
the firm engaged in its production. The cost realizations are described by the joint 
binary probability distribution < (^ci,C2). There are four realizations of (ci,C2) so 
0 is represented by The marginal (or unconditional) probability
distributions, r{c{) and r(c2), must satisfy the identities r\ =  r^ = (j)^ ^
 ^There are two direct interpretations of the model: 1) The government regulates the firm by 
setting price, or output, and by making transfer payments to the firm. 2) The government is 
engaged directly in the procurement of the public goods from the industry and contracts with the 
firm on output and total transfers. Dana uses the two interpretations of the firm’s revenue. In the 
procurement contest T is the total transfer paid from the government to the firm. In the context 
of the regulated firm producing a marketed good, the firm’s total revenue, T = t + p{q)q, consists 
of the transfer payment from the government, t, plus the firm’s sales revenue, p(g)g. Without loss 
of generality we follow the second specification.
'^The specification used in the previous two chapters, expressed in this context is given by 
iS'(ç) — (1 + S)T + {T " C{q)) where S is the distortionary cost of rising public funds. See also 
Armstrong et al. (1994) for an explanation of the difference in both formulations.
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and T2  ~  Tg =  with r\ +  r f  =  1 and =  1 .
The marginal distributions are symmetric if =  rj =  r\, that is <jf^  = ffK  Si{qi) is 
assumed to be increasing and concave in output, that is, the inverse demand given 
by Pi(qi) ~  S[{qi) is decreasing. The two markets are symmetric if the marginal 
distributions are symmetric, and if the cost and benefit functions are the same for 
both markets, Si{q) — S 2 {q), é  — c\ =  Cg and c^  ^=  cf =  Cg.
4.2.2 D ana’s main results
With the above framework Dana (1993) sets a game in which the regulator first
chooses the organization of the industry (one or two firms) and later uses optimal
incentive contracts in order to induce efficient production and to maximize welfare.
In designing the optimal mechanism Dana uses the revelation principle (Myerson 
(1979)) so it is possible to restrict attention to mechanisms in which firms announce 
their costs truthfully. Ex-post individual rationality and incentive compatibility 
constraints are imposed®.
Dana solves the regulatory problem of designing industry structure by looking 
to three optimization programmes. The first one is a benchmark case in which each 
industry is regulated as an “independent natural monopoly”, in this case regulation 
is independent of the cost correlation parameter. The second one involves two firms 
attending the market, where each one is a natural monopoly in its own market. 
Finally he considers one firm producing two goods (integrated production).
Before describing Dana’s results, it is worth explaining his solution procedure 
as we shall be replicating this in several forthcoming sections. The choice between 
monopoly production of both goods ( “integration”) and single firm production of
^Notice that, as in our previous chapter, Dana’s model also uses yardstick competition to 
cut rents. Therefore, it is necessary to impose constraints to avoid the Crémer-McLean result. 
According to Auriol h  Laffont (1992), the ex-post incentive rationality constraint together with 
restricting the analysis to two states informational parameters permit the avoidance of Crémer- 
McLean’s result.
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each good (“decentralisation”) depends on the correlation between production costs 
(ci,C2). As mentioned in section (4.1), for low correlation, integration would be 
preferred because it forces the producer to internalise the effects of its cost report 
( “informational economies of scope”). However, a sufficient level of correlation allows 
the regulator to use yardstick competition to extract rents (i.e. make lower transfers) 
in the presence of two firms as in chapter 3. If the level of correlation is p, then 
the search is for a threshold value of p (say p), such that when p < p the regulator 
chooses integration while when p > p, decentraliation is preferred.
When comparing the optimisation programmes mentioned above, Dana shows 
that the only difference between decentralization and integration is given by one 
incentive compatibility constraint in state ill). Therefore, from the solution of the 
optimisation programme under integration, Dana is able to solve for the cost corre­
lation parameter p and to analyse its role in cutting informational rents to increase 
welfare. He finds that for the cost correlation parameter p being smaller than p, the 
constraint in state [11] under integration is not binding. This permits the regulator 
not to pay for unilateral deviations in states if\l) and [Ih). In those states the ex­
ternal effects of such deviations are internalized by the integrated firm, making the 
expected transfer payments smaller under integration than under decentralisation 
(as previously noted in section (4.1)). However, iox p>  p the constraint in state {II) 
binds under integration, making transfers under separation smaller. This result is 
obtained because of the expected transfers under decentralisation depend on quan­
tities in states {hi) and {Ih)  ^ that is, and q^ f', whereas under integration they 
depend on quantities in state (A/i), that is, q^^ and Dana shows that for p < p, 
Qi > qi^ and q^ > qÿ^ which makes transfers under integration smaller. However, 
for p > p, q i’ < qi^ and q^J^  < which makes transfers under decentralisation 
smaller. Finally, since the output vector is fixed, welfare is determined by the size 
of transfer payments. Thus, the optimal organization of the industry depends on p, 
for *0 > p decentralized markets are optimal and îoi p < p integrated markets are
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optimal.
4.2.3 Delegation technology
In Dana’s model the regulator (principal) has perfect information about the thresh­
old level of the cost correlation parameter p, that is, he has perfect information 
about the binding constraints under each optimisation programme. In our case, 
we assume that Congress (our principal) cannot see p. Therefore, as in chapter 3, 
Congress uses an informed regulator to obtain the true information about the cor­
relation parameter®. We assume a three tier simple delegation model in which the 
players are Congress, regulator and the firm.
With delegation the timing of the game is as follows: 1) Firms know their own 
cost types and the level of the correlation parameter. 2) The regulator receives 
a signal (cr) about whether the cost correlation parameter p is smaller than the 
threshold level p, or receives no information at alF (cr =  0). We assume that when 
p >  p the signal received by Congress is always cr =  0. 3) Congress builds contracts 
based on the expectations of the report (r) from the regulator and proceeds to offer 
optimal contracts accordingly. 4) Contracts are signed, production and transfers 
take place. As in chapter 3 the information provided to Congress by the regulator 
is assumed to be hard information, which means that the regulator cannot lie about 
the observation since he has to give a hard proof of it®.
With this setting we construct the game shown in figure (4.1). In the first
^Alternatively, we recognise that real world industry design is often altered over time -ie. 
Congress has asymmetric information about how to organise the industry. For instance the mo­
nopolistic behaviour in the electricity pool of England and Wales was overlooked prior reform .The 
assumption that p is unobservable may be due to the fact that Congress does not have the resources 
to solve Dana’s full information rather at the start of the game. Instead it hired a regulator to 
help in the process.
I^t seems plausible that the regulator observes a signal p < p, rather than p > p. This is 
because high valuation of p improve Congress’ ability to extract rents (indeed for p =  1 the 
Cremer & McLean (1985)’s result applies). Thus, the firms are more likely to conceal high p if 
possible.
®See Tirole (1986) and Laffont (2000).
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Figure 4,1: The game 
Nature
Asymmetric Inf.
Benevolent Regulator
Non-Benevolent Regulator Report Manipulation
Prob(a = p < p) = ^
ProbiAI) =  1 -  C(1 -  0)
p < p with prob (1  — 6)> p with prob
Prob{FI) =  C(1 -  e)
Prob(cr =  0) =  (1  — )^
level of the game Congress has asymmetric information (AI) about the state of 
nature of the correlation parameter, therefore Congress maximises expected welfare 
under asymmetric information =  9Wd +  (1 — 0)VF/, where Wd is welfare under 
decentralisation and Wj is welfare under integration. In the second level of the 
game Congress uses a benevolent regulator who receives a signal a about whether 
the correlation parameter is than p with probability (  or, he receives no information 
at all (cr =  0 )  with probability (1 — C)> However, if the correlation parameter is p > p 
the regulator’s signal is cr =  0  as well. At this stage, the regulator, being benevolent, 
reports the signal truthfully to Congress. Therefore, when the state of nature of the 
correlation parameter is p < p Congress is fully informed of being at point (A) with 
probability ((1 — 6), then with that probability it maximises W/. However, when 
the report is r  =  cr =  0  Congress has to adapt expectations over cr =  0 ,  therefore, it 
maximises with probability (1 — ((1 — 9)). In this case Congress at point (B). 
In the final level of the game we allow for report manipulation, that is, when the
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signal (T = p smaller than p, the regulator can report r  =  0 .  Finally, at this stage, 
we solve for the optimisation programme under a non-benevolent regulator. As we 
will see, under some circumstances, the solution of the programmes still provides 
information to Congress to decide the right industry structure.
In the following pages we solve for the welfare optimisation programmes in each 
level of the game, that is: asymmetric information without delegation, delegation 
to a benevolent regulator and, after determining the stake of collusion, we solve 
optimal industry design when a non-benevolent regulator is present.
4.3 A sym m etric inform ation
4.3.1 Expected welfare under asym metric information
In this section we develop the first part of figure (4.1). We assume that Congress
cannot see whether the correlation parameter p is bigger or smaller than the ap-
propiate threshold level p. Therefore it has to implement contracts according to 
expectations. As in Dana we seek for a threshold where if the correlation coefficient 
p is bigger decentralisation is preferred, let call this
Assume that the correlation parameter is p > p with probability 9 and that with 
probability (1 — 9), it is p < p. Then Congress has to solve the following problem^:
max = 9Wd +  (1 -  9)Wi
= 9{Si{qi) T *S*2 (^ ?2) ~ Id -f a[Td — ciqi — C2Ç2]) +
(1 — 9){Si{qi) +  S 2 {q2 ) — Ti + a[Tj — Ciqi — C2Ç2])
=  'S'x(çi) +  ^(ga) — dTd +  9cx.\Td — ciqi — 02^2] ~
(1 — 9)Tj +  (1 — ^)o;[r/ — cigi — C2g2] (4.1)
®Here stands for welfare under asymmetric information, Wd is welfare under decentrali­
sation, Wi is welfare under integration, Td are the transfers under decentralisation and Tj are the 
transfers under integration. See appendix C.2.
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The problem has to be solved subject to the individual rationality and incentive 
compatibility constraints under decentralization and integration, the first order con­
dition for the constraints are shown below:
1. Individual rationality constraint under decentralisation (IRD):
_  cAgM] > 0 (4.2)
2. Incentive compatibility constraints under decentralisation (ICD)
-  r'*'* -  -  cJ4'‘ +  > 0 (4.3)
-  T'*'* -  4 q i‘ -  +  4gf] > 0 (4.4)
x‘‘[T“ -  44' -  44' - (4 - 4)4' -  ( 4  -  4)4"] > 0 (4.5)
3. Individual rationality constraint under integration (IRI):
-  c fg f  -  4 f l > 0 (4.6)
4. Incentive compatibility constraints under integration'": (ICI):
-  t'“'* - 44'“ - 44'“ + 44'* + 44'“] > 0 (4.7)
AU [yU _  yM _ > q (4.8)
A‘/[T" -  T “  -  44' -  44' + 44' + 44'] > o (4.s)
A^'[y" - T'" -  44' - 44'+44'* + 44'*] > o (4.10)
Notice that constraints (4.9), (4.10) and (4.11) can be written as: 
(4-4)?2'*j^“-ci9“-492-(4*-4)9i'‘“ (c2-4)g2'‘.^^ '-4 '? i-492-(ci-4)ç('^‘-(4-4)<72'‘.
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xU t “ -  T'*'* -  44 - 44 + 44" + 44"] > o (4.11)
Where 7 ^^  ^ is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for the constraints in state {hh) and the 
different A’s are the Kuhn-I\icker multipliers for the other states. Clearly the indi­
vidual rationality constraints (4.2) and (4.6) are the same. The incentive compati­
bility constraints only differ in state {II), since constraint (4.3) is equal to constraint 
(4.7) and constraint (4.4) is equal to constraints^ (4.8).
4.3.2 Optimal regulation under asym metric information
The general solution of the above problem is given byS :^
=  4  (4.12)
S ' M Y ’  =  4  (4.13)
5 ' ( 4 r  =  of +  ^ ^ i ± h i i M ( 4 _ 4 )  (4,14)
S H Y '  =  4  +  ^ ^ ± ^ ,^ ^ 1 ^ ( 4  -  4 ) (4.15)
and similarS^ for gg.
Dana’s solutions'^, which for us is the full information (FI) solution, is given by
^^Notice that they are equal to: — c^ qjf — (cj -  and —(c^  -  c[)g^ .^
^ S^ee appendix C.2.
s I^n the following solutions of the different optimisation programmes we will present the solution 
for firm 1, the reader should notice that the solution for firm 2 is symmetric. 
i^See C.l.
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the following pricing equations:
S U T  =  4  (4.16)
s 'M T  =  4  (4.17)
s ' H r  = 4  +  ^ ( 4 - 4 )  (4.18)
s 'U T  =  4 +  ^ ^ ^ ( 4 - 4 )  (4.19)
these solutions are used as a benchmark for our results.
The non-observability of the correlation parameter produces the following effects 
compared with the optimal mechanism under intégration^^:
1 . As is standard in the literature, quantities produced in the most efficient states 
(ie. II ) are not distorted from the first best allocation. Equations (4.12), and 
(4.13) are equal to equations (4.16) and (4.17).
2 . Quantities produced in the less efficient states are distorted in order to cut 
informational rents. However, they are bigger under asymmetric information, 
than under under full information^®.
To see this we compare equations (4.15) and (4.19) so that for 0 < 0 < 1, 
then > (gf^)^^. Since the constraints associated with the first order
conditions (4.5), (4.9), (4.10) and (4.11) are binding^”^ we have that (g^^^ =
{ g i Y '  > { g i T  =
3. Since quantities produced in the less efficient states are increased we have 
productive inefficiency under asymmetric information. The increase in quan-
®^It is important to make clear from here and on that in the different situations analysed, we 
solve for the optimal mechanism under integration and we compare the different solutions with 
Dana’s result and the asymmetric information result.
®^See appendices C.l and 0.2
"^^ Notice that this is Dana’s result whenever > 0, the difference in our model is that we also 
have in our pricing equations (where d stands for decentralisation), if this constraint is also 
binding it must be the case that (g^ )^"^  ^=  (çj'^ ‘)^  ^ as well.
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titles also produces an increase in transfers given up to the most efficient 
firms, since transfers depend on the production levels of the less efficient 
firms^ ® E[{T)-^^] > £?[(T)^^]. Therefore, given that Congress dislikes transfers 
(0  < CK < 1), there is distributive inefficiency^®.
Let us now consider the effects of these observations. First consider welfare 
implications. It is clear from the second observation that asymmetric information 
quantities of the less efficient firms are higher than their full information counter­
parts. Therefore, it proves that transfers are higher in the asymmetric information 
case. As welfare is decreasing in the level of transfers we have the following result.
R esult 1 2 . The increase in quantities produced by the less efficient firms under 
asymmetric information, compared to full information about the correlation param­
eter, produces a reduction in welfare . The reduction in welfare comes
from the increase in productive inefficiency and the increase in rents given up to the 
most efficient firm.
Now consider how this result affects Congress’ preference for integration or de­
centralisation. We might expect that the desire to cut additional rents under asym­
metric information would lead Congress to rely more on yardstick competition. 
Therefore we need to study the effects of asymmetric information on the corre­
lation parameter. The constraints under integration and decentralisation are the 
same except in state {II). Hence, results depend on whether the constraints on this 
state are binding or not. First consider the associated constraints (4.5), (4.9) and 
(4.10), clearly (4.5) can be obtained by adding up (4.9) and (4.10). Therefore, as 
in Dana (1993), the relevant constraint is (4.11). The regulator makes his decision 
about industry structure depending whether this constraint is binding or not. Con­
sider the case where > 0 (so the associated constraint holds with equality). In
^®This is a standard result in the literature as well, due to the fact that transfers depend on the 
production level of the less efficient firms.
®^See Armstrong et al. (1994).
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such a case < gf'  ^ and gf* < gj^. The fact that Aj > 0 and Aj > 0 from the pric­
ing equations above implies that the associated constraints also hold with equality, 
therefore gf^  =  gf^ and gj* =  gj^. Prom this we can equalise (4.14) and (4.15) and 
the same for gg obtaining®®:
‘ + (1 - 0 ) * ( )
-  ( i - 0 ) ( ÿ M + m  "  (T T g )^ '
Wi ^  (1 -  g ) [ ( / 0 ' ‘' ‘ -  0  , il ,.
"  (1 -  + 4>M){,phh + ÿih) (1 - 0 ) “ '  '
Now solving for A^ g =  0 give us:
( / « “  -  ^  ("»)
which produces the following result.
R esu lt 13. The level of correlation beyond which decentralization is chosen is re­
duced under asymmetric information compared to full information,
(^Z^/i)l/2(y./y.^)l/2 — (r(ri)V2(7'^7'^)l/2
Therefore, under asymmetric information. Congress is more likely to decide for 
decentralization when integration is optima?^.
To check on our results, notice that when ^ =  0 we are back to Dana’s solution 
under integration, with the correlation parameter beyond which decentralisation is
^°See appendix C.2.The solution for the threshold value of p under all the situations we analise is obtained from the solution for the Lagrange multipliers when Ajg =  0- See appendix C,2,
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chosen at its maximun level. Whereas, for  ^ =  1 we obtain the solution under 
decentralisation®®, with the level of correlation beyond which decentralisation is 
chosen at its minimum level. (Technically, when 6 = 1 the constraints for the 
integrated structure do not play any roll in the solution.).
4.4 B enevolent regulator
4.4.1 Expected welfare under a benevolent regulator
This section develops the second part of figure (4.1). Therefore, we introduce dele­
gation to the above problem and specify the optimisation programme according to 
the signals received by the regulator about the cost correlation parameter. Finally, 
we also check if there is an increase in welfare by using an informed regulator to 
settle contracts. As before we look for the threshold level of p beyond which de­
centralisation is chosen, when Congress uses a benevolent regulator. We call this 
threshold level p®.
Consider the following information technology: Congress hires a benevolent reg­
ulator in order to receive information about the correlation parameter, with prob­
ability (  he observes a signal cr = p < p and submits his report r = p < p. With 
probability (1 — (), he observes cr =  0 and reports r  =  0. When p > p the regulator 
always observes cr — 0. Congress also knows that there are two states of nature for 
the correlation parameter, that is p > p or p < p with probabilities 6 and (1 — 0 ) 
respectively. Therefore, Congress is fully informed (point A in figure (4.1)) with 
probability ( ( 1  — 0) and maximises with that probability. Notice that in this 
case, is equal to Dana’s welfare under integration W/. On the other hand, 
when it faces r  =  cr =  0 it updates its believes usin Baye’s rule®®. Therefore with
recover Dana’s pricing equations under decentralisation. See appendix C.1.2.
^^Congess has to calculate the total probability of cr =  0 as Prob{a =  0) =  Prob(a ~ %\p < p)Prob{p < p) + Prob{a — 0|p > p)Pvob{p > p) =  (1 -  ()(1 -  0) +  0 =  (1 -  ((1 -  9)),
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probability (1 — ( ( 1  — 0)), Congress has no information (point B in the same figure) 
and maximises Hence, Congress’ optimisation problem now is given by:
max W '’ =  f (1 -  e)W '^‘ +  (1 -  C(1 -  9 ))W ^‘
= c(i -  o)w‘ +  (1 -  c(i -  B))[ew^  + (1 -  e)w’\
= (1 -  0)(i +  (ie)w‘ + 0(1 -  c(i -  0))VK‘*
=  i )W ‘ +  (1 -  i>)W ‘ (4.25)
where the conditional probabilities of Congress being fully informed and not in­
formed are (1 — 0)(1 +  (0) =  *0 and 0(1 — ((1 — 0)) =  (1 — if}), respectively. Finally, 
by making straightforward substitutions we have:
lyt- _  = c(i -  e)[w^  ^-  -  0C(i -  e)[w^  -  >  o (4.26)
Equation (4.26) is obtained from Dana’s result that for p < p welfare under inte­
gration is greater than or equal to welfare under decentralisation {W^ > W^), due 
to the fact that transfers under integration are smaller than under decentralisation 
(F7[T(g)]<E[Tx(g) + 71;(g)]).
R esult 14. From equation (4.26) above, having an informed benevolent regulator is 
useful since it increases welfare compared to asymmetric information.
Congress has an optimisation problem similar to the one solved in section (4.3.1), 
the difference comes from the way in which the probabilities affect the welfare func­
tions and the constraints.
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4.4.2 Optimal regulation w ith a benevolent regulator
Under a benevolent regulator we find the following pricing equations®^:
S’H Ÿ  =  4  (4.27)
S 'M Y  = 4  (4.28)
s ' H f  =  4  +  - ^ ^ - - " ( 4 - 4 )  (4.29)
s ' U H  =  4  +  ^''‘ y “ ' (4 - 4 ) (4.30)
Delegation to a benevolent regulator has the following effects compared with the 
optimal mechanism:
1 . Quantities produced in the most efficient states are not distorted, equations 
(4.27) and (4.28).
2. Quantities produced in the less efficient states are distorted in order to cut in­
formational rents. They are reduced compared to the solution for asymmetric 
information, but they are still greater than or equal to the solution under full 
information. Therefore, under integration productive inefficiency is reduced 
compared to asymmetric information.
Notice that (-0) >  (1 — 0), then comparing equations (4.15), (4.19) and (4.30) 
we have that (gf^)^^ > (gf' )^  ^> We have that for > 0 quantities in
states hi are equal to quantities in state hh in every case ((gf )^* =  (gf^O^, where 
the Ts refer to the informational environments (i.e. FI, AI, 6). Therefore, we 
reach the above conclusion.
3. Since quantities are reduced, transfers given up to the most efficient firms are 
reduced as well. Due to the assumption that Congress values income in hands
^^ See complete solution in appendix C.3.1.
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of the firms less than income in hands of consumers (0  < a  <  1), there is a 
reduction in the distributive inefficiency.
Therefore, we confirm result (14) with the following result:
R esu lt 15. Delegation to a benevolent regulator produces a reduction in productive 
and distributive inefficiencies. The reduction in the inefficiencies produces an in­
crease in the expected welfare under delegation to a benevolent regulator compared 
to asymmetric information, > VF® >
Regarding the correlation parameter, given that { l—fj) < 6, we find the following 
result:
R esu lt 16. A benevolent regulator increases the level of correlation beyond which 
decentralization is chosen, compared to its level under asymmetric information;
(y.iy./l)l/2(^iy.^)l/2
0/1/1
(r[rf)^/2(r2r 2 )^ /®
_ h^h>  =  __EZ________________ E Z ______________________ (A Qi \(j,iy.ft)l/2(y.iy./l)l/2
A benevolent regulator provides Congress with information that reduces his ex­
pectation of facing the state of nature p >  p and, therefore, there is a reduction in 
the expectation of yardstick competition being more efficient to cut rents, than the 
use of informational economies of scope.
We still need to check two extreme cases. For i/? =  1 it is required 0 — 0. 
Therefore, in this case we have Dana’s solution for the integrated case. For *0 =  0 it 
is needed to have 0 =  1. Thus, as in the asymmetric information case, we are back 
to Dana’s solution under decentralisation due that the constraints for the integrated 
structure do not play any roll in the solution.
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4.4.3 Comparing profits
This section and section (4,5) develops the third and final part of the game presented 
in figure (4.1). As a building block to model a non-benevolent regulator this section 
defines and compares profits under asymmetric information and a benevolent reg­
ulator. The objective is to define the stake of collusion between the regulator and 
the firm, that produces the incentives for the regulator’s strategic behaviour.
AI profits versus benevolent reg u la to r’s profits
We have that 11(g) =  T{q) — C{q) is the profit that the firm earns as a function 
of the output vector to be implemented by the planner. Hence, under asymmetric 
information those profits are:
ein"(9 '" ')l =  s n ‘j{q^') +  (i -
=  9[{d: -  +  ( 4  -  +
(1 -  e) max {(4 -  + (4 -  4 )(«2'‘)'^ ';
(4-4)(4y' + (4-4)(4T';
(4 - + (4 - (4.32)
However, under a benevolent regulator they are:
s[n"(4)l = i>n‘}(q<’) + (1 -  v)n‘j(4)
=  (1 -  ^ )[(4  -  4 ) ( 4 Y  +  ( 4  -  4 )  (4")"] + 
i> max {(4 - c[){qrf + (4 - 4)(4'‘)‘l 
(4-4)(4V + (4-4)(4V;
(4 - 4)(?r)' + (4 - 4)(4'‘)’’} (4.33)
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Prom the first order conditions of the optimization programme^® we have: (gf > 
(g f^ ; > (gJO  ^ and > (gf^ )**; > (gj^)^. Therefore, the
expected profits under asymmetric information are greater than or equal to the 
expected profits under benevolent regulator^®.
An"(g) =  s [ n “(î'^Ol -  ®[n“(g'’)]
= e[{c1 -  é M i i ' y  -  (gfT) + (4 -  4)((?f)'‘' -  (??)'')! + 
C0(i -  «)(4 -  4)(4V+c«(i -  «)(4 -  4)(4'*)''l +
max { ( 4  -  4 ) [ ( 1  -  -  ( îD '')  -  ce(i -  0 )(?f'‘)'] +
(4 -  4)[(i -  m < A Y ‘ -  («?)'■) -  C«(i -  «)(gf )"];
( 4  -  4 )[(i -  0 )((4 ‘) "  -  (%“ )'’) -  m  -  +
(4 -  4)[(l -  0 ) ( . { < é y  -  (g^)") -  C«(i -  e ) ( g f  )‘l;
( 4  -  4)[(1 -  0 ) { { q i Y '  -  ( g f ) ' ’) -  (g (l -  0 ) (g f ) ‘] +
(4 -  4)[(1 -  0 ) { i q i Y ‘ -  (gJ*)'’) -  C«(1 -  9)(g3*)'l} > o (4,34)
Therefore, if the firms face a cost correlation parameter p < p, transfers under
integration are less than or equal to transfers under asymmetric information. Thus, 
firms are better off under asymmetric information. Finally, notice that for  ^=  0 we 
have 'ip = 0 which makes — g^ , from equations (4,14) (4.15), (4.29) and (4.30). 
Therefore, in that case, we have All^^(g) =  0, and there is nothing to be gained from 
capture.
Appendices C.2, C.3.1. 
®^See appendix C.5.1.
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4.5 N on-benevolent regulator
4.5.1 Welfare under a non-benevolent regulator
As in chapter 3, for a self interested regulator there is scope for strategic behaviour, 
for instance if the regulator receives a signal, a — p < p and reports r  =  0 , the firm 
can get AIl"(g) > 0 as defined by equation (4.34). The maximum amount that the 
firm is willing to offer to the regulator is a bribe of All^^(g) with a value for the 
regulator of kAU!‘^ {q). As in chapter 3 fc — and Ac is the exogenous transaction 
cost of the side transfer from the regulator to the firm. For Congress to provide 
incentives to the regulator to tell the truth requires a transfer:
s ~  /cAn“(g) (4.35)
The expected cost of the incentive payment is given by^ :^
a ( l  -  ^ )(s =  a ( l  -  g)(&An"(g) (4.36)
With the above information in mind, the new optimization problem for Congress 
is:
max =  C(1 -  e)W^^ + (1 -  C(1 -  e))W^^ -  aC(l -  0)s
=  C(1 -  e)W^ +  (1 -  C(1 -  e))[9W^ +  (1 -  9)W^] -  a ( ( l  -  9)s 
=  ( 1 -  9)(1 +  CO)W  ^-h (^1 -  C(1 -  0))W^ -  aC(l -  9)s 
=  +  (1 -  ^) -  o:((l -  g)s (4.37)
'^^ This is because the payment occurs with probability (1 -  6)Ç which is the probability for 
Congress to be full informed while facing a non-benevolent regulator and it has a distributive cost
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Subject to the same individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints 
as in section (4.4.2) and to the truth-telling constraint given by equation (4.35).
4.5.2 Optimal regulation under a non-benevolent regulator
As before the solution^® of the optimisation programme is given by the following 
pricing equations:
(4.38)
(4.39)
=  4
s M ’')’"' =  4
s M T =  4  4-
=  c, +
4>hi
(4.41)^hh
In this case the comparison with the optimal mechanism brings the following results:
1. Again quantities produced in the most efficient states are not distorted.
2. Quantities produced in the less efficient states are distorted in order to cut in­
formational rents. They are reduced compared to the solution for the benevo­
lent regulator. As in chapter 3, Congress reduces quantities in order to reduce 
the stake of collusion. Therefore, rents paid to the most efficient firm are re­
duced as well. This reduction in rents should increase welfare since Congress 
dislikes rents (0 < a  < 1), However, the decrease in rents has a cost that comes 
from the transfer given up to the non-benevolent regulator, which Congress 
also dislikes. As long as the cost of preventing capture^® is less than the sav­
ings from the reduction in rents (a (l — 0)CfcAH^ (^g” )^ < H(g^) — H(g"^)) the 
non-benevolent regulator is still useful because he increases welfare relative to 
the asymmetric information case.
^^See appendix C.4.1.
Notice that ex-post the cost of preventing capture is based on
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Notice that the above feature is particular to Dana’s model. Compared to 
chapter 3, here the output vector is fixed, therefore welfare depends on the 
size of the transfer payment. That is, in each of our solutions quantities pro­
duced by the most efficient firms are the same, only quantities produced in 
the less efficient states are distorted. These quantities determine rents paid to 
the most efficient firms. On the other hand, in this model, consumer surplus 
is determined by quantities produced in the most efficient states. Thus, chap­
ter 3, additional to the cost of preventing capture, a non-benevolent regulator 
reduced consumer surplus, whereas now consumer surplus remains constant. 
Hence, we have to balance the effects of capture between the cost of its pre­
vention and the savings in rents paid to the most efficient firm; the result is 
that a non-benevolent regulator could be welfare improving.
3. We observe that quantities produced in the less efficient states under full in­
formation are also smaller than the ones produced under a non-benevolent 
regulator. Therefore, we need to determine the relationship between 
and where i f  refer to the nature of the firms’ cost parameters. To
visualise this relationship we proceed in three steps. First, we take > 0, 
with {0 < "ip < 1) and (0  < fe < 1), and compare equations (4.15), (4.30) and 
(4.41), we conclude that (g^^)"'' < (g^^^  ^ < (g'* )^^ .^ Second, we notice that 
< g^hh'^ nb < ^ghh'^ Ai gg well, 80 that, W6 need to check (g^ )^^ *» versus
^  W ~ ^)^12 T Q:C(1 -  oyh
then, for the expression to be smaller than or equal to zero, with (g^^)’^  ^ > 
{qhh)F^  ^ we require 0 < aC(l — Oyk < (1 — 'ip)Xi2 - Third, as in the previous 
cases, for Aÿg > 0 we have that constraints (4.5), (4.9) (4.10) and (4.11) are 
binding, therefore, (gf^)”  ^=  (gf''-)"*', in each case.
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An interesting feature of this result is that, if the above inequality is satisfied, 
quantities under a non-benevolent regulator could be smaller than quantities 
under full information. To understand this, notice that Aÿg is the lagrange mul­
tiplier of the constraint on decentralisation, therefore it represents the marginal 
effect of an increase in the rents on social welfare. On the other hand, the ex­
pression affected by the capture parameter k is the expected marginal social 
cost of an increase in the transfer to the non-benevolent regulator. Therefore, 
the relationship could be interpreted as follows: if the expected marginal cost 
of the rents is bigger than the expected marginal cost of the incentive payment 
to the regulator, then is reduced up to full information levels. How­
ever, when the contrary is true, that is, when the expected marginal cost of 
the incentive payment to the regulator is bigger than the marginal effect of the 
rents paid to the firm, capture is so costly that the optimal mechanism reduces 
q^hh-^ nb beyond full information levels to minimise the stake of collusion.
Therefore, from points two and three above we have the following result:
R esult 17. A non-benevolent regulator could be useful as long as the total costs of 
preventing capture are smaller than savings in rents paid to the firm. That is as long 
as (a{X — 9)C,kù>H!‘\q^^) < H(g^) — H(g"^)j. For certain values of the parameters 
preventing capture could he so costly that quantities and transfers could be reduced 
beyond full information levels.
With respect to the correlation parameter, delegation to a non-benevolent regu­
lator produces the following result:
R esu lt 18, The level of correlation beyond which decentralisation is chosen is given
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by:
nb _
{rir^y i^ irlr^y i’^
_i______________  . .o x
(fir^y^^ir^r^y^^
Equation (4.42) differs from the one obtained for the benevolent regulator p < p, 
equation (4.31), by the term multiplied by the capture parameter k. The first 
thing to notice from equation (4.42) is that the marginal effect of capture on 
the correlation parameter could be positive or negative. In general, for >
)+  ^  ^ +  ((p^^y] the marginal effect is positive. This feature is in­
teresting because, from section (4.2.2), we know that it is precisely the externalities 
produced by deviations in states (hi) and (ih) that Congress wants to internalise 
with the integrated structure. Hence, in this case the non-benevolent regulator pro­
vides information on the higher probabilities of these states. A positive marginal 
effect of capture on the correlation parameter increases p"^  ^ over p .^ However, as 
with quantities, we must study the relationship among parameters to determine the 
position of relative to p.
We call [-] =  \{(P^ ^^ {1 - 9 ) -  (P^ )^{<p^  ^+  (P^ )^ +  (<^ ^^ 1 - 9 ) -  +  <^ '^ )1 and
(.)(.) =  ((^ ^^  -f- (p^ )^(^ (p^ ^^  + (p^ )^. Prom above we know that [•] > 0 for >
é>(ÿ (ç!> +(f> _)±4> +ff> .)] Therefore, we can prove that^° that for any
the relationship runs as follows p > p^^ > p  ^ > p^^. There­
fore, the non-benevolent regulator still permits alerts exploitation of informational 
economies of scope over the levels permitted under asymmetric information. How­
ever, if the inequality is reversed then > p the non-benevolent regulator must 
be harmfuP^ since the level of correlation beyond which decentralisation is cho-
^°See appendix C.4.1.
^^ See appendix C.4.1.
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sen is greater than the one obtained under full information. Finally, in the case 
that +  (0^^)^]. we have [•] < 0, then we require
Aj > to sustain the following relationship among the correlation parameters
P > /9^  > in which case the non-benevolent regulator reduces the range
for the exploitation of informational economies of scope.
If we compare these results with the ones obtained in chapter 3, we would not 
be surprised that the non-benevolent regulator provides information of the firms’ 
cost parameter. In chapter 3 an increase in capture produced an increase of the rent 
effect. Basically, in that chapter, the increase in capture showed that a more efficient 
firm (with a higher stake of collusion) was among the potential firms to serve the 
market. In the current case we have a similar result. That is, if an increase in 
capture has a positive effect on the correlation parameter it provides information 
of a higher probability of the states {hi) and (Ik) to exist. In those states, firms 
with low cost correlation (p < p) would prefer to be decentralised, because for them 
rents are higher under separation. Those firms are precisely the ones interested 
to keep Congress in asymmetric information. However, the solution of the optimal 
mechanism makes the non-benevolent regulator to provide information of the relative 
probabilities of those firms to exist. Therefore, the correlation parameter is increased 
and rents are reduced. However to achieve this result Congress has to give up a costly 
transfer payment to the non-benevolent regulator. As in the case of quantities p^  ^
approaches p as long as the expected cost of the transfer given up to the non- 
benevolent regulator is smaller than the marginal savings from decentralisation.
On the other hand, when the relative probability of state {hh) is higher than 
probabilities of states {hi) and {Ih), the non-benevolent regulator provides infor­
mation that makes Congress reduce its expectations of facing deviations hi and Ih. 
Therefore, the correlation parameter is reduced with respect to the benevolent reg­
ulator case. Again, as long as the expected cost of the transfer given up to the 
non-benevolent regulator is smaller than the marginal savings from decentralisation
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approaches p^^.
Finally, analysing the extreme values we have that ^ =  1 produces 'ip = 0 and 
only the constraints under decentralisation play a role in the solution. Therefore, 
the model collapses to Dana’s solution under decentralisation. For ^ =  0 we have 
Ip = 1 which produces AU!’’'{q)p<p =  0 as pointed out at the end of section (4.4,3). 
Thus, only the constraints under integration play a role in this case.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter has analysed Dana’s problem of designing the structure of a multi­
product natural monopoly industry under political economy constraints. In order 
to do so, it has been necessary, first, to introduce delegation to Dana’s problem 
and second, to allow for a non-benevolent regulator that could be captured by the 
firm(s) he has to regulate.
There are three things to discuss when evaluating our results: industry design 
(integration versus decentralisation), industry behaviour (outputs) and the welfare 
effects of the regulator (of course all of these are related). These require on to 
summarise the comparisons we have made between p, p^^, p ,^ p"  ^and the quantities 
and transfers obtained with these four settings. We do this below
As in chapter 3 we found that delegation to a benevolent regulator increases 
welfare. This increase in welfare comes from two sources a) from an increase in 
productive efficiency, due to the reduction in quantities produced by the less efficient 
firms and b) from the increase in the possibility for Congress to chose the right 
industry design, due to the increase in the correlation parameter over asymmetric 
information levels.
In the first case, the reduction of quantities produced by the less efficient firms 
increases welfare, by reducing the size of the transfer payments given up to the 
most efficient firms. In the second case, the benevolent regulator approaches the
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correlation parameter (beyond which decesntralisation is the best option) to the 
full information level at no social or distributional cost. Therefore, in terms of 
Armstrong et ah (1994), with a benevolent regulator Congress not only obtains 
productive efficiency, but also exploits informational economies of scope to improve 
distributive efficiency.
Delegation to a non-benevolent regulator need not decrease welfare compared to 
the benevolent regulator’s case. Compared to our results from chapter 3, this result 
seems to be a bit different. In chapter 3 delegation to a non-benevolent regulator 
reduced welfare from two sources a) the social costs of preventing capture b) the 
reduction in consumer surplus due to the reduction in quantities. Now the presence 
of a non-benevolent regulator only affects welfare by the costs of preventing capture. 
That is since prices of the most efficient firms are not distorted, consumer welfare is 
not distorted. The increase in prices of the less efficient firms by the presence of the 
capture parameter, reduces these quantities. Given the fact that transfers depend 
on the quantities produced by the less productive firms their reduction reduces 
transfers, which increases welfare. The overall effect of capture on social welfare 
depends on the relationship between the overall savings obtained by reducing rents 
and the overall costs of preventing capture. If the rents’ savings are bigger than 
costs of preventing capture then social welfare is increased. Thus, again hiring the 
regulator could be beneficial.
Turning to industry design, a non benevolent regulator can improve the outcome 
relative to asymmetric information and relative to a benevolent regulator (though at 
a cost of an incentive payment for truth-telling). In particular, when the probabilities 
of states Ih and hi are high, then a non-benevolent regulator may improve the 
industry design decision. This is because these states are the ones where externalities 
are high between the firms and, therefore, where Congress reduces transfers with 
the integrated structure, by making the firms to internalise those esternalities.
Our results bring an important question, maybe for future research, which is
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related to the notion of the optimal level of capture in a given society. That is, 
with an emphasis in industry design, what would be the maximum level of capture 
in which a regulator is still useful under different institutional frameworks? At 
a simple level, this is a question about whether there is an optimum level of k. 
However, more formally it requires the endogenisation of the transaction of capture 
Ac and the analysis of how its determinants are affected by institutional settings.
Modelling dynamics in an environment where separated firms, in time one, go 
for integration in time two or viceversa seems to be another suitable extension.
Finally, in the empirical arena, with the possibility to face integrated firms pro­
viding services like fixed linked telecommunications, electricity and gas distribution 
and/or transmission, the results of the model, at least under certain levels of the pa­
rameters, strengthen the notions provided by Dana. That is the presence of capture 
strengthen’s the call for integration when cost correlation is low, which could be the 
case for natural gas and electricity transmission and/or distribution. On the other 
hand, it strengthens the call for decentralisation when cost correlation is high, which 
could be the case for industries like fixed linked telecommunications and electricity. 
Therefore, it remains to see the approach taken by different countries when dealing 
with these issues.
CHAPTER 5
The Natural Gas Industry in Mexico: Structure, regulation and
performance
5.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters we explored two theoretical models of industry de­
sign under political economy constraints in the form of capture. From our results 
we learnt that capture affects society by reducing consumer and producer welfare. 
However, we also learnt that, in the case of industry design, the final effects of cap­
ture are ambiguous: the final decision will depend on the particular circumstances 
in question. For certain values of the parameters, a captured regulator could still 
be useful as long as he provides the right information. Therefore, it is not only the 
presence of political interference, but also its level, that matters for policy making. 
The most recent theoretical models of political economy of regulation have tried to 
approach an explanation of what happens in the real world by incorporating more
129
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players (interest groups), voting rules, dynamics an so on^. The models presented 
in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis may be extended by incorporating these changes. 
However, for this final chapter, we depart for a moment from theory and look at a 
real world case of industry design.
The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the complex process of industry and 
regulatory design in the real world. The idea is to contrast what we learnt in earlier 
chapters with the different issues occurring in specific deregulation process. Our 
reason for proceeding in this way is to improve our understanding of the strengths 
and weaknesses of our theoretical models.
To perform the task, we consider a case study of the partial liberalisation of the 
natural gas industry in Mexico. The reasons for choosing the Mexican case are not 
only personal^, but also academic, since we consider that the Mexican natural gas 
reform provides a good example of the way in which political economy constraints 
shape industry structure and regulation.
In this case study, we will follow the methodology developed by Transaction 
Costs Economics and New Institutional Economics described in chapter 2; this pro­
vides the academic structure necessary to identify questions and data suitable for 
studying industry structure and regulatory design. We will try to combine a macro 
and micro approach (Williamson (1994)) to study what we think could be the prin­
cipal constraints that shaped the Mexican natural gas reform. Regarding the macro 
approach, we will base our analysis on Newbery (2000)’s explanation of why partial 
liberalisation may occur. As for the micro approach we will build on the methodol­
ogy developed by Levy & Spiller (1997) that studies the match among institutions 
and regulatory frameworks to explain industry performance before and after re­
form, and the application of this methodology by Spiller & Vogelsang (1997) to UK
^See chapter 2.
^After all, my motivation to study regulation came from my work experience at Pemex Gas 
and Basic Petrochemicals (PGPB in Spanish) during the deregulation of the Mexican natural gas 
industry (1993-1997).
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telecommunications reform.
The chapter proceeds as follows: section (5.2) presents an overview of the method­
ology used in this chapter; section (5.3) presents a background on Mexican economic 
reform; section (5.4) presents some background on the reform of the Mexican oil in­
dustry. The latter two sections look to place the reform of the Mexican natural gas 
industry in the context of the wider economic reform programme pursued by vari­
ous Mexican governments during the eighties and nineties. They build on Thacker
(2000) and Williams (2001) who analyse trade and market reforms in Mexico. Sec­
tions (5.5.1) and (5.5.2) analyse the main reasons for the partial liberalisation of the 
natural gas industry in Mexico, they also study the changes in the institutional and 
regulatory frameworks between 1992 and 2000.
5.2 Transaction C osts and N ew  Institu tional Eco­
nom ics
For Williamson (1994), the “New Institutional Economics” offers several related per­
spectives to explain how transaction costs affect reform programmes and economic 
development. He recognises two main divisions among these related perspectives. 
The first one, macro-analytic in nature, studies how formal and informal institutions 
explain the reform process and its outcome. The second one, which he considers 
more micro-analytic, focuses on the firms’ and markets’ behaviour^.
According to Williamson (1994) the main results for the approach are:
1. Institutions are important, and they are susceptible to analysis.
2. The explanation of events requires specific detail.
^Newbery (2000) could be considered as example of the macro-analytic approach whereas 
Joskow (2000b) is an example of the micro-analytic approach.
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3. Positive analysis (with emphasis on private ordering and de facto organisation) 
as against normative analysis (court ordering and de jure organisation) is where 
this approach focuses attention.
In sum, from the point of view of new institutional economics, transactions costs 
affecting the institutional environment and governance matter for economic policy 
making. These transactions costs come from the effort placed by the agents in 
society, firms, government and individuals on minimising the costs of their interac­
tions. This minimisation leads to the formation of different organisations, of which 
markets versus hierarchies is an example (Williamson (1994)). Therefore, a reform 
programme cannot be planned in a vacuum; instead, the way in which the reform 
takes place must look at the institutional environment of a given country, as well as 
the mechanisms of governance involved in the reform.
As mentioned before, in this chapter we will follow the the general lines proposed 
by the New Institutional Economics to analyse natural gas reform in Mexico. The 
goal is to locate this reform in the context of a wider economic reform and detect 
the main constraints that shaped industry design and regulation of Mexico’s natural 
gas industry. In a second step we will use the methodology developed by Levy Sz 
Spiller (1997) and the application of this methodology by Spiller & Vogelsang (1997) 
to study the possible alignment between institutions and the regulatory framework 
to explain industry structure and performance.
As mentioned by Williamson (1994) the work done by Levy and Spiller^ to 
analyse industry structure, regulation and performance in the telecommunications 
industries, is one of the first works that attempts to develop a methodology based on 
“Transaction Costs Economics” to study the design of regulatory institutions and 
the performance of the network industries.
Levy & Spiller (1997) study the matches and mis-matches between the institu-
^Comments done by Williamson on a forthcoming publication at that time.
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tions and the regulatory framework of a given country, to explain industry structure 
and performance. According to them in some cases, given a prevailing set of insti­
tutions, a competitive regulatory framework or industry structure may not perform 
well. Therefore, to achieve good performance may require a restrictive regulatory 
regime. They look at regulation as a design problem, in which a positive performance 
is based on the potential for the regulator to achieve commitment and accountability.
In summary, the authors argue that a country’s political and social institutions 
affect the credibility and the effectiveness of its regulatory framework, and hence 
its ability to encourage private investment and support efficiency in the production 
and use of services. Therefore, performance can be satisfactory under a range of 
regulatory arrangements, as long as three complementary mechanisms are in place 
to restrain arbitrary administrative action: a) substantive restraints on discretionary 
actions by the regulator, b) formal or informal restraints on changing the regulatory 
system and c) institutions to reinforce the restraints.
Using this framework the authors develop a decision tree (figure (5.1)) that, 
taking into account the institutional endowment of a country, predicts the kind 
of regulatory framework that most probably reflects the restraints in place®. The 
stages of this tree provide the structure for the work presented later in this chapter. 
With this tool Levy & Spiller (1997) proceed to analyse the regulatory history of 
the telecommunications industry of five selected countries: the United Kingdom, 
Jamaica, Chile, Philippines and Argentina. Their decision tree is used to char­
acterise the regulatory framework prevailing at different periods of the history of 
the telecommunications industry in these countries and the alignment between that 
regulatory framework and the countries’ institutional environment. Their main con­
clusion is that, in most of the cases, high levels of investment and good performance 
are present when regulation and institutions are aligned, with no regard to the type
®See appendix D.1.2.
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Figure 5.1: Decision tree for regulatory design
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Spiller & Vogelsang (1997) apply the above framework to the study of regulation, 
institutions and performance in the telecommunications sector in the UK. Their 
work focuses on the formal and informal institutions that permitted the UK to 
achieve commitment and accountability in the regulation of its telecommunications 
industry. In particular, Spiller & Vogelsang (1997) analyse three elements that 
restrain government discretion in the regulatory arena and limit the potential for 
policy reversals:
1. Formal institutions that permit the separation of powers conforming the state; 
and the governance structure, that is to say the written rules that allow dif­
ferent agencies to participate in the regulatory process.
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2. Informal institutions® or norms that restrain governments from arbitrary ac­
tions. For example, permanent bureaucracy, white papers laying out the im­
plications of major policy changes and delegation of substantive powers to 
regulators.
3. Finally, the incentives in the regulatory framework (such as the use of licences, 
attention to competition, involvement of several agencies in the regulatory 
process and the detail of the incentive regulation such as price caps).
In the final part of the this chapter we will attempt to analyse how these elements 
were combined in the Mexican context.
5.3 M exico’s econom ic reform
The history of Mexico’s economic reform has been very well documented in the 
literature (OECD (1999)). During the first half of the eighties the country began 
to change its development model, from a closed economy, based on imports substi­
tution, to a more open one. However, it was from 1988 that the economic reform 
became so intense that Mexico changed to be one of the most open economies of the 
world (Lustig (1998); Thacker (2000)).
The imports substitution modeF, on which the country based its growth for more 
than 30 years, showed some weaknesses by the end of the sixties which, combined 
with high fiscal and current account deficits, high inflation and lack of confidence 
from the business sector (Lustig (1998)), resumed in the economic crisis of 1976. 
In spite of that, the discovery of new oil fields and high oil prices, combined with
®See appendix D.1.3 for discussion of the way in which these informal institutions retrain arbi­
trary actions.
^This model was implemented in several countries in Latin-America by the middle of the last 
century. The main idea was to protect the indigenous industry from external competition to 
promote the national production of consumer and capital goods. The indigenous production should 
substitute imports for national production.
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cheap external borrowing, permitted the Mexican economy to remain closed until 
the eighties.
By the end of the Lopez Portillo government in 1982 the country was, together 
with Brazil, one of the most indebted countries in the world (Thacker (2000)). High 
interest rates, the decline of oil prices and a world economic recession made Mexico 
to face another economical crisis (Lustig (1998)). The 1982 crisis was considered 
by the government only a financial crisis that produced the outflow of high sums of 
capital. The government response was to nationalise the banking system.
In the next years Mexico had to face economic reconstruction with a very tight 
macroeconomic adjustment programme, with lack of confidence from the private 
sector (national and international) due to the nationalisation of the banking system, 
and with an inward oriented economy, that could not operate due to the contraction 
of the aggregate demand.
It was not possible for the country either to access international loans, due to 
the burden of the foreign debt, or to rely on the oil industry, due to the drop in the 
oil prices, to generate resources to finance investment. The challenge was to attract 
national and international private investment. To pursue this goal it was necessary to 
generate the confidence for private investment, national and international, to return 
to the country. A closed overprotected economy in the middle of a contraction 
in aggregate demand would not be attractive for investors®, not least because by 
remaining closed no safeguards against discretionary actions by the government 
would take place. Therefore, as most of the literature proposes, the need for private 
investment put a high level of pressure on the government to reform the economy. 
The paradigm was to create macroeconomic stability and to open the economy.
Opening the economy was a fundamental step, besides the creation of macroeco-
closed economy may attract foreign investment under the circumstance of a growing ag­
gregate demand, as was the Mexico’s case after the second world war. The idea is that foreign 
investors could enjoy rents coming from the lack of competition due to government protection, see 
Thacker (2000).
The Natural Gas Industry in Mexico: Structure, regulation and performance 137
nomic stability, because creating an open market oriented economy was seen as the 
way to create confidence for private investment, as well as a condition for Mexico 
not to depend on the oil industry for its future growth.
The three key factors for Mexico’s economic reform were privatisation, regulatory 
reform and trade policy. From the very beginning of his government, president De la 
Madrid (1982-1988) focused on the privatisation of some public firms and intended 
to reform trade policy. However in the middle of the crisis, with high pressures from 
society, the government spent most of its time pursuing macroeconomic stability. 
Controlling inflation was a priority for the government. Initiating a major privatisa­
tion programme in an environment of macroeconomic and political instability could 
have proved disastrous for the country.
In spite of this, during the De la Madrid period, the government privatised, 
closed or merged more than 500 public enterprises (PEs); most of a small size. 
It was not until Salinas’s term (1988-1994) that the government pursued a major 
privatisation programme, accompanied with, as some scholars say, a dramatic change 
in the regulatory framework and trade policy (Thacker (2000); Williams (2001); 
Lustig (1998)). In twelve years (1982-1994), including the De la Madrid period, 
the government divested 857 “non-strategic public enterprises” (Williams (2001)), 
changed the regulatory framework firom one of the most closed to one of the most 
open of the world®, joined the GATT and signed a free trade agreement with USA 
and Canada. See tables: (5.1) and (5.2).
S^ee appendixes: D.2 and D.3 for the main privatisations during Salinas’ government.
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Table 5.1: Mexican divestiture: De la Madrid (1982-1988) 
and Salinas (1989-1994) Governments^^)
Tot.PEs Divestments^®) Sold New PEs Remaining PE’s
1983 1,155 75 nd 10 1,090
1984 1,090 64 nd 18 1,044
1985 1,044 96 nd 7 955
1986 955 155 nd 7 807
1987 807 161 nd 15 661
1988 661 45 204((:) 2 618
1989 618 76 29 7 549
1990 549 139 61 8 418
1991 418 96 42 5 328
1992 328 66 53 8 270
1993 270 24 5 12 258
1994 258 21 1 15 252
 ^ Built with information from Williams (2001),
 ^ PEs that were closed, merged or transferred from the federal to the state gov­
ernment.
“ Number of PEs privatised in the period 1982 1988.
Table 5.2: Measures of trade barriers in Mexico(^)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Import licence 
coverage^ ®) 100.0 100.0 83.0 35.1 27.0 27.0 21.2 18.7 14.0
No. of tariff 
categories 16 10 11 5 _ 5
Maximum tariff 100.0 - - 100.0 45.0 40.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Average tariff^ '’) 27.0 27.0 23.3 22.6 22.6 11.8 13.1 12.1 10.4
Official import 
price coverage^ ®) - _ 25.4 18.7 0.6 0.0 0.0
 ^ SourceThacker (2000).
 ^ As percentage of domestic production value. 
Percentage weighted by import value.
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What was the result of this dramatic change in the Mexican economy? In 1994 
Mexico suffered another economic crisis, considered the deepest in the last 60 years. 
However, the literature agrees that the economic reform pursued during Salinas’ 
government gave Mexico the flexibility to respond efficiently to the economic crisis, 
which made possible for the country to restart economic growth after two years 
(Lustig (1998)). One cannot deny the structural change in Mexico’s economy and 
the strength that it produced for the country to confront the economic crisis^ ®. 
However, the literature also agrees that in important cases the reform was pursued 
following political times and lacked the construction of solid institutions to promote 
competition. For example, the privatisation of the banking system favored special 
interest groups ("the president’s friends”) and lacked a solid governance structure 
and regulatory framework to permit the institutions^^, prevailing at that time, to 
apply prudential regulation of the banking operations (Williams (2001); Ramirez
(2001)). The result was for society to pay the financial losses from irrecoverable 
loans and fraudulent operations, when the banking rescue converted those losses 
into public debt^^.
The literature also agrees that the economic reform was the right step to take 
for the Mexican economy. However, institutions (or the lack of them) and processes 
matter for the final result. A lower speed of reform, building the right set of regula­
tory institutions, and designing industries structure with a more competitive profile 
could have been a better way to proceed. The open question is that if given the set 
of institutions prevailing during Salinas’s government, it could have been possible
^^Among another things the economic reform generated the conditions for the involvement of 
the US government in Mexico’s financial rescue, as well as a certain level of confidence for private 
investment to return to the country.
Mexico counted with the formal institutions to invigilate the financial system: the secretary 
of finance, the central bank and the national banking commission. However they lacked of inde­
pendence from the government and their governance structure suffered from overlaps.
^^The concern has been that the income generated by the privatisations was not enough to cover 
the amount of the financial system rescue, as well as the incapacity of the country to share the 
benefits of the reform (Lustig (1998)).
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to proceed in another way. The answer to that question could be “no” due to the 
momentum reached by the technocrats^® at that time (Williams (2002)).
Table 5.3: Income Distribution^^)
Decile 1984 1989 1992 1994
I 0.69 0.68 0.73 0.79
II 1.28 1.36 1.42 1.53
III 1.95 2.08 2.20 2.35
IV 2.99 2.99 3.23 3.31
V 4.53 4.06 4.54 4.52
VI 6.51 5.46 6.19 6.03
VII 8.78 7.35 8.36 8.12
VIII 12.37 10.48 11.30 11.26
IX 18.04 16.02 16.47 16.64
X 42.86 48.53 45.56 45.46
Gini coefficient^®) 58.23 62.05 58.96 58.61
SourceLustig (1998).
The Gini coefficient is an inequality index that in­
creases as the distribution of income becomes more 
skewed.
The data have been corrected for underreporting. 
Wage and non-wage income for each household is mul­
tiplied by and adjustment factor.
The reason is the high concentration of capital in Mexico (table (5.3)). Therefore, 
the groups affected and favored by reform were very well loiown in advance^^. Rapid 
privatisation was perceived as a commitment tool with reform, it was also a strategy 
to avoid special interests organising themselves to block the reform, and finally, 
although some institutions existed to regulate and/or invigilate the process, the 
president had almost absolute powers due to Mexico’s concentrated government^® 
and the lack of democratic procedures for decision making in the ruling party.
^^This adjective is used to denominate the group of policymakers educated mainly in US that 
came to power at the end of the seventies in several latinamerican countries (Williams (2002)).
Williams (2002) points out one of the explanations of Salinas reform success was the rapid 
identification of the groups that would be affected or beneficiated by the reform. In the most 
important cases this rapid identification prove to be crucial to reduce the resistance of the affected 
groups. The strategy was creating division among them by making some of their elements part of 
the winners of the reform.
^®Levy & Spiller (1997) characterise a concentrated government as the one with majority in 
Congress, so that it is relatively easy for the executive to pursue its proposals.
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5.4 T he oil industry in context
If we compare the achievements in privatisation and trade liberatlisation, the reforms 
applied to the oil industry could look small. Moreover, if we take in to account 
the importance of this industry for the competitiveness of the export sector, and 
we realise the need of this industry to attract investment after decades of under­
investment in exploration and exploitation (Marquez (1989); Foss et al. (1993)).
Most of the literature presents Mexico’s nationalism as the main reason that 
blocked the liberalisation of the oil industry during Salinas’s government. In par­
ticular, the oil sector and PEMEX have been icons of Mexican independence for 
a long time. The nationalisation of the oil industry in 1938 responded to a set of 
circumstances that produced the exploitation of Mexican natural resources by in­
ternational oil companies so that, the nationalisation of the oil industry permitted 
the government to raise the flag of Mexican autonomy. It is true that the nation­
alistic feeling could have been used by the coalitions opposing reform to block it. 
It might also be true that a deeper reform in the oil sector could have flowed the 
privatisation programme and the trade reform due to its high political content. For 
instance, Rubio (1993) argues that a reform of the oil industry during the privatisa­
tion programme and the negotiations for the free trade agreement could have been 
seen as imposed by foreigners. Therefore, the government decided to postpone a 
deeper reform in the oil industry, so that the privatisation programme and the free 
trade agreement could then be seen as the lack of reform in the oil industry
However, it remains to ask if the arguments outlined in the preceding paragraph 
are the complete answers to the question of the lack of liberalisation of the oil 
industry. It seems that the picture is more complex than the one presented above 
due to the following causes:
1. The relationship between the government and the oil industry: PEMEX is still
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not only an important source of financial resources for the government^®, but 
also an important warranty in case of any contingency as was shown during 
the economical crisis of 1994^’^.
2 . The relationship with different sectors in the society: PEMEX has developed 
complex relationships with different sectors of the society, unions and the 
former official party PRI^® and the private sector. These have created diverse 
interest groups promptly to defend the status quo.
3. The complicated industrial relations in the energy sector, where, full liberli- 
sation in some markets could have undesirable effects in others^® that may 
require a parallel reform.
It could be argued that besides trade policy, and the so called nationalistic 
sentiment there is another set of transaction costs associated with the liberalisation 
of the oil industry, some of them of a political nature and some of them of an 
economic one. Therefore, from the discussion presented in the literature review, 
it is possible to argue that the framework provided by transaction cost economics 
could be of great use to the analysis of the oil industry and natural gas. Transaction 
costs are present in the incentives from the government to keep the oil industry as a 
public entity. They are present in the costs of coalition formation, and finally they 
are present in the possible strategic behaviour of the players participating in the 
different energy markets in Mexico.
®^Prom 1988 to 1998, oil income represented in average 31 percent of the federal government 
income. Calculated with information from PEMEX (1999a).
“^^ FEMEX revenues were used to warranty the 20 thousand million dollars in lines of credit 
authorized by Clinton’s administration to the Mexican government.
®^The PEMEX gate during the first year of Fox government is an example of this. The firm was 
accused of transferring financial resources to the PRI candidate Labastida.
^^Two examples of this, as will be discussed later in the chapter are the unsolved debate between 
natural gas and sour fuel oil, where more penetration of natural gas in electricity generation will 
displace fuel oil with no potential market for it (OECD (1999); Foss et al. (1993)), and the slow 
reform of the LPG industry where penetration of natural gas would affect important interests in 
LPG distribution as well as create the problem of what to do with the LPG excess.
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In spite of the observed constraints, during the the nineties, the governance struc­
tures of the energy sector and PEMEX were reformed in an attempt to comply with 
the energy requirements of an open economy. The goal was to support the exporting 
sector and to attract investment in electricity, natural gas, and petrochemicals.
In 1993 PEMEX was divided into four functional operations or business lines: 
(1) Pemex Exploration and Production (PEP), (2) Pemex Refining (PR), (3) Pemex 
Gas and Basic Petrochemicals (PGPB) and (4) Pemex Petrochemicals (PP). The 
option of dividing the firm along functional lines apparently favoured transparency 
of operations, due to improvement in accounting practices, but it failed to induce 
competition^®. On the other hand, the division might at least have disturbed some of 
the political and economic interests that oppose any further reform (Rubio (1993)). 
Some examples of this are the reduction in labour force from 210,000 in 1987 to 
just over 100,000 in 1995 (OECD (1999)), the separation of budgets for the different 
business lines, that have to operate as independent business centers reporting to the 
corporate strategy division, and the improvement in the control of the operations 
inside each division^^.
In the case of the governance structure of the energy sector, before reform Mex­
ico’s energy policy was decided among four groups: the Secretariat of Energy, Mines 
and Public Industry (SEMIP), the Federal Electricity Commission (CPE), PEMEX 
and the Secretary of Finance. CFE and PEMEX played the role of energy planners 
and regulators, that is, they were the facto regulators. After reform the gover­
nance structure was changed, SEMIP was transformed to the Secretary of Energy 
(SENER) only in charge of the supervision of the energy sector, due, among other 
things, to the privatisation of public firms and the mining sector. The government 
established an independent regulator, the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE),
'^ I^mportant areas that have potential for competition remain as legal monopolies: oil and gas 
exploration and exploitation, and oil refining.
Parallel to this new governance structure, the government pursue the partial libaralisation of 
the electricity sector permitting independent producers to sell electricity to CFE.
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for the electricity, natural gas and LPG^^ industries . So that, PEMEX and CFE 
lost their role as regulators of their industries.
5.5 N atural gas in M exico: industry structure, 
regulation and perform ance
This section analyses the evolution of the natural gas industry in Mexico. Following 
Newbery (2000), the intention is to explore the reasons behind its partial liberali­
sation in 1995, as well as to use the framework developed by Levy & Spiller (1997) 
and Spiller & Vogelsang (1997), mentioned before, to study issues in governance, 
incentives and performance. This section has been divided in two parts, the first 
part goes from 1945 to 1992. It provides a broad picture of the institutional ar­
rangements in the industry and its evolution before reform. The second part goes 
from 1992 to 2002. It studies the institutional reform required for liberalisation and 
also attempts to characterise the incentives of special interest groups that led to the 
partial liberalisation of the sector. Finally, there is a summary of the evolution of 
the Mexican natural gas industry after reform.
5.5.1 Background (1945-1992)
According to Marquez (1989) the history of the natural gas industry in Mexico starts 
around 1945. Since its beginning the Mexican natural gas industry was linked to the 
oil industry, due to the fact that most of the natural gas produced in the country is 
associated with oil production^^.
After the nationalisation of the oil industry in 1938, the regulatory law of the
^^The CRE regulates LPG only when it is transported by pipelines.
^^This association remains to the present, due to the legal monopoly of PEMEX over natural gas 
and oil production, and the constant budget constraint faced by PEMEX that obligates the firm 
to bias investment to oil projects in order to maximise profits. See Marquez (1989), lEA (1995).
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Article 27 of the Mexican constitution settled PEMEX as the only entity with the 
right to explore and exploit oil resources in the country. The goal was to keep 
Mexican natural resources in the hands of the state.
Prom 1945 to 1985 the natural gas industry developed by PEMEX passed through 
periods of high and low investment, following mainly the evolution of investment in 
the oil industry. This was also linked to the government programme of energy self- 
sufficiency (Marquez (1989)). From the early 40's to the beginning of the 70’s, the 
programme was designed to respond to the needs of the Mexican industrial sector, 
during the period in which the imports substitution model was implemented and 
also declined. From the late 70’s to the eighties, it was linked to the investment in 
the oil industry, due to the discoveries of new oil fields in the country, that launched 
Mexico to be one of the most important oil producers in the world (Morales & 
Vargas (1988)).
The dependency of the natural gas industry on the oil industry in Mexico was 
due to the fact that PEMEX, as the only producer of oil and its derivatives, has 
always been subject to an annual budget constraint authorised by the government. 
Therefore, in order to maximise profits and exports PEMEX has always stressed 
oil projects over natural gas projects, since oil projects are more profitable. One 
example of this situation could be seen in the volume of gas burnt to the atmosphere 
over the period where the argument was that is was more profitable for PEMEX 
to invest limited resources in oil exploration and production, rather than gas recov- 
ery^'^(Marquez (1989); Foss et al. (1993)).
Using the decision tree^^ (figure (5.1)) developed by Levy & Spiller (1997) to 
characterise Mexico’s natural gas industry regulation and performance pre-reform, 
we have to look at Mexico’s governance and institutional endowment. Their decision 
tree starts asking about the independence of the judicial system in order to explain
^^ See Appendixes D.4, D.5 and D.7. 
Appendix D.1.2.
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the regulatory structure of a given network industry.
In Mexico’s case due to the existence of a legal figure known as “el juicio de 
amparo” the judicial system has ruled against government decisions through Mexi­
can history^®. However, the concentration of the presidential power in Mexico has 
also limited judicial power (Castro (2000)). Therefore, if we follow the hypothesis 
of Levy & Spiller (1997) then the presence of a non-independent judiciary implies 
government ownership of the oil and gas industry (accompanied by inefficiencies and 
the need for international warranties). On the other hand, under the hypothesis of 
an independent judicial system the path takes us towards responding “yes” to the 
question of unified government, “no” to the parties alternation of power, and “no” to 
the questions about complex party decision making and legally binding contractual 
arrangements^^. As figure (5.1) shows, the answers to those questions leads Mex­
ico’s oil and gas industry to public ownership. Therefore, according to the authors 
it seems that the institutional framework was in line with the regulatory framework 
(or industry structure).
Before studying the effects of the institutional changes after reform on the new 
regulatory (industry structure) framework of Mexico’s natural gas industry. We 
would like to proceed as Levy & Spiller (1997) and analyse the possible matches 
and mismatches of Mexico’s institutional framework and regulation pre-reform. We 
ask the following question: is it possible to explain the variation in investment in the 
oil and gas industry using matches and mismatches between the industry regulation 
(structure) and the institutions prevailing in Mexico during those periods?
It seems that between (1945-1992) the governance structure of the oil industry 
remained stable, along the lines dictated by Article 27 and its regulatory law. PE-
^®The Mexican juicio de amparo was instituted since the eighteen hundreds, and its function 
has been to rule out laws and/or procedures that contradict the Constitution. It general terms it 
shares some similarities with the judicial review practiced in the US (Castro (2000)).
^^The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) remained in power, with an absolute majority 
in Congress, for more than 60 years, in a political system where the president was the head of the 
party with almost absolute powers.
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MEX, the ministry of energy, the ministry of planning, the ministry of finance and 
the office of the president were in charge of the energy policy for the oil industry 
(Morales k  Vargas (1988)).
A strong government in charge of implementing the import substitution model 
of development required cheap energy for the industry, therefore investment in oil 
exploration and production was a priority, not only for oil. by itself, but also for 
the production of fuel oil and diesel. The last two products proved to be cheaper 
than natural gas for industrial consumers, due mainly to the high investment costs 
that were required for gas recovery and transmission (Marquez (1989)). Hence, the 
increase in gas production was a result of an increase in oil production, rather than 
a specific policy to develop the natural gas industry.
Can we argue that during this episode there was a match between the oil industry 
structure (or regulation) with the institutional framework? The answer to this 
question seems to be “yes” . A strong executive in charge of promoting economic 
development, with the strength to invest in the energy sector and with the ability 
to subsidise energy prices generated the confidence in the private sector to invest 
in the country, leaving aside the rest of the inward oriented policies implemented 
during the period (Lustig (1998); Marquez (1989)).
Marquez (1989) and Morales k  Vargas (1988) report a reduction in investment 
in oil exploration and production by the end of the 60’s. Can we observe a mismatch 
of the regulatory framework of the oil industry and institutions during this period 
as well? Did the institutions change? If so which ones?
With no change in the governance structure of the energy sector (Morales k  
Vargas (1988)), at the end of the sixties one important institution changed. By the 
end of the sixties the imports substitution model was showing signs of structural 
weaknesses. Mexico was not able to pursue the substitution of intermediate and
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capital goods^®, therefore, the economy showed a structural need to import those 
goods, a situation that was reflected in the balance of payments. Government policy 
to subsidize the industrial sector through low energy prices was no longer sustainable, 
PEMEX faced financial problems that reduced its ability to invest in oil and gas 
exploration and production (Marquez (1989), Morales & Vargas (1988)).
What was the mismatch in this period? After the nationalisation of the oil indus­
try Mexico had no other option to invest in the oil industry than through indigenous 
public and private investment. The international community lost property in Mex­
ico and, therefore, it was impossible to get foreign investment even in the form of 
international loans (Marquez (1989); Morales k  Vargas (1988); Lustig (1998)). The 
country pursued an inward oriented economic policy, which was only possible with 
a strong government. It created the confidence from national investors, therefore, 
the country experienced a period of growth in the economy and in the oil sector. 
However, as long as the economic model was no longer sustainable and the economy 
was in stagnation, the governance structure of the oil industry conflict with, the 
more open market oriented measures needed to solve, not only PEMEX’s financial 
problems, but also growth in the Mexican economy.
The literature argues that Mexico’s economy and political institutions needed 
reform as early as the 70’s. However, it recognises as well that the discovery of oil 
fields in the late seventies gave to country a leeway to postpone these reforms. Those 
discoveries not only generated direct resources for investment, but also gave Mexico 
the opportunity to access international loans in an environment of low interest rates 
(Lustig (1998); Williams (2001); Thacker (2000)).
The relaxation of the budget constraint permitted the government to match the
^®The imports substitution model pretended to develop Mexico’s industry in two stages. The 
first one was to substitute consumer and intermediate goods. The second one, was to substitute 
capital goods. The problem for capital goods substitution was that they require development of 
technologies. Mexico failed in the development of those technologies and ended up importing more 
capital goods (Villarreal (1986)) creating pressures to the external balance.
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governance structure of the oil industry, with the country’s institutions again. A 
strong government with enough financial resources was perceived to be trustworthy, 
not only by the national investors, but also by the international funding agencies. 
In addition, the U.S. developed interests in the Mexican oil and gas industry as a 
result the international oil crisis (Morales k  Vargas (1988)). Growth was resumed, 
oil production was increased, but because of the high profitability of the oil projects, 
natural gas projects remained as a second priority. Therefore, the increase in gas 
production came from the gas associated to oil production. PEMEX did not invest 
in natural gas recuperation situation that was reflected in the high levels of gas 
burnt to the atmosphere^® (Marquez (1989)).
The high priority that the government of Lopez Portillo put on the development 
of the oil industry, to use it as the axes for economic development, was reflected in the 
level of dependency of the Mexican economy from oil revenues. This dependency was 
shown to be catastrophic when Mexico entered, in 1982, a deep economic crisis. The 
internal structural problems caused by the deterioration of the imports substitution 
model were worsened by the combination of three external factors: the world wide 
economic crisis, the increase in international interest rates and the reduction in oil 
prices (Lustig (1998)).
The government of Miguel de la Madrid, as discussed before, implemented a deep 
stabilisation programme to control the economy and stop the crisis. Austerity was 
the main part of this programme, and it was reflected in the investment levels in 
the oil industry®®. However, de la Madrid also started the economic reform with the 
privatisation of PEs. It was understood that to complete the reform of the economy 
it was necessary to reform the oil industry as well. Partial reform of the oil industry 
only took place in 1992 during the government of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994). It 
continued in 1995 with the partial liberalisation of the natural gas industry during
®^See appendices D.4 and D.5
^^Particularly exploration and drilling, see appendix D.8 table (D.7).
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the Zedillo (1994-2000) government.
The next section discusses the way in which the reform of the energy sector in 
general, and the natural gas industry in particular, took place. The objective is to 
continue with Levy & Spiller (1997) methodology to analyse the change of institution 
and the political constraints that shaped industry structure and regulation of the 
Mexican natural gas industry after reform.
5.5.2 Industry structure: partial liberalisation of M exico’s 
natural gas industry (1992-2002).
Mexico’s natural gas industry was liberalised in 1995 by that time, the government 
of Ernesto Zedillo had already learnt the lessons of the privatisation programme and 
the regulatory reform implemented by Salinas. NAFTA was signed, the Mexican 
economy was a model open economy and PEMEX was reorganised with a reduction 
of approximately 100,000 work places. However, Mexico’s economy was immersed 
in the worst crisis of its history.
The reform of the Mexican natural gas industry took the form of partial liber­
alisation®^; exploration and production remained as legal monopolies, transmission 
was open to private investment with PGPB operating as a dominant incumbent 
with vertical integration between transmission and retail, distribution was open to 
private investment with the privatisation of the distribution lines owned by PGPB 
and retail was open to competition.
With the constraint to implement a partial liberalisation programme, the govern­
ment’s challenge was to design a proper governance structure, as well as a consistent 
regulatory framework, that could produce incentives for efficiency. In the light of the 
literature discussed in chapter 2, Mexico’s liberalisation of the natural gas industry
®^ Pull liberalisation includes privatisation and the introduction to market competition of the 
potential competitive activities. Most of the time it requires vertical separation of the natural 
monopolistic parts from the competitive parts of the industry Newbery (2000).
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represents an interesting case study, since it provides a clear example of the joint 
determination of industry structure and regulation®^. That is, the decision taken to 
reform the industry keeping production as legal monopoly in spite of its contesta­
bility (Brito & Rosellon (1998)), called for the regulation of natural gas prices. The 
decision of keeping PGPB as a dominant incumbent in transmission integrated with 
retail called for the design of a regulatory framework that could limit potentially 
anticompetitive practices by the firm®®.
So far, the literature studying the liberalisation of the natural gas industry in 
Mexico has focused on the study of the design of incentive regulation, discussing 
mainly the optimality of the measures taken to regulate natural gas prices at the 
well (Brito & Rosellon (1998)), regulation of gas marketing activities in Mexico 
(Brito & Rosellon (2000)), the optimal division of the distribution areas in Mexico 
City (Rosellon (1997)) and the regulation of natural gas distribution tariffs (Ramirez 
& Rosellon (1999)). In these works, governance and industry structure have been 
taken for granted. The goal of this section is to study the constraints that shaped 
industry design, and the governance structure of the natural gas industry in Mexico. 
This will include analysis of the institutional change required for liberalisation: The 
question here is whether a new alignment between the institutional and regulatory 
frameworks can be expected to emerge.
W hy partial liberalisation of the Mexican Natural Gas industry?
Newbery (2000) makes a case for partial liberalisation of the electricity industry 
around the world. In his view, partial liberalisation comes mainly from the political 
economy constraints faced by a given country. However, he recognises that the 
particular structural characteristics of the industry in a specific country also play a
^^Dana (1993) observes this relationship among industry structure and the design of regulatory 
frameworks.
description of the governance structure and the regulatory framework could be found in 
Rosellon & Halpern (2001) and OECD (1999).
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role in determining public participation®^.
However, in his view, partial reform must contemplate the possible need to in­
troduce competition as much as possible, as well as to prepare the terrain for future 
reforms. Newbery’s framework could be translated to the analysis of reform in net­
work industries. However, the requirement is to pursue a careful analysis to detect 
the possible areas that prevent the full reform from taking place. This will help us to 
understand the final outcome, and to determine the future possibilities of continuing 
the reform process.
In the case of Mexico’s natural gas industry it has been taken for granted that, 
due to the constraint imposed by Article 27 of the Constitution, the government 
had no option but to keep natural gas production as a legal monopoly®®. However, 
the subsequent decision to organise the market with PGPB as a dominant incum­
bent in transmission and retail, with integration between the two activities, has no 
explanation under this constraint. Distribution was not an issue because of the few 
distribution lines that were the property of PGPB at that time. Once the structure 
of the industry was decided the problem was how to regulate it. That has been the 
main concern of the literature about Mexico’s case after reform.
Nine years have passed since the initial liberalisation of the natural gas industry 
in Mexico®®. One question to ask at this stage is that whether it is still valid to 
analyse the forces that produce the industry structure it presents today. This section 
argues that the question is still valid and it also argues that from the answer to this 
question it will be possible to determine the possibility for further changes that 
could increase competition in the sector.
®^ For instance, systems where electricity is produced mainly with hydro-power with the need for 
coordination of water use among different agents, call for public ownership as in Brazil (Newbery 
(2000)).
According to Rubio (1993) the constraint to private participation in the oil industry comes 
from the regulation to Article 27 of the Constitution, not from the Constitution itself. It is the 
regulation of the Article 27 that prohibits risk contracts in the oil industry.
Although the process started in 1992 the official year for the liberalisation is 1995.
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What were (and may still be) the constraints, that the government faced in the 
design of the natural gas industry in Mexico? We suggest these were:
1. The constitution and its regulatory law in the case of energy.
2. The governance structure of the energy sector.
3. The role of PEMEX as an important source of income and warranties for the 
government.
4. The structure of the energy sector: the fact that PEMEX is the main consumer 
of natural gas, and the relationship between natural gas-LPG, and natural gas- 
fuel oil.
5. Bureaucracies and the private sector.
It is difficult to determine with absolute certainty which of the listed constraints 
were and may still be binding. The work required to complete that task requires 
field research that is beyond the scope of this section. As explained before, our 
purpose is to provide the first analysis of the ‘black box’ of the reform process in 
Mexico’s natural gas industry.
On the other hand, it seems that the above list of constraints is similar to the 
ones that affected the liberalisation of the oil sector. However, as usual, the con­
straints present specific issues related to the natural gas industry that require a deep 
analysis. In the following pages, the section proceeds with the characterisation of 
those constraints. The idea is to look for the role that they could have played in 
Mexico’s natural gas industry design and regulation.
1. The Constitution:
Article 27 of the Constitution reserves the ownership of the surface resources 
for the nation and rules out concessions and risk contracts in the oil industry. 
The regulatory law of the article indicates how the nation will carry out their
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exploitation, granting exclusive rights to PEMEX. In an amendment in 1958 
it ruled out private participation in the oil industry.
Rubio (1993) argues it was the regulatory law and not the constitution that 
had to be changed to encourage liberalisation. This was done in 1995. Then as 
a result of the amendment, private participation was permitted in transporta­
tion, distribution, storage and retail. Exploration and exploitation remained 
exclusive activities developed by PEMEX.
According to this outcome, the Constitution and its law were an avoidable 
constraint for the government. Mainly, because the Constitution itself does 
not prohibit private participation in the oil industry (Rubio (1993)). Then it 
is necessary to see the limitation in the amendment to the regulatory law in 
another set of constraints, but the Constitution itself.
2. The governance structure of the energy sector:
Prior the liberalisation the governance structure of the oil industry (and in gen­
eral of the energy sector) was organised as a committee formed by the ministry 
of finance, the ministry of energy, the office of the president and PEMEX. The 
institutional framework was plagued with overlaps and ambiguities, regarding 
the State’s role as administrator of natural resources, policymaker, regulator 
and producer of goods and services (Rosellon k  Halpern (2001)).
PEMEX had an important role as energy planner and regulator. For instance 
the firm was in charge of proposing the goals for production, investment, busi­
ness development and price setting. The final decision was taken by the differ­
ent committees with the authorisation of the ministries of energy and finance, 
and the office of the president®" .^
®^ An example of the situation is the way in which the gas distribution was regulated. PEMEX 
was in charge of authorising the distribution tariffs through previous revision by the prices commit­
tee (integrated by government secretaries mentioned before and PEMEX). Non of the distribution
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When confronting the gas industry reform, the government realised the need 
for reforming the governance structure of the industry. In order to do it, the 
government had to transform some institutions, and, as mentioned before, it 
changed the role of the ministry of energy so it could take sole charge of the 
oil and electricity industries. It also created an independent regulator (the 
CRE). With this new framework, the role of PEMEX, through its subsidiary 
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals (PGPB), in the natural gas sector was 
changed to that of a regulated public firm.
What was the role of the new governance structure in the design of the natural 
gas industry? It seems that the new governance structure and the decision to 
keep PGPB as a dominant incumbent were taken simultaneously, therefore, 
the CRE had to adapt the regulatory framework to the PGPB constraint®®. 
However, with this new structure the role of PEMEX is well determined, it also 
opens the door for further reforms like future vertical separation between retail 
and transmission, and innovations in the regulation of natural gas exploration 
and production.
3. The role of PEMEX as an important source of income and warranties for the 
government.
As we saw ear her in the chapter, the Mexican government has historically im­
posed a heavy tax burden on PEMEX (table (D.16)). The resources collected 
from PEMEX represent an important source of income for the government
companies was authorised to curtail service in the case of customer failure to pay for the gas. The 
companies used to complain that the distribution tariffs were settled very low, so that, they could 
not recover their costs. However since neither them nor PEMEX could curtail the service, some 
of them decided to argue not having being paid by the customers, which in many cases could 
have been proved to be true, and refused to pay PEMEX for the gas. Then the situation for gas 
distribution was that of low tariffs combined with big debt.
^®The groups in charge of the design of the governance structure of the energy sector designed 
the industry structure as well. According to the goals of the independent agencies like the Federal 
Competition Commission (CFC) and the CRE, it seems counterintuitive the way in which the gas 
industry was liberalised, since those goals call for a more competitive structure.
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(table (D.16)). Control over these resources has provided the Mexican gov­
ernment with the support to confront the recurrent economical crises faced by 
the country in the last 20 years®®.
Table 5.4; PEMEX Tax Burden (millions 
of Mexican pesos) )(*)
Period Sales revenues(^) Taxes Tax burden%
1992 77,740 51,057.3 65.7
1993 84,202.0 58,970.4 62.9
1994 100,300.0 59,086.8 58.9
1995 161,547.0 99,500.8 61.6
1996 235,820.0 147,582.5 62.6
1997 269,507.0 181,479.8 67.3
Source INEGI (1988) .
 ^ Internal sales and exports.
Table 5.5: Participation of the oil industry in Mexico’s government income 
(millions of Mexican pesos)
Concept 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
T otal Incom e 65,506 90,204 117,710 117,617 212,221 194,813 215,301 283,195
Oil Incom e 22,904 28,653 34,739 42,114 50,996 52,773 58,664 100,028
Contributions 13,450 17,985 25,995 31,003 34,870 35,033 31,136 72,866
IBPS(^) 7,277 7,987 5,162 6,763 12,212 13,400 21,777 17,447
iv a G) 2,177 2,681 3,477 4,348 3,913 4,341 5,752 9,685
Non-oil income 42,602 61,551 82,971 135,503 161,225 142,040 156,637 183,167
Oil income/total (%) 35.0 31.8 29.5 23.7 24.0 27.1 27.2 35.3
For 1983-1988 source PEMEX (1999b). 
 ^Taxes applied to PEMEX.
“ Consumption tax.
Would the Mexican government lose income by allowing private participation 
in exploration and production of natural gas? In the past, due to the budget 
constraint, it was more economic for PEMEX to burn the gas rather than 
to recover, process and sell it. Therefore, private participation in exploration 
and exploitation of natural gas seems to be complementary to public partic­
ipation. In the context of a well organised institutional framework, allowing
was mentioned earlier in this chapter that oil exports were used as a warranty for the loan 
given by the Clinton adminstration’s to secure the Mexican economy during the 1994 economic 
crisis.
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private participation, would generate “sunk” investments and taxes revenues 
for the country^®. However, in spite of the above, there still are some issues to 
consider:
(a) Permitting private participation in this area may be perceived by different 
groups as the first step to privatising another sector of the oil industry.
(b) PEMEX has always faced higher taxes than private firms. Therefore, this 
opens another door for revision of the tax structure of PEMEX, and with 
that a potential reduction in tax revenues for the government,
(c) There would be a loss of control of resources by the government, since it 
would no longer be able to dispose of the income produced by the firm 
in the ways like those discussed in sections (5.3) and (5.4).
(d) Most importantly, the uneasy experience that the country had with the 
privatisation of the banking, airports, and telecommunications industries 
(Ramirez (2001)).
Therefore, in spite its potential benefits, private participation in the Mex­
ican oil the government still confronts a series of counter incentives pro­
duced by the possibility to lose control over the income generated by the 
firm.
4. The structure of the energy sector:
PEMEX is by far the biggest consumer of natural gas in the country, mainly 
through its petrochemicals branch, electricity production and re-injection to 
the oil fields for pumping (table (D.5)). The internal price paid by PEMEX is 
calculated using transfer price formulae, based on the regulated price for first 
hand sales established by the CRE. This regulated price is linked to the USA
According to SENER (2002) report the investment constraint would be partially relaxed with 
the use of Multiple Service Contracts (MSG) for natural gas exploration and exploitation.
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price; since the USA market is recognised as a highly competitive market; it 
therefore reflects the opportunity cost of the Mexican natural gas. More pro­
duction of Mexican gas is only expected to reduce the volume imported from 
USA, changing the arbitration point to the north of the Mexican transmis­
sion network (Brito k  Rosellon (1998)). If. Mexico becomes a net exporter of 
natural gas^  ^ then prices must remain at international levels.
Table 5.6: Dry natural gas balance (MGPD)(^)
Concept 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
O rigin 2,790 2,906 2,891 3,093 3,359 3,674 3,734 3,885 3,921
Production 2,396 2,458 2,376 2.614 2,798 2,816 2,709 2,791 2,804
Ethane to pipelines 118 112 101 76 44 82 114 98 101
Direct from fields 134 149 190 277 381 599 750 752 710
Imports 97 125 173 84 108 145 146 231 292
Other flux 45 61 50 42 27 32 14 13 14
D estin ation 2,782 2,907 2,907 3,099 3,319 3,609 3,653 3,859 3,581
PEMEX consumption 1,497 1,518 1,421 1,524 1,663 1,788 1,620 1,775 1,829
Exports 5 19 21 36 37 32 136 24 25
Internal sales 1,280 1,368 1,464 1,541 1,620 1,789 1,889 2,061 1,993
Industry 803 823 906 956 983 1,056 l,194(b) 1,190(*’) 984<‘^ )
Electricity 385 466 494 492 538 639 705 871 1,010
Households 92 80 63 93 100 94 - -
Gas in pipelines - 1 - -2 - - -1 -1 -1
Statistical difference 8 -1 -16 -6 40 66 80 26 71
Source PEMEX (1999a)
Includes sales to distribution companies (sales to households).
Looking at security of supply for PEMEX, if the increase of natural gas pro­
duction comes from private investment in gas recovery and exploitation, its 
seems the firm will be affected in positive terms, since it will continue produc­
ing the gas it needs to operate, from its associated an non-associated fields 
currently in operation which would relax the pressure over oil fields research 
and development. The benefit would be more availability of natural gas for 
PEMEX itself, for the electricity sector, industry and households.
However, there are at least two drawbacks to this scenario. The first one
study done by George & Mortensen (1995), from the Canadian Research Institute, develops 
three forecasts for the Mexican natural gas industry one of which oversees Mexico as a sleeping 
giant in gas production. See SENER (2002) also.
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is the “unsolved dilemma between natural gas and sour fuel oil” (George & 
Mortensen (1995); Foss et al. (1993); lEA (1995)) and the second one is a 
possibly smaller, but not less important dilemma, between natural gas and 
LPG (Foss et al. (1966)).
(a) The sour fuel oil dilemma.
Mexico produces high volumes of heavy crude oil -Maya type- (table 
(D.19)). that need deep conversion refineries to be processed into high 
value products like gasolines, industrial oils and asphalts. Deep conver­
sion refineries suffer from asset specific investment subject to hold up 
problems, so it is difficult to export this kind of oil to the international 
market. The major market for the Mexican heavy crude oil is located in 
the USA’s region of Mexico’s gulf coast (Boue k  Figueroa (2002)), there­
fore Mexico consumes large volumes of this high sulfur oil in the internal 
market and only exports the remaining part to the USA.
Table 5.7: Mexico’s oil production by type(^) (TBD)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
T otal 2,505.6 2,513.3 2,548.0 2,675.8 2,667.7 2,673.4 2,685.1 2,617.2 2,858.3
Heavy 1,222.7 2,245.5 1,265.8 1,332.6 1,350.4 1,320.6 1,270.1 1,220.4 1,370.6
Light 653.6 673.2 706.5 756.9 756.9 735.3 790.6 890.0 864.1
Supper light 629.4 594.8 575.8 587.0 582.3 562.2 525.1 532.7 577.7
Source PEMEX (1999a) .
One residual product of Mexico’s heavy crude oil refining is sour fuel oil, 
this product, historically, has been highly used in electricity generation, 
and in different heating processes in the industry. With the new environ­
mental regulations agreed in NAFTA, and applied in 2003 and the reform 
in the natural gas sector it is expected natural gas will substitute fuel oil 
in an important way (SENER (2002)). The problem is that it seems 
that PEMEX does not have a substitute market for its fuel oil (George
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& Mortensen (1995); Foss et al. (1993); lEA (1995)). Without this sub­
stitute market the substitution of fuel oil by natural gas would produce a 
big loss for PEMEX^®, this situation is likely to create counter incentives 
for PEMEX and the government to speed up more developments in the 
natural gas industry.
From the presentations of the Mexican authorities and private sector 
in the International Association for Energy Economics (lAEE), North 
American Annual Conference held in Mexico in October 2003, it seems 
that the above dilemma is still not resolved. The forecasts of the Mexican 
natural gas industry, for the next ten years, coincide with the reduction 
of Mexico’s imports of natural gas, LPG and fuel oil. However, they em­
phasise the need to change PEMEX’s fiscal regime and/or the regulatory 
framework to increase public and private investment in natural gas explo­
ration and exploitation that could identify the country as an important 
player in the natural gas market. However, none of those claims make any 
reference to the need for a parallel set of reforms to the refining indus­
try, in order to reduce fuel oil production. Moreover, for the time being, 
PEMEX expects to increase its heavy oil production (lAEE (2003)).
The options contemplated at the moment by Mexican authorities are 
investing in deep refinery plants in Mexico. However, the budget con­
straints and legal limitations on private participation in refining are a 
big obstacle for this option to take place. Another option, that has been 
put in practice with the investment of PEMEX in Deer Park refinery in 
Texas, is to take positions in deep refinery plants in USA to export Mex­
ico’s sour fuel oil for gasoline production and import the gasoline required 
for Mexico from those refining centers (Foss et al. (1993)).
this substitution comes from imported natural gas it would produce a negative effect in the 
balance of payments as well.
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It is important to see that the above discussion is part of a controversy. 
From the projections of the natural gas and oil products markets, pub- 
fished by the SENER (2002), it is possible to see that for the period 
2002-2010 the country will only substitute the imports of fuel oil, so that 
the implicit assumption is that during the period no further reforms to 
the natural gas market will take place.
(b) The LPG dilemma.
LPG in Mexico is a mixture of butane (80 percent) and propane (20 per­
cent) approximately. These liquids are associated with oil and natural gas 
production and are obtained through a process of cryogenic or centrifuge 
separation. The lack of investment in natural gas distribution fines pro­
duced a very important market for LPG in the households sector, mainly 
for heating and cooking.
Most of the LPG is transported by PGPB pipelines to the main ser­
vice facilities. From there the LPG is again transported by road to the 
consumption centers by private companies. Distribution to the final con­
sumers is done by private companies. Foss et al. (1993) points out that^® 
the LPG distribution market has oligopolistic characteristics with a few 
companies controlling large market share. Therefore in their opinion, 
the LPG distribution market has characteristics of quasi-rent capturing 
markets.
Apart from the switching costs, the potential substitution of LPG by 
natural gas suffers from two problems. The first one is that substitution 
will affect interest groups associated with LPG distribution. The second 
one comes from the difficulties in selling the LPG in an international 
market or using the propane and butane in the petrochemical industry
43It seems that this market structure has not changes significatively in the last ten years.
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which in both cases require high levels of investment. Therefore, this 
market also presents counter incentives to speed up the reforms of the 
natural gas industry^'^.
5. Bureaucracies and the private sector.
What has been the role of bureaucracies and the private sector in the design of 
the Mexican natural gas industry? Following Williams (2001) analysis of the 
economic reform process during Salinas’s administration, we could say that 
the Salinas and Zedillo governments failed to construct a strong reforming 
coalition in the energy sector. Not only did the natural gas industry have to 
face a partial liberalisation programme, but also the reform of the electricity 
sector has been on hold all these years.
However, it seems that the failure in constructing a reforming coalition had 
different sources in both cases. In Salinas’ case, after restarting economic 
growth, the government was in a strong position. However, in Zedillo’s case, 
the government was in a weak position due to the economic and political crisis 
of 1994.
To broadly understand the difficulties in constructing a reforming coalition 
for the natural gas sector, the following paragraphs analyse the stakes of the 
different groups in the oil and natural gas industry.
(a) The government.
As discussed in section (5.4), Rubio (1993) argues that the main impedi­
ment for the reform of the oil industry^® was the negotiation of NAFTA.
Again, the SENER (2002) prospective for the natural gas industry only contemplates the 
substitution of LPG imports with natural gas imports. Therefore, no important changes in the 
governance and/or the regulation of the sector are expected.
^^And in our opinion, for the reform of the natural gas industry as part of the oil industry.
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He maintains that any attempt at reform could have been seen imposed 
from abroad which would have ended up in a complete failure.
Although this argument could be true, it is interesting to see the possi­
bility that inside the government, even the free trade agreement coalition 
could have had a stake in not liberalising the oil and natural gas indus­
tries. The reforming coalition of the Salinas government expended a lot 
of economic and political assets in the NAFTA negotiations. Therefore, 
the political risk of implementing the full liberalisation of the oil or at 
least the natural gas industry could have put the NAFTA negotiations 
themselves at risk.
During the Zedillo government the story became quite different. NAFTA 
was already signed and Mexico was an example of a liberalised economy. 
Zedillo launched the partial liberalisation of the natural gas industry in 
the middle of the deepest economic and political crisis in Mexico’s history. 
Therefore, a deeper reform of the natural gas industry involving private 
participation in gas production and privatisation of the transmission lines 
would have caused more problems to the Zedillo administration. More­
over, because the Mexican society had the perception that the crisis in 
the banking system was an example of the failure of Salina’s liberalisation 
programme. To solve the economic crisis, most of the political assets of 
Zedillo’s administration were used to rescue the banking system. It seems 
that there was a stake in part of the government for not pursuing a deeper 
liberalisation programme in the natural gas industry, due to the possible 
troubles that it could have caused in other areas of Mexican politics at 
that time^®.
®^It is well documented in the literature and the news of that time that, in the aftermath of the 
crisis of 1994, the government had to intervene in the banking system and convert the financial 
losses in public debt. This measure was highly non-political because the Mexican society had to 
pay for the excessive risks taken by the banks. The government faced strong opposition from
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(b) PEMEX
What would be the incentives of the diverse areas in PEMEX regarding 
a deeper liberalisation of the natural gas industry?
i. The union'. The reform applied in 1992 cost more than one hundred 
thousand jobs. It is clear that the union had a very big stake in 
blocking any further reform that could cost the loss of more jobs. Any 
decision to privatise gas production or to sell the transmission lines 
would have been seen as the starting point of further privatisation in 
another area resulting in the loss of more jobs.
ii. PEMEX Refining (PR): As pointed earlier in this section, the fuel 
oil dilemma plays an important role in the incentives for PR to block 
any reform that would increase the volume of natural gas sold in the 
Mexican market. This problem is increased with the investment in 
refining plants to produce fuel oil with low sulphur content. Hence, 
there is a plan to substitute fuel oil with natural gas but also for 
PEMEX to invest resources to produce more fuel oil rather than nat­
ural gas. A more liberalised natural gas industry would affect directly 
vested interests in PR, regarding the way in which the economic re­
sources are allocated.
iii. PEMEX Exploration and Exploitation (PEP): At first glance, it seems 
that PEP is not particularly affected by permitting private participa­
tion in gas exploration, exploitation and recovery. After all PEP has 
been traditionally concerned with oil production and the production 
of natural gas has been a secondary activity. As noted in section
associations of debtors. Therefore, it seems that with the taking over of the banking system by 
the Mexican government and the political environment, selling a deeper reform of the natural gas 
sector was a very difficult task. The last thing that Zedillo would have wanted was to confront 
PEMEX’ union together with the debtors associations.
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(5.5.1), the budget constraint faced by PEMEX had produced not 
only high volumes of natural gas burnt in the past, but also the 
lack of investment in natural gas exploration and fields development 
(Marquez (1989)). Therefore, it seems that private participation in 
gas natural activities would permit PEP to concentrate on oil pro­
duction.
However, there are ways in which the status quo of some interest 
groups in PEP could be affected. One is the potentiality of natural 
gas activities being used as a benchmark for PEP. Another is, again, 
the concern of having private participation in natural gas production 
activities as the first step to permitting private participation in oil 
activities.
iv. PEMEX Gas and Basic Petrochemicals (PGPB): FVom the conclu­
sions of the lAEE 2003 Noth American Conference it seems that 
what is stopping Mexico from developing a solid natural gas market 
is the lack of natural gas. If PEMEX cannot invest in exploration 
and production, then PGPB would welcome private participation in 
those activities to increase its sales.
However, regarding its position as a dominant incumbent in trans­
portation and retail, the story would be different. With more gas it 
is possible that the market will face more entrants in transmission, 
distribution and retail. Under this kind of environment PGPB would 
probably face stronger regulation. In the UK the experience was the 
voluntary vertical separation of British Gas as a way for the firm to 
avoid regulation (Armstrong et al. (1994); Newbery (1999)). 
Regarding the vertical integration between transmission and retail.
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technical arguments^'^ were sustained. As Adrian Lajous commented 
in his participation in the (1993) lAEE North American Confer­
ence^®, the lack of storage facilities in the Mexican system required a 
close coordination between transmission and retail for security rea­
sons. That factor together, not only, with the high amount of work 
needed to separate PGPB assets from the other PEMEX subsidiaries, 
but also with the difficulties of developing an accounting system for 
the regulated activities, may explain the option of liberalising the 
natural gas industry with PGPB as an integrated incumbent. How­
ever, it seems that vertical integration is producing barriers for more 
competition in the industry^®, a situation that can be seen in the lack 
from new entrants in retail.
(c) Private Sector: Industry and households.
i. Industry. Perceived wisdom would imply that a full liberalisation of 
the natural gas industry would have positive effects on the industry 
as a whole. However, even partial liberalisation could have had some 
negative effects for certain groups. The principal problem came from 
the elimination of subsidies and the formalisation of property rights 
through contracts, that in an environment of a protected industry, in 
the short term, could produce a negative shock®®. On the other hand, 
the partial liberalisation still provides a sort of insurance against 
external shocks. The reason is that the government keeps a higher
^^The political reasons for not privatising the transmission assets were discussed previously.
^®General Director (GEO) PEMEX (1994-2000).
Furthermore this industry structure is calling for more regulation of PGPB activities (Brito & 
Rosellon (2000)).
After reform, according to written contracts, PGPB was able to curtail service in the case of 
not payment of the gas consumed. Another issue is the requirement for consumers to use financial 
services to hedge price increase. A new situation that proved to be very difficult in the year 2000 
and that will be discussed later in this chapter.
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control of the industry,
ii. Households.
Would households be better off with a deeper natural gas market 
liberalisation? The experience around the world shows that it de­
pends on how the liberalisation is translated into consumer choice 
and reduction in prices.
In the Mexican case this sector may not represent an active opponent 
for liberalisation of the natural gas industry. However, the substitu­
tion of LPG for natural gas has become a problem, not only due to 
the switching®  ^ costs of converting to natural gas, but also because 
of misinformation about security of natural gas compared to LPG. 
In some neighborhoods households have stoped the construction of 
distribution lines, because of the fear that these lines may explode®®.
Regulatory design
The previous section discussed some of the main constraints that shaped the struc­
ture of the natural gas industry in Mexico. The result from these political an 
economic constraints was a partial liberalisation of the industry. Production, which 
in most parts has potential for competition, remained as a legal monopoly under the 
control of PGPB, transmission and distribution were open to private investment as 
activities under regulation, and finally retail was open to private participation and 
open to competition. PGPB remained as a dominant incumbent with integration 
between transmission and retail.
This industry design put some constraints on the design of its regulatory frame-
®^ Most of the consumers are low income families that may not be able to pay for the connection 
to the distribution line, as well as for the costs of changing burners of cookers and water heaters.
®^ This fear is based in two accidents that PEMEX had in the eighties. An explosion of LPG stor­
age facilities in Mexico City and an explosion of pipelines transporting oil products in Guadalajara 
City.
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work^^. In the first place, having a legal monopoly in production called for regulation 
of the natural gas first hand sales^^ prices; in the second place, the fact that PEMEX 
remained as a dominant incumbent with integration between transmission and retail 
called for the separation of accounts and a continued checking of the two areas in 
order to prevent anticompetitive behaviour.
This section will analyse the new structure and regulation of the Mexican natural 
gas industry, in the light of the institutional transformation faced by Mexico in the 
last 20 years®®. The section continues with Levy & Spiller (1997)’s methodology, 
it also makes use of the institutional check list®® developed by Spiller & Vogelsang 
(1997) to analyse the liberalisation of the telecommunications industry in the UK. 
The idea is to follow their approach by looking at the possible match of the Mexican 
“new institutional environment” with the natural gas regulatory framework.
The following pages present an overview of the recent institutional change in 
Mexico:
1. Political institutions.
(a) Executive power.
During Salinas’ government, Mexico started a process of political démocrati­
sation. The process, according to some authors, was unfortunately biased 
by the “president’s preferences” (Williams (2001)). However, the creation 
of the Federal Electoral Commission and the more active participation of 
the political parties permitted a clean election in 1994, when the PRI®^
®^ The Mexican case provides a good example for Dana (1993)’s argument that industry design 
and regulation are jointly determined.
^^First hand sales are defined as the sales from PP to any other customer including other 
subsidiaries of PEMEX and the government.
®®Mexico’s institutional transformation was not only a result of the economic reform, but also 
the result of a democratization processes that started in the 1988 presidential election,
GGgee appendix D.1.3
®^Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) "official party” until the 2000 election.
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candidate Ernesto Zedillo won the election and again in 2000 when Vi­
cente Fox the PAN®® candidate became president.
Until Salinas, the Mexican government could be considered as an inte­
grated governments^, due to the fact that the PRI always had a majority 
in Congress and the president was always able to impose his decisions on 
Congress. However, the Zedillo and Fox governments have had a minor­
ity representation in Congress so that, government decisions have been 
taken using traditional negotiation and lobby procedures.
(b) Legislative power.
With no party hving absolute majority in Congress, the new institutional 
arrangements have produced a more independent legislative power. Two 
important examples are the difficulties experienced by Zedillo and Fox 
when proceeding with tax and electricity reforms. However, it seems 
that the new independence of the Congress has also created problems for 
reaching agreements since at the moment most of the debates take place 
from an extremely partisan view®®.
(c) Judicial power.
Zedillo’s government, on the other hand, implemented a series of trans­
formations in the judicial system to make it more independent from the 
executive. In this case, the effect has been a more independent rela­
tionship between the regulatory agencies and the judicial system. This 
culminated, for example, in the court ruling against some regulatory agen­
cies in severla cases. According to Sanchez (2003), in the face of a new 
independence of the judiciary, the lack of a well defined set of criteria
^^Partido Accion Nacional (PAN).
G^ See appendix D.1.2.
®®Two examples of this are, again, the tax and electricity reforms. In spite of the reforms 
proposed by Zedillo and Fox are quite similar, the PRI does not support Fox reforms in response 
to the negative of the PAN to support them when they were proposed by Zedillo.
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for decision making in competition, has produced an excess of litigation 
which has a negative effect on competition itself.
2. Governance structure. As discussed in section (5.4), from 1995 the governance 
structuré of the energy sector was transformed. The SENER received a specific 
role to oversee energy policy, it was created an independent regulator for the 
natural gas and electricity sectors, and PGPB and CFE reduced their role from 
energy policy makers and regulators to that of regulated firms. The main goal 
of this change had been to reduce the overlap of functions among the different 
agencies and most importantly to avoid the conflicting interests produced by 
having the government as owner, energy policy maker and regulator.
3. Informal institutions (norms).
(a) Permanent bureaucracy?
Mexico’s public sector has been characterised over the years for the high 
level of politicisation of its bureaucracy, which has resulted in the non­
permanency of officials, at least at the medium and high levels. A com­
mon practice in the public sector prior to the presidential elections was 
to ask for forced donations for the PRI candidate campaign. Another 
common practise on the election day was to force bureaucrats to vote for 
the PRI candidate.
The government was related directly with the PRI, the bureaucracy em­
ployed by the government was perceived as employed by the PRI. The 
bureaucracy job stability was linked not only to the PRI’s stability, but 
also to the dominant group’s inside the PRI. Therefore, with the new gov­
ernment, bureaucrats tended to move from one area of the government 
to another.
The effect of these kinds of procedures caused an important loss of ex­
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pertise in the public sector, since after getting some knowledge in their 
respective areas bureaucrats, often, ended up working in totally different 
areas: from budget planning to education, from the city administration 
to the foreigri office, from agriculture to energy and so on. Or they sim­
ply ended up unemployed, just waiting for an opportunity with the next 
candidate.
As for the elections of 1994 some of the practices described above were 
changed, at least the most important ones like the monetary collections 
and the electoral fraud. The general consensus in the media after the 
1994 election was that Zedillo won the presidency on a fair ground. How­
ever, regarding the stability of the bureaucracy and the independence of 
the regulatory agencies, it is interesting to see that the president of the 
Federal Competence Commission, Santiago Levy, and one of the Com­
missioners, Pascual Carcia, were removed from their offices before they 
finished their periods in charge, to work in other areas of the new govern­
ment. It is also interesting to see that the appointment of Jaime Serra 
as the Secretary of Finance caused an exodus of bureaucrats from the 
Secretary of Commerce to the former one.
With the coming of a new political party to power in the election of the 
year 2000, the bureaucracy lost, for the first time, their direct link to the 
PRI. However, in spite of President Fox’s insistence on creating a public 
service career to eliminate the politicisation and avoid losing the skills 
of the bureaucracy, new-comers linked to the party in power®  ^ came to 
the different secretaries and some movements of bureaucrats among the 
different secretaries took place as well.
For the time being the electoral competition seems to be a key factor to
®^ And to the group called Fox’s friends.
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reduce politicisation of the bureaucracy, however strong efforts are needed 
to give job stability to bureaucrats. The installment of programmes like 
the public service career will be very important to keep the expertise of 
bureaucrats and to increase their level of professionalism®^.
(b) White Papers laying out implications of major policy changes to give 
opportunity for lobbying.
The executive has always had the obligation to inform Congress through 
specific studies (“white papers”) of the reasons for major policy decisions. 
The problem was that during the times in which the PRI was in power 
these studies were of limited use because of the subserviance of the leg­
islative to the executive. The political changes in Mexico have produced 
no absolute majority in Congress since the Zedillo period. Therefore, lob­
bying and direct negotiation have become a more common practice for 
the government to implement policy changes. This new situation makes 
these white papers a more important commitment devise for non-drastic 
policy change.
In the case of the energy sector, although the ORE has the power to 
implement changes in regulation, he has to present to the COFEMER®® 
a white paper explaining the impact of policy change. With this mecha­
nism the regulator is restrained from arbitrary action, thereby increasing 
commitment.
(c) Delegation of substantive power to regulators.
The law of the ORE gives it enough powers to change regulation. The 
ORE has the power to accept or reject methodologies for natural gas pric-
®^ Job stability is an important factor to reduce the politicisation of the bureaucracy and to in­
crease professionalism. A more independent bureaucracy would be able to express their professional 
opinion reducing the bias in decision making (Spiller & Vogelsang (1997)).
®^ Federal Commission for Regulatory Improvement.
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ing, transmission and distribution tariffs, interconnection charges, etc. It 
can approve or reject the licences for the different regulated activities 
and regulate the PGPB commercial activities. It also has the power to 
sanction service contracts between the different players in the market.
In principle the ORE has the power to change the licences according to 
directives published by itself. Therefore licence modifications are subject 
to ORE approval and in the case of any disagreement between the parties, 
commercial law has to be applied to solve the case®^ .
Major changes in regulation are subject to administrative law, so that the 
ORE has to produce a white paper justifying the change, and the case 
has to be sanctioned by the COFEMER. Informal rules prevent the CRE 
from implementing major changes in regulation without consultation, 
including the opinion of the SENER, the private sector and the office 
of the president. This organisation differs from the UK, where there is a 
clear view of the diverse agencies involved in the regulatory game. In the 
UK, for example, in spite the independence of the regulator, the state 
secretary could block a decision taken by the regulator, however, the 
secretary of state cannot impose any decision over the regulator (Spiller 
& Vogelsang (1997)).
4. Regulatory framework.
(a) Use of licenses to stipulate pricing and access regulation®®.
Mexican natural gas regulation is based in licenses for transmission, dis­
tribution and storage. The licenses stipulate pricing and access method-
G^ See Comision Reguladora de Energia http://www.cre.gob.mx
®®With a tradition of protecting contracts licences become a clear tool to assure commitment. 
Licenses can specify both substantive restraints on regulatory discretion and restraints on changing 
the regulatory system as well as the regulatory incentives structure. The specificity of licenses 
makes procedural violations easier to identify and keeps regulators from deviating too broadly 
(Spiller & Vogelsang (1997)).
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ologies, capacity, the trajectory of the pipelines in the case of distribution, 
the distribution area, the service conditions etc. The firm and the reg­
ulator can change the license, according to the directives that the CRE 
publishes, but in case of disagreement the parties are governed by com­
mercial and administrative laws.
(b) Attention to competition®®?
The new regulatory framework opens national and international retail 
of natural gas to private participation as a non-regulated activity. Gas 
transmission and storage were open to private investment as regulated 
activities, however the law does not provide those activities with exclu­
sivity rights, so there is the possibility of competition in these businesses 
as well. Distribution is regulated under exclusivity rights, however at the 
end of the exclusion period no new exclusivity rights will be provided, 
so there is a potential for network competition in distribution too. The 
potential looks higher in Mexico City due to the fact that the metropolis 
was divided into four distribution areas (Rosellon (1997)).
PGBP’s integration of transmission and retail seems to have foreclosed 
competition in retail, since in spite of its potential there have been no 
new competitors in the market. Network competition seems to be even 
farther away, since for it to happen requires a mature market and at the 
moment the Mexican market is generally regarded as being insufficiently 
mature for this®^ .
It seems that competition has not played an important role in securing
Competition increase commitment by reducing the potential profitability of the firm, lowering 
prices in the contested segments of the market and reducing the ability of regulators to behave 
opportunistically towards the regulated firm (Spiller & Vogelsang (1997)).
According to Foss et al. (1993) by 1992 Mexico’s natural gas market was a small province 
compared to USA and Canada. It seems that the situation has not changed very much in spite of 
the liberalisation of the market in 1995.
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commitment and reducing the need for regulation. Indeed as Brito & 
Rosellon (2000) observe, there is even a need to impose regulation in 
PGPB’s retail activities.
(c) Involvement of several agencies in any efforts to push through licence 
amendments.
The CRE has to publish the directives for licence amendments. Any 
licence amendment required before the directives are published is subject 
to the relevant laws. Therefore, commercial and administrative law limits 
the power of the regulator for arbitrary action. However, there is no 
other agency with formal veto power®®. Independent courts are required 
to ensure commitment against arbitrary action in the Mexican case.
(d) The details of the regulatory incentives such as price cap regulation®®.
In Mexico price level and price structure are regulated. Price level is 
subject to a cap (maximum income), the firms can choose prices that on 
average do not exceed the cap. The structure of the prices settled by the 
firm is also regulated to avoid undue discrimination and cross subsidies 
among consumers.
Performance
This section presents a brief review of the Mexican natural gas industry after reform. 
Our goal here is to close the chapter by indicating the extent to which reform has 
affected performance.
1. Natural gas demand and supply
we mentioned in previous pages, in the UK the state secretary could veto a decision taken 
by the regulator Spiller & Vogelsang (1997).
®^ The regulator discretion is determined by the amount of intervention permitted in the com­
pany’s price setting and investment decisions. Price caps work as a commitment device, since 
they permit the firm to set prices subject to the cap, reducing the level of regulatory intervention, 
(Spiller & Vogelsang (1997)).
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Table (D.17) presents data in thousands of millions of BTUs (T-MBTUs) of 
Mexico’s natural gas production, internal sales (excluding Pemex consump­
tion) exports and imports for the period (1980-2002). As can be seen, both 
production and internal sales started a sustained increase after liberalisation 
in 1995. Table (D.18) presents the rate of growth of production, internal sales 
and the natural gas implicit price divided into governmental periods of six 
years (or sexenios)'*'®. As can be seen, after the De la Madrid period, the rate 
of growth of internal sales has always been greater than the rate of growth 
of production, their gap increased by 0.56 percent points in Zedillo’s term, 
compared to Salinas’s term. This situation, as shown in table (D.17), has 
produced an increase in natural gas imports to cover the gap.
Table 5.8: Natural gas demand and supply^ (1980-2002) t -m b t u ’s
Year Production Exports Imports Internal sales*’ Fleured'’ Implicit Price'*
1980 1093.44 104.42 0.00 507.97 12.0 0.009
1981 1201.59 106.86 0.00 497.87 16.4 0.013
1982 1258.33 101.26 0.00 500.40 15.0 0.017
1983 1254.60 80.49 1.65 489.21 10.0 0.059
1984 1161.41 55.03 1.78 460.97 8.5 0.175
1985 1164.25 0.00 1.46 453.61 7.7 0.313
1986 1138.56 0.00 1.92 409.41 10.7 0.504
1987 1145.47 0.00 2.12 411.51 8.1 1.015
1988 1156.06 0.00 2.36 400.80 3.5 2.372
1989 1194.76 0.00 16.91 417.17 3.0 3.908
1990 1231.80 0.00 16.09 469.79 2.6 4.161
1991 1222.23 0.00 60.86 513.11 2.6 3.997
1992 1180.30 0.00 91.34 507.54 2.7 4.911
1993 1161.21 1.72 35.82 474.58 3.5 6.320
1994 1182.37 7.12 46.37 507.32 3.3 5.877
1995 1160.41 7.96 64.11 542.73 5.1 5.664
1996 1199.58 13.47 31.11 572.82 9.5 11.355
1997 1237.63 15.98 42.62 600.53 13.6 15.568
1998 1322.65 14.78 56.78 676.10 13.6 14.480
1999 1307.49 51.34 55.22 704.07 10.3 17.9542000 1351.94 8.77 86.01 766.12 9.8 32.0392001 1345.52 9.22 108.35 739.01 7.8 37.1052002 1389.77 1.63 233.51 918.08 6.0 31.759
Source SENER, PEMEX and Marquez (1989) .
Excludes PEMEX consumption.
As proportion of total production.
 ^ Calculated as: value of total sales divided by total energy sold and multiplied by the 
World Development Index WDI conversion factor,
Corresponding to the governments of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), Carlos Salinas (1988- 
1994) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000).
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Table 5.9: Rate of growth®' %
Production Internal sales*’ Implicit Price
1982-1988 -0.74 -1.92 43.04
1988-1994 0.19 2.05 7.88
1994-2000 1.164 3.58 14.73
1980-2000 0.16 0.97 17.28
Calculated from table D.17 .
*’ Excludes PEMEX consumption.
With regard to natural gas burnt to the atmosphere, table (D.17) also shows 
its increase to levels comparable with the ones obtained at the beginning of the 
80s. Finally, natural gas implicit price^^ also registered an important increase 
after liberalisation, being almost four times bigger in 2002 compared to the 
implicit price of 1995.
It is not the purpose of this section to try to make final conclusions from the 
data shown in table (D.17). However, the table does summarise interesting 
information of what has happened in the natural gas industry in the last 8 
years. In general it shows a reactivation of the natural gas market compared to 
its situation during the second part of the eighties. That is, after reform there 
is an increase in production, internal sales and in the activity of the external 
market. An interesting point to notice from table (D.17) is the increase of 
natural gas burnt to the atmosphere. It seems that the Mexican dependency on 
associated natural gas, mentioned in section (5.5.1), is still present. Although, 
it is fair to say that, according to SENER (2002), PEMEX has made important 
efforts to increase the production of natural gas from non-associated fields, as 
well as to increase the exploration and drilling of non-associated natural gas 
fields.
Table (D .ll) shows the exploration and exploitation of oil wells. For 1998
Calculated as the ratio: total sales value over total sales energy and adjusted by the World 
Development Index (WDI) conversion factor.
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PEMEX increased substantially the number of wells drilled, by 2001 and 2002 
their number was comparable to the levels registered at the beginning of the 
eighties. What is important for the natural gas industry is that from 1998 to 
2002, 40 new gas fields were discovered which represents 62% of the natural 
gas fields discovered in the previous 17 years.
Table 5.10: Exporation and explitation of oil wheals (1980-2002)^®^
Year
Drilled
Total Exploration Development
%Sucess
Exploration Development
New fileds 
Oil Gas
1980 432 73 349 42 83 28 6
1981 405 62 312 38 87 10 11
1982 353 50 261 28 82 10 8
1983 305 54 194 28 88 11 6
1984 282 68 235 32 85 10
1985 288 78 225 41 81 5 2
1986 246 56 117 47 86 4 6
1987 103 27 94 36 85 2 1
1988 144 30 98 23 82 2
1989 123 24 58 41 77 6 4
1990 106 51 81 33 93 7 3
1991 184 45 126 52 86 6 6
1992 129 38 83 59 94 4 10
1993 78 19 47 52 89 8 1
1994 63 17 55 38 91 2
1995 101 10 94 60 97 1 0
1996 114 11 107 60 95 1 0
1997 121 15 115 70 96 0 1
1998 203 19 214 62 98 2 4
1999 234 28 206 41 91 0 52000 247 49 236 57 95 1 52001 459 45 404 53 91 2 212002* 344 42 300 50 88 3 5
 ^ Source: SENER.
These discoveries have raised expectations for the natural gas industry, but, 
the institutional locks for private investment in exploration and exploitation of 
natural gas fields still represent an important obstacle for their development. 
In order to ameliorate the problem two second best solutions have been taken 
by the government. The first one has been to allow for NGL imports, and the 
second one is the implementation of multiple service contracts (MSC) for nat­
ural gas exploitation. According to the government and private specialists, it 
is expected that the MSC will reduce Mexico’s natural gas imports in the near 
future. However, as mentioned previously, major changes in the institutional
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and regulatory framework would be required for the country to play a major 
role in the North American natural gas market (SENER (2002)).
2. Investment in transmission and distribution
Prom 1996 to 2001 the GRE^^ gave 94 permits, 57 for non-open access, 14 
for open access and 21 for distribution. The permits include those for existing 
transmission and distribution companies prior to reform. The preexisting lines 
in transmission include the two permits given to PGPB, one for the National 
System of Pipelines (SND"^ ®) and the other for a non-interconnected pipeline in 
the north of the country known as the Naco-Hermosillo system. In distribution 
they include the permits given to ten preexisting distribution companies.
The length of the open access transmission system in Mexico by 2001, ac­
cording to the CRE, was 10,839 km, however 9,043 km corresponds to PGPB, 
therefore private investment has only contributed 1,796 km of pipelines to 
open access. The distribution lines have contributed most of the total length 
to the pipelines in the country; by 2001 the distribution lines were 28,042 km.
Prom the reports provided by the regulator it is difficult to estimate not only 
the real increase in the size of the distribution network, but also the real 
increase in investment, as the regulator does not distinguish old from new 
networks and existing from new investment^'^.
The Secretary of Energy published a study of Mexico’s potential for trans­
mission of natural gas pipelines (SENER (2003)). This estimated that with 
the substitution of the 80% of fuel oil consumed by the industry, the realisa­
tion of new projects in the electricity sector, and with the construction of the 
Mexico-Guatemala pipeline, there is a potential for the construction of more
^^ See CRE webpage, http://www.cre.gob.mx .
^^Sistema N a c io n a l de Ductos in S pan ish .
^^The information has been solicited to the regulator through the Federal Institute for Access 
to the Public Sector Information (IFAI inspanish).
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than 122 new transmission pipelines that would contribute 8,823 km to the 
natural gas pipeline transmission network. According to the SENER study, 
the potential for the transmission pipelines also creates new opportunities for 
the delimitation of 24 new distribution areas.
If the new investments in transmission already realised are added to the po­
tential investments described by SENER then, up to now, the country has 
reached 21.69% of its total capacity for new investment after reform. However, 
the assumption of substituting 80% of the fuel oil consumed by the industry 
seems to be too strong, since it does not give an estimate for the retail of this 
fuel in alternative markets or an estimate of the investment requirements in 
refining capacity for its transformation in lighter fuels. However, it still pro­
vides a benchmark to compare the progress reached in the transmission and 
distribution sectors.
3. P rices
Table (D.12) shows natural gas prices adjusted by the WDI conversion factor 
for the period 1981-2002. The table shows some interesting issues that could 
be attributed to natural gas market reform. Prom 1981 to 1988 there was 
a single price for the industry and the households sectors, furthermore from 
1989 to 1991, the price for the households sector was smaller than the price 
offered to the industry, in spite of the higher costs of serving the former sector. 
Therefore, it is possible to say that from 1981 to 1991 the government trans­
ferred a net subsidy to the households sector. However from 1992 the prices 
of natural gas presented a more market based structure, having prices for the 
industrial sector lower than the prices for households'^®. It is interesting to 
see that the change in price structure started in 1992, rather than 1995 when 
the reform to the natural gas industry was implemented. This is because of
^^Which reflects the cost differential to serve both markets.
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the reforms implemented by Carlos Salinas’ government to the oil industry in 
general; among other things this looked to align national prices to USA prices 
plus/minus transportation costs (netback methodology) and to introduce cost 
criteria for the determination of price structure.
Table 5.11: Internal prices of natural 
gasf®-! (1981-2001) (Pesos per Million BTU)
Year
Industry
Non-border Border
Households
1981 0.02 0.02 0.02
1982 0.03 0.03 .01
1983 0.08 0.08 0.08
1984 0.18 0.18 0.18
1985 0.42 0.42 0.42
1986 0.53 0.53 0.53
1987 1.65 1.65 1,65
1988 2.02 2.02 2.02
1989 3.18 3.18 2.58
1990 3.56 3.56 3.11
1991 3.91 3.91 3.88
1992 5.16 5.16 6.31
1993 5.10 5.10 10.43
1994 4.87 4.20 10.62
1995 6.84 6.03 12.16
1996 16.66 12.16 22.27
1997 13.34 12.91 21.46
1998 13.88 13.75 -
1999 14.24 14.54 -
Source: SENER.
Prices adjusted by the WDI conversion factor.
It is important to mention that the high price increase in the year 2000 gen­
erated an interesting event in the regulatory process in Mexico. The weather 
conditions in the USA caused an unprecedented increase in natural gas prices 
that was translated to Mexico’s internal prices. This increase caused strong 
financial problems for the industrial sector which organised itself to put high 
pressure on the government for a reduction in those prices. The argument 
was that internal prices should not be increased for changes in the weather 
conditions that happened in the USA. The immediate response from the gov­
ernment and the regulator was that the formula for first hand sales prices 
included the opportunity costs of the natural gas sold in the country, and
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that since the market was open in 1995 the private sector was always able to 
sign hedging contracts in the US market. Further pressures from the indus­
trial sector, under a problematic economic situation, pushed the government 
to require PGPB to readjust contracts with the private sector. This episode 
together with the PGPB integration of transmission and retail may be linked 
to the lack of new entrants to the retail business in spite of being a non­
regulated activity. Commented by several specialists in the lAEE 2003 North 
American Conference, these events place some question marks over the real 
independence of the regulator. After the event, the CRE has made strong 
efforts to incentivise consumers of natural gas to use financial instruments to 
hedge future price shocks.
Finally, table (D.8) shows natural gas, LPG and fuel oil implicit prices^® in 
pesos per MBTU adjusted by the WDI conversion factor, for the period (1980- 
2002). As shown, prices of natural gas started increasing before 1994, however 
they followed a similar pattern to that of LPG and fuel oil prices, with fuel oil 
having more fluctuations from 1995 to 2002. The increase of natural gas prices 
of 1996 and 2000 are particularly high, showing the impact of external shocks 
over internal prices due to use of the netback formula to calculate first hand 
sales prices that link national prices to the North American market (Rosellon 
& Halpern (2001)).
It is interesting to see that after reform the three fuels started to open a 
price differential. This price differential may have permitted some inter-fuel 
competition, taking into account respective switching costs. However, the 
lack of development of financial and commercial mechanisms have overexposed 
Mexico’s energy sector to the price volatility in the USA. Given the political 
and social importance of both fuels the government’s response has been to
Calculated as the ratio of the value of internal sales divided by their heat power.
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Table 5.12: Mexico: Implicit prices of Natu­
ral Gas, LPG and Fuel Oil® (1980-2002) (Pe­
sos per MBTU adjusted by the WDI conver­
sion factor.)
Year Natural Gas** LPG Fuel Oil
1980 0.009 0.024 0.010
1981 0.013 0.030 0.014
1982 0.017 0.025 0.014
1983 0.059 0.040 0.035
1984 0.175 0.050 0.102
1985 0.313 0.050 0.167
1986 0.504 0.275 0.256
1987 1.015 0.653 0.528
1988 2.372 1.870 1.387
1989 3.908 2.240 2.201
1990 4.161 1.817 2.309
1991 3.997 2.381 3.009
1992 4,911 3.561 4.395
1993 6.320 5.415 4.742
1994 5.877 7.543 5.346
1995 5.664 7.317 6.273
1996 11.355 18.850 10.554
1997 15.568 18.178 14.434
1998 14.480 20.320 11.935
1999 17.954 22.049 16.7892000 32.039 36.798 30.7432001 37.105 41.149 26.5282002 31.759 36.037 31.511
'Estimated a, ( a a n ) of the internal sales, withinformation from SENER.
intervene in both markets. In the case of natural gas, as discussed earlier, by 
encouraging PGPB to offer special contracts at a fixed price; in the case of 
LPG by fixing the LPG final price due to its “social” importance^^.
4. O ther issues
Beyond the effects on prices, production levels and demand there are another 
set of variables on which the market reform made a positive impact. Some 
examples are the provisions and the actual enforcement of quality and safety 
norms, the delimitation of property rights by the mean of contracts^® and 
the introduction of financial mechanisms to hedge price volatility, particularly 
after the unfortunate episodes described above.
^^LPG is consumed principally by the household sector.
*^ ®In some cases PGPB provided natural gas to customers without a specific contract.
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It seems that the principal problem for the industry continues to be the lack of 
natural gas. Some partial solutions have taken place with the construction of storage 
facilities to import NGL, and with the implementation of the MSC. Nevertheless, the 
speculations about the real potential of the Mexican natural gas industry remain.
To place Mexico as an important player in the North American natural gas 
market, at least, a further reform of PEMEX is required in order to free economic 
resources for oil and natural gas development. However, this task does not seem so 
easy due to the politicization of the firm, as discussed in this chapter.
5.6 C onclusions
This chapter has attempted to use the theoretical framework developed by transac­
tion costs economics, to analyse the decision taken by the Mexican government to 
implement the partial liberalisation of the natural gas industry.
The study has followed the approach in Newbery (2000); Levy & Spiller (1997); 
and Spiller & Vogelsang (1997). It has therefore taken three steps:
1. It has briefly analysed the liberalisation programme implemented by the Mex­
ican government from the eighties to the mid-nineties, in order to look at the 
liberalisation of the natural gas industry in the context of a bigger liberalisa­
tion programme.
2. It has attempted to highlight the combination of macro and micro constraints 
that shaped the partial liberalisation of the natural gas industry in Mexico.
3. Finally, it has also analysed the institutional and regulatory design developed 
to regulate the natural gas industry under the constraint imposed by PGPB 
integration between transmission and retail, and PP legal monopoly over pro­
duction.
The main results of the chapter could be summarised as follows:
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1. The liberalisation of the natural gas industry has been both encouraged and 
constrained by the global liberalisation of the Mexican economy. It has been 
encouraged because of the need for clean energy sources to support the com­
petitiveness of the Mexican industry in the context of the NAFTA. However, 
it has also been constrained because of the high political content of the oil 
industry and the risks that its further liberalisation could have imposed on 
the global liberalisation project pursued the successive Mexican governments.
2. The economic and political crisis faced by Mexico in 1994 also imposed a series 
of constraints on building a liberalising coalition for the natural gas industry. 
This is against the background of other failures suffered by the country in 
the privatisation and liberalisation of other sectors of the economy, like the 
banking system and the telecommunications industry.
3. Besides the macro-constraints mentioned above, the industry also faced a set 
of micro-constraints for the full liberalisation to be implemented. This chapter 
has attempted to characterise those constraints to uncover the ones that are 
likely to be binding. There are difficulties to uncover these fully, because of the 
private character of the decision making at the different stages of the reform.
However, this study goes beyond what has been done in the past in the analysis 
of the liberalisation of the Mexican natural gas industry. The simple general­
isation that the option adopted by the government to partially liberalise the 
natural gas industry was taken due to the political internal and external forces, 
leaves the processes of decision making in a black box, and does not help us 
to understand the particular constraints faced by the different players in the 
industry. From the policy making point of view it does not help to clarify if a 
further reform could be implementable.
From the micro constraints that we analysed, it seems that the ones related to 
the structure of the energy sector and bureaucracies are the ones that weighed
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the most in the final decision taken by the government.
The fact that production is in the hands of a big player (PP) has historically 
linked natural gas production to oil production^® providing a big stake for the 
“oilers” versus other areas of the business, this situation did not change after 
reform. The fuel oil dilemma seems to have played a role as well due to the 
lack of resources to invest in refinery capacity to accommodate the potential 
fuel oil displaced by natural gas.
4. Regarding the regulatory reform, it seems that regulation was designed accord­
ing to the industry structure, therefore, in spite of potential competitiveness of 
oil production, natural gas prices at the well were regulated and the regulatory 
framework has to deal with a dominant integrated incumbent.
However, it is possible to say that in liberalising the natural gas industry, the 
government made a strong effort in building the right set of institutions to 
match the regulatory framework and vice versa. There is an independent reg­
ulator with enough powers for decision making, which is limited in its powers 
by the use of several regulatory mechanisms like the use of licensees, price caps 
and by the judicial power through the limits imposed by commercial and ad­
ministrative law. With the professionalisation of the regulators, independent 
budget, a more independent judicial system and the existence of informal rules 
like the requirement to consult with SENER and the office of the president 
regarding important matters, it seems that the government has succeeded in 
encouraging commitment to the regulatory rules.
In a more open view it could be said that the institutions created for the 
natural gas industry are settled in a more stable overall Mexican institutional 
environment produced by two forces: 1) a democratic force fed by the need of
®^As it was discussed in the chapter, maximisation of profits subject to a budget constraints 
always favours oil projets against gas projects.
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the Mexican society of a more democratic system, with a more even interaction 
among the executive, legislative and judicial powers and 2) a commitment force 
from government’s not to change the rules of the game.
Some drawbacks are: a) the lack of formal rules for the participation of other 
agencies, like the Federal Competence Commission and SENER in the regu­
latory process (as in the UK) and b) the non-written rules that still link the 
regulator to political decisions as was shown during the price shocks of the 
year 2000.
In terms of Levy & Spiller (1997)’s decision three (figure (5.1)) Mexico presents 
an hybrid situation. On one side the judicial system is becoming more inde­
pendent, parties started swapping in power, and contracts have become a more 
important binding constraint. However, government decision making has be­
come problematic because the government has no majority in Congress and 
parties have followed partisan interests. Finally, the professionalisation of the 
bureaucracy is still an issue. It seems that this hybrid situation will produce 
strong constraints for any further liberalisation of Mexico’s natural gas indus­
try.
5. Finally some descriptive indicators of the performance of the natural gas in­
dustry after reform were briefly analysed. From them it could be concluded 
that there was a relative success in attracting private investment to the trans­
mission and distribution sectors. However, the industry confronts a difficult 
situation regarding natural gas production, that may affect its future.
Diverse scenarios have been developed to forecast the behaviour of the Mexican 
natural gas market. In the most conservative ones, the substitution of fuel 
oil for natural gas only reduces the volume of fuel oil imported. Thus, the 
composition of the energy imports change to a cleaner fuel and there is no fuel 
oil natural gas dilemma. However, under stronger assumptions over changes
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in regulation, fuel oil faces a higher rate of substitution which raises the issue 
of what to do with the fuel oil produced in the country.
In any case, there is a consensus that in order to reach scenarios in which 
natural gas takes a more dynamic role in Mexico’s economic development 
further changes are needed in the global regulatory framework that not only 
alow a more dynamic role of the private investment, but also permit PGPB 
to operate with a more business oriented profile.
Rom the analysis it is also possible to see that other areas of the business, like 
storage and retail, have not been developed. Until recently some permits for 
storage related to LNG have been conceded by the CRE, as it has been the 
strategy of importing LNG to satisfy the increase in demand. However storage 
for normal natural gas has not been developed. Rirther, no new entrants to 
retail to compete with PGPB have appeared in the market, maybe due to the 
strong position of the incumbent caused by the vertical integration of retail 
and transmission. It seems that to develop those business areas it will be 
necessary to make further adjustments either to the regulatory framework or 
to the industry design.
CHAPTER 6
Conclusions
6.1 M ain findings
In this thesis we have studied some aspects of the political economy of the regulation 
of network industries. Specifically we attempted to study the problem of industry 
design under political economy constraints. Our motivation has been the range 
of industry structures, regulatory regimes and outcomes that have occurred in the 
more than 20 years of experience of regulatory reform of network industries around 
the world. Due to the special nature of the network industries, their reform which 
in some cases included privatisation of public firms, has been typically charged with 
high political content. Therefore, in most of the cases political times dictated the way 
in which the reform took place, including with this, the way in which the industries 
were organised as a result of the reform process. The resulting organisation of these 
industries dictated the way in which their regulatory framework was settled, as well 
as their future transformations. Thus, we observe that political economy issues
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matter for industry design and regulation. Some examples of these arguments, 
as they were commented in the thesis, are the telecommunications, electricity and 
natural gas industries in the UK, the electricity industry in the USA and the natural 
gas end electricity industries in Mexico. In the rest of this section we present a 
summary of our main findings, together with some ideas for future research in the 
field.
Chapter 2 constitutes our literature review, there we tried to answer the question: 
Why do we regulate network industries? We found that according to the public 
interest theory (PIT) the reason for economic regulation of these industries is to 
correct the market failure produced by the natural monopoly condition and the 
network externalities they present. However, we also found that, in a broader sense, 
regulation may occur as well as a result of the pressure of interest groups that try 
to capture rents occurring in the markets they look to regulate, this is basically 
the capture theory of regulation (CTR), According to Laffont (2000) the theory of 
economic regulation was divided between these two paradigms up to the end of the 
seventies. This was then our starting point from which we moved to discuss some of 
the main topics of what in the literature of “New Economics of Regulation” (Laffont 
(1994); Vogelsang (1998)) is called “optimal regulation”.
The main contributions of Chapter 2 were: 1) Present the “Canonical Model 
of Regulation” in line with PIT to explain how asymmetric information, between 
the regulator and the firm he has to regulate, induces the implementation of “third 
best mechanisms” as the optimal solution to the problems of market failure, linked 
to network industries. 2) Introduce transformations to the canonical model to ad­
dress the problem of capture of the regulator by the firm he has to regulate raised 
by CTR. Capture is motivated by the fact that asymmetric information produces 
rents to be retained by interest groups. Allowing for political intervention in the 
canonical model of regulation induces the implementation of, what Vogelsang (1998) 
calls, “fourth best mechanisms” as the optimal solution for regulation. 3) And fi-
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nally, present the most recent theoretical and empirical developments in incentives 
and political economy of regulation. Prom the theoretical literature we observed 
that perhaps the main progress has been the introduction of dynamic settings and 
endogenous transaction costs of capture, together with departures from complete 
contracting. On the other hand, from the empirical literature we observed that, 
in most of the cases, it has studied the results of the regulatory reform experience 
around the world, using the tools developed by the transaction cost and new institu­
tional economics (TCE and NIE respectively) to explain the observed differences in 
industry structure, regulation and performance. The main findings of the literature 
have been that a) for the design of industry structures and regulatory frameworks, 
the detailed micro-analysis of the new structures is required to detect the new set of 
incentives prevailing in the industry (Joskow (2000b); Newbery (2000)); b) the align­
ment between institutions and the regulatory framework could explain the relative 
success and failure of the privatisation and regulatory reform policies in different 
institutional settings (Levy & Spiller (1997)).
The principal conclusion we derived from Chapter 2 is that of a possible gap 
in the literature regarding industry design and regulation under political economy 
constraints. Chapters 3 and 4 tried to cover the gap, whereas chapter 5 attempted 
to illustrate the complexities of industry design with a case study. Next we discuss 
the main findings in our core chapters.
Chapter 3 and 4 are similar in nature, both of them develop theoretical models 
of industry structure under political economy constraints in the form of capture. 
Both chapters make use of the methodology developed by Laffont (2000) to study 
capture within the canonical model of regulation. Their difference relies in the kind 
of network industries they analyse.
Chapter 3 studies industry design of an homogeneous natural monopoly industry 
when capture is present. The issue is the decision that Congress has to make about 
having one firm or two firms serving the market, when regulation is delegated to a
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non-benevolent regulator. The problem is that having two firms serving the market 
(regulation by duopoly) produces the duplication of fixed costs. We built on Au- 
riol & Laffont (1992)’s solution to this problem under no delegation. We introduce 
delegation and allow for a non-benevolent regulator, from there we obtained the 
price-markup equations under capture for the monopolistic and duopolistic struc­
tures.
The comparison of these price-markup equations permitted us to solve for the op­
timal level of duplication of fixed costs under capture. Our main results were that 
delegation to a benevolent regulator increases welfare under both industry struc­
tures. This is due to to the fact that a benevolent regulator increases quantities 
and reduces the expected rents given up to the most efficient firm under both in­
dustry structures. A non-benevolent regulator, on the other hand, reduces welfare 
under both structures, this is because Congress has to give up an incentive payment 
to the regulator to deliver true information. The reduction in welfare comes from 
three sources; the social cost of incentive payments to the regulator, the reduction in 
consumer surplus due to the reduction in quantities and the reduction in producer 
surplus due to the reduction in rents. Consumers and firms suflfer from capture.
However, regarding the optimal level of duplication of fixed costs it is not straight 
forward to derive analytical conclusions from our results. That is, this optimal 
level may increase or decrease according to the values of the parameters. For the 
optimal level of duplication of fixed costs to increase with the level of capture it 
is required to impose some constraints on the parameters. As a general intuition 
we found that if the monopolistic structure is more affected by capture than the 
duopolistic one, then the optimal level of duplication of fixed costs is more likely to 
increase as the level of capture rises. Due to the difficulties in deriving analytical 
conclusions, we performed two numerical simulations assuming an exponential and a 
normal probability distribution functions. The numerical simulations confirmed our 
intuition. In both simulations we found that the optimal level of duplication of fixed
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costs may increase with the level of capture for certain values of the parameters.
These numerical simulations also permitted us to observe that for a given level 
of capture the optimal level of duplication of fixed costs increases with the level of 
productivity. As for the effect of the cost of public funds over the optimal level of 
duplication of fixed costs, we found that it depends on the productivity parameter 
for the exponential pdf and on the level of capture for the uniform pds. However, 
for high productivity and capture, the optimal level of duplication of fixed costs 
increases as the cost of public funds increases.
Chapter 4, on the other hand, studies the case of heterogeneous products. In 
this case the decision faced by Congress is that of regulating the industry as a multi­
product natural monopoly or as two separated natural monopoly industries, In this 
case, we built on Dana (1993)’s solution to this problem with no delegation. He 
found that for low levels of correlation between products, a multi-product natural 
monopoly increases welfare compared to regulating two natural monopolies, each 
producing one good. The above results are driven by the fact that for low levels 
of correlation informational economies of scope outperform yardstick competition. 
As in chapter 3 we introduced delegation to Danas problem and we allowed for a 
non-benevolent regulator. We explored the effects of having a captured regulator 
over the ability of Congress to exploit informational economies of scope to reduce 
rents. As in chapter 3, we found that delegation to a benevolent regulator increases 
welfare compared to asymmetric information. This is because a benevolent regulator 
improves industry design and industry performance at no cost (-ie. approximates 
the correlation parameter to the full information level and reduces transfers at no 
cost).
Allowing for a non-benevolent regulator not necessarily decreases welfare com­
pared to the benevolent regulator case. This is due to the fact that, in this model, 
the presence of a non-benevolent regulator does not reduce consumer surplus. That 
is, in Dana’s model consumer surplus is determined by the production of the most
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efficient firm (s) and producer surplus (transfers) is determined by the production of 
the less efficient firm(s). As we saw trough our results, quantities produced by the 
most efficient firm(s) are not distorted, hence consumer surplus remains constant. 
However, quantities produced by the less efficient firms are reduced under benevo­
lent and non-benevolent regulators’ cases, therefore rents are reduced in both cases. 
The presence of capture reduces rents more than under the benevolent regulator 
case but this reduction in rents comes with a social or distributional cost due to the 
transfer payment given up to the non-benevolent regulator for truth-telling. There­
fore the final effect on social welfare has to be measured by the trade off between 
rents saving and the cost of preventing capture.
For industry design, a non benevolent regulator can improve the outcome relative 
to asymmetric information and relative to a benevolent regulator (though at a cost 
of an incentive payment for truth-telling). In particular, when the probabilities of 
states Ih and hi are high, then a non-benevolent regulator may improve the industry 
design decision. This is because these states are the ones where externalities are 
high between the firms and, therefore, where Congress reduces transfers with the 
integrated structure, by making the firms to internalise those externalities.
Finally, the goal of Chapter 5 was to illustrate the complexities of a regulatory 
reform process involving industry design with a case study. We chose the Mexican 
natural gas reform not only for personal reasons, due to my professional experience 
working at Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals (PGPB) during the natural gas 
reform in Mexico, but also because -in general- the Mexican case represents a good 
example of the liberalisation policies implemented during the eighties and nineties 
around the world and -in particular- the reform of the Mexican natural gas industry 
presents also a good example of how political economy constraints shape industry 
structure and regulation.
Having said that. Chapter 5 attempts to study Mexico’s natural gas reform using 
two general approaches developed by the NIE (Williamson (1994)). The first one.
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a macro approach looks for macro-variables to see the possible constraints in liber­
alisation. In our case this macro-approach looks at the role that the wide economic 
reform that Mexico pursued from the beginning of the eighties and the economic 
crisis of 1994 may have had on the reform of the Mexican oil and natural gas in­
dustries. This approach makes use of Newbery (2000)’s explanation of why partial 
liberalisations of network industries may occur. The second one, a micro approach 
uses Levy & Spiller (1997)’ methodology to look at the matches or mismatches of 
the institutional and regulatory frameworks to analyse industry structure, regula­
tion and performance. In this case we study the prevailing set of institutions to 
explain industry structure and regulation before and after liberalisation.
Prom our analysis we found that, at a macro level, contrary to the common 
thought, the Mexican Constitution imposes an non-avoidable constraint for the lib­
eralisation of the oil and natural gas industries, the partial liberalisation of the Mex­
ican natural gas industry may be explained by some other constraints that use the 
Constitution constraint as their support. We found two main binding constraints 
that may have differed over time, the first one was the overall liberalisation pro­
gramme implemented during the Salinas’ period in which the government’s priority 
was focused on the privatisation of important public firms -including the financial 
sector- and the negotiations of NAFTA. The political assets of Salinas’ government 
were expended in these two projects, therefore, any further liberalisation of the oil 
industry in Mexico, given its high political content, could have put the whole project 
at risk. The second one is the dependency of the Mexican government on oil indus­
try revenues, that during the economic crisis of 1994, in Zedillo’s administration, 
presented more relevance, not only because the Mexican government became more 
dependent of the oil industry revenues to finance debt, but also because those rev­
enues served as a warranty for the international loans required to confront the crisis. 
Mexico’s natural gas industry was reformed in 1995 in an environment in which 
the government was concerned with the economic stabilisation of the country and
Conclusions 196
in which the liberlisation programme of the previous administration was perceived 
by most of the Mexican society as an important cause of the crisis, therefore, fully 
liberalising Mexico’s natural gas industry faced strong constraints.
In a more micro level, we found that bureaucracies and complex industrial rela­
tions in the energy market also may have played a role in the partial liberalisation 
of the Mexican natural gas industry. In the first case, the fact that production of 
natural gas has been historically linked to oil production, may have created a big 
stake for the bureaucracies in charge of oil production to protect the status quo. In 
the second case, the fuel oil dilemma seems to have played a role as well, due to the 
potential risk of lost income for PEMEX resulting from the high substitution of fuel 
oil for natural gas.
The follow up of the methodology developed by Levy & Spiller (1997) showed 
that -in general- the institutions prevailing before liberalisation on the natural gas 
industry matched the industry structure during the periods of higher investment. In 
this case government concentration and the lack of democratic procedures for deci­
sion making inside the ruling party called for public ownership of the oil industry, as 
it was the case. However, parallel to the overall economic liberalisation programme 
some of the Mexican institutions changed, in particular, Mexico invested an impor­
tant amount of resources in creating a more democratic system. This produced in 
Levy and Spiller’s nomenclature a non-concentrated government that, together with 
the reform of the governance structure of the energy sector, seems to be more in line 
with private participation in the natural gas industry.
6.2 Som e Lessons
Our theoretical models of chapters 3 and 4 fit in the literature of New Economics 
of Regulation, which incorporates political economy constraints (capture) in a well 
specified welfare optimisation problem. Asymmetric information among the players
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gives the motivation for capture, then the principal (Congress) has to add a true 
telling constraint at a ocial or distributional cost. The outcome in each case is that 
a capture parameter is added to the price-markup equations. When those equations 
are compared to the ones obtained under delegation to a benevolent regulator we 
were able to obtain two clear results: a) capture reduces welfare, b) a non-benevolent 
regulator could still be useful as long as it provides the right set of information. 
However, as for the determination of industry structure our results show that, even 
in these simple models, it is hard to determine the final effect of this single capture 
parameter over Congress decision making. The reason is that this effect still depend 
on the parameters, that in our models come in the form of productivity, social costs 
of public funds (or Congress’ distributional concerns) and Congress’ probabilities of 
facing a favourable informational set.
Compared to our theoretical chapters. Chapter 5 represents a world with a wider 
and more complex set of parameters. Therefore, as most of the literature does, we 
required to depart for a moment from our normative models with complete contract­
ing to follow the tools developed by the NIE and TCE to analyse the reform process 
of the natural gas industry in Mexico. Therefore, from what we have observed in 
Chapter 5, a question to ask is that if in the light of that wider and more complex 
set of parameters that the real world presents, we can still learn from our theoretical 
models. In a broad sense this is the dilemma that science, in general, and economics 
in particular face. If our theoretical models are let’s say our controlled experiments, 
then we can look at the parameters of our equations and try to give an explanation 
of what we can observe in the real world.
For instance, the case study of Chapter 5, together with a number of other ex­
amples, confirms that political economy issues matter for industry design. However, 
in which way? and why? Coming back to our theoretical results we can see that 
in the case of homogeneous goods, under certain circumstances the duplication of 
fixed costs increases with capture, the productivity parameter and the cost of public
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funds. Therefore, we would expect to see more duopolistic structures in countries 
where there are more problems of capture, and less efficient tax systems, but also in 
countries with more productive firms. In the case of heterogenous goods our results 
show that capture reduces the level of correlation beyond which decentralisation is 
chosen. However, this level of correlation is reduced as well with Congress’ dislike 
for transfers (distributional concern) and is increased with the probability of facing 
a high cost firm. In this case we would expect countries with capture and income 
distribution problems to rely more on yardstick competition, whereas if the firms are 
low productive, then a regulated multiproduct monopoly would be a better choice.
Does this fit what we see in the real world, including our case study of chapter 
5? This is a point difficult to address. However, from Auriol & Laffont (1992)’s 
motivation for regulation by duopoly, the existence of duopolistic structures in the 
natural gas industry in USA and Germany commented in Chapter 2, we see that 
more developed countries have implemented duopolistic structures more often than 
less developed countries. It is generally accepted that these countries face either less 
problems of capture or their institutions are more prone to constrain government’s 
actions. Therefore, the capture parameter alone may not explain why less developed 
countries with apparently more problems of capture and less efficient taxing systems 
present less situations of network competition. Some explanations to this may rely 
on the productivity parameter, or it may be the case that less developed countries do 
not have the required institutional constraints to make their governments implement 
the optimal mechanism. Which takes us back to our analysis of Chapter 5.
As for our model of Chapter 4, we observe more firms in the market provid­
ing multiproduct services like gas, electricity and hxed-link telecommunications. 
According to our results we would expect to see industries more often where cost 
correlation is low, like electricity and natural gas transmission or distribution, facing 
either regulation by yardstick competition or being regulated as independent natu­
ral monopolies, in countries with problems of capture an income inequality. On the
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other hand, in more developed countries we would expect to see more multiproduct 
firms of this type. One important lesson of our model in chapter 4 was the insight 
into the optimal level of capture in a given society. That is, ceteris paribus, for high 
levels of capture, its prevention could be so costly that it may be more efficient for 
the society to regulate those industries as independent monopolies.
Our case study in chapter 5 did not intend to test our theoretical models, as we 
mentioned before, it illustrates the complexities regarding industry design of network 
industries. However, some issues could be picked up from this case to address our 
model of chapter 3. For instance, even though Mexico’s natural gas transmission 
was opened to private investment, PGPB remained as a dominant incumbent in 
transmission. It seems that the fear that any privatisation of the assets of PGPB 
could lead to the privatsation of assets of other divisions of PEMEX created a stake 
for different interest groups, including some inside the government, to keep PGPB as 
dominant incumbent in transmission. With a high stake of collusion from the status 
quo, if we reinterpret our capture parameter as the lobby of these interest groups, 
we would have expected as an optimal response to this lobby, at least the division of 
PGPB in a number of transmission companies with the possibility of future network 
competition^. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the resulting industry structure may be 
explained by the difficulties to implement the optimal contract.
6.3 Future research
From the latest progress in theoretical literature of regulation mentioned in Chapter 
2, some straight forward extensions to our models of industry design are the inclusion 
of dynamics to our regulatory game. This could permit to model a situation like the 
one faced by British Telecom in which network competition was allowed in a second
^Neither this kind of policy was implemented in the telecommunications industry in Mexico, 
where Telemex was privatised as a dominant incumbent as well.
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stage. The introduction of more interest groups and endogenous transactions costs 
of capture, could extend our models to address more realistic situations like the one 
observed in our case study. More interest groups and endogenous transaction costs 
would permit to model lobby processes and the power of different interest groups. 
Finally, in a dynamic setting with voting systems it could be possible to model the 
change of industry structure in longer periods.
Regarding empirical work, the role of political constraints on industry design, 
seems to be open for future research. As we saw in Chapter 2 an amount of work 
has been done to analyse the relationship between political institutions regulatory 
frameworks and investment in network industries. It looks reasonable to use the 
political data bases used in those works to analyse the relationship between those 
political institutions and the way in which industry structure has been designed in 
different countries after reform.
APPENDIX A
Chapter 2: Appendices
A . 1 N atural m onopoly
If a firm with market power reduces overall welfare by setting price higher than 
marginal cost and by reducing the quantity, quality and the number of the goods 
produced in an economy, should it be simply horizontally or vertically disintegrated? 
Should barriers to entry be eliminated to introduce competition?
Sometimes just eliminating a monopoly is not the best answer to improve welfare 
in the economy, because under certain circumstances monopolies could be benefi­
cial for the economy, for example in the case of research and development of new 
technologies it is said that a monopoly position could justify the stability to invest 
in research (Tirole (1989)). Horizontal mergers could be welfare improving if syn­
ergies out-weigh price increase (Parrel & Shapiro (1990)) or if there is entry as a 
post-merger decision with no quantity reduction (Willig (1991)). Vertical integra­
tion could eliminate the double marginalization problem, due to having a chain of
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monopolies in the market (Tirole (1989)). Finally, it could also be the case that 
producing a given output with more than one firm will cost more than producing 
with only one firm.
In the last case it is said that a natural monopoly exists, and the best way to 
increase welfare in the economy is to keep production with only one firm and to 
regulate it in order to reduce price and to increase total output.
Historically a natural monopoly has been associated with economies of scale and 
scope, however those kind of economies are not sufficient conditions for a natural 
monopoly to arise. The sufficient condition is the global subadditivity of the cost 
function which is attained when there is cost complementarity in the cost function 
or when there is a declining ray average cost function combined with a trans-ray 
convexity condition of the cost function. All the conditions will be defined in the 
following lines^ :
1 Economies of scale exists when the average cost of production decreases as 
output expands. The effect appears when fixed costs are high and variable 
costs are low, in such a case it could be shown that average costs decrease per 
unit produced.
2 Economies of scope appear when more than one good is produced by the firm 
without the expansion of its fixed costs. With several goods, sometimes there 
are shared equipment or common facilities that make producing them together 
less expensive than producing them separately. Economies of scope are said 
to exists if a given quantity of each of two or more goods can be produced by 
one firm at a lower total cost than if each good were produced separately by 
different firms.
^Notice that in the case of single product firm, economies of scale for all levels of output are 
equivalent to falling average cost function and to subadditivity of the cost function. However 
subadditivity of the cost function does not require falling average cost function. For a formal 
discussion see: (Schmalensee (1979); Sharkey (1982); Braeutigan (1989)).
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It is possible for economies of scope as well as for economies of scale to exist 
at some levels of output but not at others. For example it may be cheaper 
to have one firm producing two goods when small quantities of the goods are 
being produced, but not large quantities and vice versa.
3 It is said that the cost function is sub-additive when at a given level of output 
the cost producing that output is lower with one firm than with more than 
one firm, regardless of how output might be divided among multiple firms.
That is:
Y^C{g,)  > c C £ q , )  
where the q'^ s are the quantities of the different products.
A natural monopoly exists when the cost curve exhibits subadditivity in the 
relevant range of the market demand, since as in the case of economies of scale and 
scope, subadditivity could exist at certain levels of output, but not at others^. The 
sufficient conditions for subadditivity of the cost function are:
(i) Cost complementarity: increasing production of any output reduces (does not 
increase) marginal costs of all other outputs.
c(%  +  z )  -  c ( x )  > c ( x  d- y  +  z )  -  c (%  +  y  )
if the cost function is differentiable cost complementarity can be represented 
by:
< OV%g,dqidqi
I^n the case of public utilities industries high fixed costs make a strong barrier to entry and 
from the social point of view, it is not efficient to have two firms producing the same products 
because it leads to over-investment. One good example of over-investment could be seen in the gas 
distribution network in Monterrey Mexico, where there are pipelines that run parallel with each 
other to serve different customers in the same area and none of the pipelines were working at full 
capacity by the time of the liberalization of the natural gas industiy in 1995.
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(ii) Declining ray average costs pins trans-ray convexity.
(a) Declining ray average costs is defined as:
C (# )  < tC(gf)
or
C(kq)
k
for A: > 1
(b) Trans-ray convexity is written as:
d- (1 -  6)67(3/) >  C[6(a;) d- (1 -  6)(3/)]
With X and y vectors of products and k defined as before.
Trans-ray convexity plus declining ray average cost =  subadditivity of
the cost function^.
Given that there is a natural monopoly, the regulator must try to induce the 
firm to choose a price level and quantity that maximizes total welfare. Setting price 
equal to marginal cost maximizes total surplus, but in a situation where marginal 
costs run below average costs a firm setting price equal to marginal cost will operate 
with loses and at some point it will shut down. For that reason, the regulator’s 
optimal outcome will be a second best one in which it will induce the firm to charge 
a price equal to average cost. At that point price will be reduced and quantity will 
be increased compared to the unregulated monopoly.
The way in which the regulator could induce the firm to the second best outcome 
is one of the most important issues in the economics of regulation. In the following
^Notice that conditions (i) and (ii) are sufficient, but not necessary conditions. For a deeper 
discussion about all the definitions and conditions presented see: Sharkey (1982).
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pages a general review of the literature of the economics of regulation developed in 
the last fifteen years will be presented. However, before doing that, a second source 
of market failure called network extenalities which is directly related to the utilities 
industries will be analyzed.
A .2 N etw ork externalities
As it was remarked before, a natural monopoly condition is a general feature of 
network industries, however there exists another source of market failure produced 
by the so-called network externalities^. These network externalities are a common 
feature not only of network industries, but also of markets of goods that have network 
characteristics.
“In its simplest economic definition, a network is a set of points (or nodes) and 
interconnecting lines or (edges) organized with the object of transmitting flows of 
energy (electricity, heat), information (sound, data, pictures) or materials (water, 
freight, passengers, etc.). Each point can be an originating node from which the 
flow is emitted, a terminating node, that is a node receiving the flow, or a node 
that plays an intermediary role of transmission, storage, amplification, coordination, 
dispatching and so on. Some networks are one-way, like gas, cable TV, and water 
delivery and some are two-way, such as passenger transportation or telephone” (EC
(1999)). In one-way networks customers are not identified, so the flow goes from the 
source to the customer only. In two-way networks customers, are identified so the 
flow could go in both directions, as the ability to make and receive calls in telecoms 
or round trips in rail services.
The fundamental characteristic of a network is that many of its components 
are required for the provision of a service. For that reason, network components
^Liebowitz & Magnolis (1994) formulate some criticisms about the existence of such network 
externalities and of the lack of empirical work done in the area.
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are complementary to each other. This characteristic of multiple potential comple­
mentarity makes it possible to extend the notion of network to industries where no 
physical networks exist, such as the set of users of VHS video recorders, the users of 
PC-type computers or even to social organizations (EC (1999); Economides (1996); 
Liebowitz & Magnolis (1994)). Therefore, the analysis developed in the study of 
network industries can be used to study vertical integrated firms with strong com­
plementarities and vice versa (Economides (1996)). There are two types of network 
externalities®:
(1) Direct externalities: customers are identified with components of the network. 
The typical example is a two-way network as in telephone services. In that 
case, an additional user provides direct externality to all customers in the 
network, since all of them can receive a call from him or make a call to him.
(2) Indirect externalities: customers need not to be identified with the components 
of the network. It arises when the addition of one customer increases the 
quantity of goods provided in the market and reduces the cost of its provision. 
One-way networks can only present indirect externalities. An example is the 
reduction in cost when new customers are connected to a gas distribution 
network®.
There are, of course, negative externalities such as those produced by network 
congestion in telephone services or overload in gas and electricity transmission and 
distribution.
The question is: Can market forces produce the incentives to internalize both 
kinds of externalities?
I^n another nomenclature networks are related to economies of density and economies of clubs, 
however, those definitions have as a consequence direct and/or indirect externalities defined in the 
text (EC (1999)).
®In general indirect externalities are more related to economies of scale and scope (Liebowitz 
& Magnolis (1994)).
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Economides (1996) argues that: “under perfect competition and network exter­
nalities the marginal social benefit of network expansion is larger than the benefit 
that accrues to a particular firm under perfect competition. Thus, perfect compe­
tition will provide a smaller network than the optimal, and for some relative high 
marginal costs perfect competition will not provide the good while it is socially 
optimal to provide it”. He also argues that, a monopolist that is unable to price dis­
criminate will support a smaller network an will charge higher prices than perfectly 
competitive firms. Finally, he concludes that oligopoly and monopolistic competi­
tion under compatibility will support a network of a size between monopoly and 
perfect competition. Under incompatibility if costs of achieving compatibility are 
lower for all firms than the increase in profits because of compatibility , then the 
industry move towards compatibility is socially optimal.
Thus, in the case that some firms benefit from compatibility and some firms do 
not, but having the global costs of compatibility lower than the global benefits, some 
firms will resist global compatibility when it is socially optimal to achieve it. This 
issue is also related to the situation of two firms one of them controlling an essential 
facility or bottle neck. In that case, the access to the network could be forclosed 
by the firm controlling the bottle neck by charging high inter-connection fees or 
at least reducing the quality of the inter-connection by implementing imperfect 
compatibility, (Armstrong et al. (1994); Economides (1996)).
There is another potential problem with the competitive outcome due to the 
particular feature of networks. The problem ia that there is more value to its 
products when more customers participate in the network up to a certain point, 
that feature produces a set of multiple equilibria in the size of the network. That 
is, because of the indirect externalities (club effects) the attractiveness of a given 
network is closely dependent on what each potential customer thinks about the total 
number (or identity) of customers in each competing network. That expectation 
makes customers enter or leave the network so, if the network does not reach its
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critical mass corresponding to the price they have chosen it wont be able to survive 
(Economides (1996); EG (1999)).
The literature about regulation of network industries tells that those industries 
with clear monopoly characteristics should be regulated, and those industries with 
more possibilities for competition must be open to it. However, according to the 
discussion of network externalities above, even those networks industries with high 
potential for competition^ could require intervention to solve problems of compati­
bility, inter-connection, and critical mass of the networks®.
A .3 N ew  In stitu tional and Transaction C osts Eco­
nom ics
What is TCE and how it could be used to the analysis of institutions, politics and 
regulatory design?
For Joskow (2 0 0 0b): “ The primary objective of the transaction costs economics 
(TCE) is to understand how variations in certain basic characteristics of transactions 
led to the diverse organizational arrangements that govern trade in a market econ­
omy. The organisational arrangements that have been of primary interest include 
the internal organisation of firms, the determinants of the boundaries between firms 
and markets and the properties of contractual arrangements between buyers and 
sellers of goods and services. The driving force affecting the choice of governance 
arrangements is the desire to economize on the total costs of goods and services, 
including costs associated with contractual hazards and the costs of institutional 
arrangements designed to address such hazards TCE adopts a comparative insti­
tutional choice approach to analyse alternative governance arrangements... Within
^Such as rail services, telecomms and air transport.
®It is argued that the English mobile-phone experience with Telepoint ended in a failure, because 
of the inability of the franchises to set up a base large enough for their network to be attractive to 
new customers (EC (1999)).
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the comparative institutional framework , TCE also relies heavily on an incomplete 
contracts approach to the evaluation of alternative contractual and organisational 
arrangements. The costs associated with writing, monitoring, and enforcing incom­
plete contracts, and the problems (contractual hazards) that incomplete contracts 
engender for armonising potentially conflicting interests of buyers and sellers to 
perform in mutually satisfactory way as economic conditions change over time, is 
central to the analisis of institutional choice, brhaviour and performance from a 
TCE perspective.”
For Williamson (1994), the (NIE) offers several related perspectives to the expla­
nation of how transaction costs affect reform programmes and development itself. 
The main division is between the institutional environment approach, which is a 
more macroanalytic perspective related with formal and informal institutions that 
take into account the legal and political environment to explain the reform process 
and its outcome. And a more micronalytic perspective which deals with firm and 
market modes of contract and organisation.
According to him the main results for the institutional economics are:
1. Institutions are important, and they area susceptible to analysis.
2 . The action resides in details.
3. Positive analysis (with emphasis on private ordering and the facto organisa­
tion) as against normative analysis (court ordering and the jure organisation) 
is where (NIE) focuses attention.
In sum, from the point of view of new institutional economics, transactions costs 
affecting the institutional environment and governance matter for economic policy 
making. Those transactions costs come from the effort placed by the diverse agents 
in the society, firms, government and individuals to reduce the transaction costs of
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their interactions. That minimisation leads to the formation of different organisa­
tions from which markets versus hierarchies is an example (Williamson (1994)).
Therefore a reform programme cannot be planned in a vacuum, so that, the way 
in which the reform takes place have to look at the institutional endowment of given 
country, as well as the mechanisms of governance placed in the reform, due to the 
fact that the diverse agents in society will look for different ways of economising 
their transactions, leading to strategic brhaviour and group formation. Then, the 
way which agents organise themselves could lead to unintended consequences.
APPENDIX B
Chapter 3: Appendices
B .l  O ptim al regulation under com plete inform a­
tion
rP
W(g) =  C/(g) +  V(g) =  /  [6!(g) +  A f  (g)g -  (1 +  A)(^g +  AT) -  AU]dF(/)) g(') J0
Subject to:
U{p) = 0
The first order conditions are^: 
r0I +  AP(g) — (1 +  X)P}dF{P) —
Jf3
^Differentiation of a definite integral: Let, I{x) =  F{x, t)dt be the definite integral, then by 
the Leibnitz’s rule: F'(œ,t)df. In the optimization problem above for the consumer
welfare we have I{q) =  / J S{q)dF{p) so, =  / J S'{q)f{p)dp = S'{q) / J  f{p)d0 =  S'{q) since 
dF(P) =  f{P)dp and f{P)dp =  1. The same is applicable to the rest of the terms.
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{S'{q) 4 - XP'{q)q H- XP{q) — (1 -{- A)/3} =  0 
Then we have 5"(ç) =  P{q) so,
n<!) - 0 =
Under concavity assumption, dividing by P{q) we get the result:
P{qm) ~ P __ A 1
P{qM) l  +  Ar/(P(gM))
Assumption Al, concavity of V{q)\
f  W)g -  (1 +  A)(U -  P(ç)ç _  _  A:) =
S{q) +  XP{q)q — (1 +  X){Pq — K)  — (1 +  X)U 
Taking the first derivative with respect to q:
r  (g) =  +  AP'(ç)g +  AP(g) -  (1 +  A),9 =
(1 +  A)P(g) +  XP'{q)q — (1 +  X)P > 0
By the definition of consumers’ welfare.
Checking the second order condition we need:
=  (1 +  A)P'(g) +  AP'%g)g +  AP'(g) =
(l +  2A M g) +  A P % )g< 0
For that to be accomplished P'(q) < 0 and P"{q) < 0 is required. (Normal 
goods).
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B .2 Incentive com patib ility  constraints
Prom Laffont & Tirole (1993), consider:
■ I{p,p) = t 0 )  + P{q{p))q0)-I3q{p)
The first order condition for truth-telling is:
i ( /3 j )  =  0
That is /3 =  /?max^(/3,0)
i{p,P) =  i{0) + P{q0))q{P)q{0) + P { q { m 0 )  -  Pq0)  = 0
m
Prom:
=  -  P {q0 ) )q0 )  +  0 9 0 )P=0
U{0) = t{0) + P{q0))q{0) -  0q{0) -  K
Œ = i(p) + p{q(0))q(0)q{p)+ p { q m m  -  m )  -  q m
Substituting i[p) and using the envelope theorem:
Ù{0) =  - P { q 0 ) ) q 0 ) q 0 )  ~  P (q 0 ) )q 0 )+
0 9 0 )  + P{q{0 ) )m q{0 )  + P ( q m m  -  0 m  -  q{0)
Ù{0) =  -q{0)
Constraint q{P) < 0 comes from the socially costly rent, less efficient firms 
produce less at the optimum.
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B .3 Hazard rate o f substitu tion
A note for the hazard rate of substitution from Simon & Blume (1994): Exam­
ple 24.6. Derivation of density functions from failure rates. Let /  be the density 
function for a continuous random variable t > 0  and let F  the corresponding distri­
bution function. Think about t as denoting the lifetime of a mechanical or electrical 
component, then^:
R{t) =  1 -  F{t) = Fr\T > t\
The probability that the component lasts at least t time units, is called the 
reliability function. Given / ,  F  and R, the failure rate or hazard function Z  is 
identical to:
Z(t) =  =  M“  1 -  F{ t )  R{ t )
The function Z  can be thought as the probability that the component will fail in 
the next At time units, given that it has not failed up to time t, because the later 
conditional probability is equal to:
Z  could be defined as Z  = and can be thought as the probability that the 
component will not fail in the next At, given that it has not failed in the last 
t. Given /  and F, Z  is defined. The interesting fact is that it is possible to go 
the other way, given a hazard rate function Z, there is a unique corresponding 
probability density function /  and a distribution function F  that satisfies Z.
To construct /  from Z  note that R{t) — 1 — F{t) and R'{t) = —F' ~  —/  so, Z  
can be rewritten as:
F(()
^Note: F{t) =  Pr\T < i[.
Regulation by duopoly under political economy constraints _______________215
with initial condition R{0) =  1 — F(0) =  1. Z{t) is then a linear homogeneous 
differential equation in R  whose solution is:
R(t) =  e~^oZis)ds 
since /  =  F ' =  (1 — R)' = —R' then:
R' = R{t)Z(t) = f{t) = Z(t)e~^oZ(^)ds 
Now f{t)  depends on the form of Z{t), setting Z{t) =  a:
f(t )  =
Exponential distribution function.
If Z{t) =  then:
f{t,  a(3) =  {aP)t^~^e~°‘^
Weibull distribution function.
B .4  D iscontinu ity  o f th e hazard rate o f su bstitu ­
tion
The stochastic structure Auriol & Laffont (1992):
I a; G [0 , 1] b and e are independent
=  a /?+ (l—a)e =  < b G {b,b} v=Prob(b=6)
G [e,ë] G(.)and g(.) are the dist. and density functions.
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This stochastic structure is the continuous version of =  a 6 +  (1 — with 
b e  ( 6 , 6} and E E  discrete. It is easy to check that when E  has more than one 
element (i.e., can take more than one value) and o; < 1 , the matrix of conditional 
distribution M of generic elements mij = Prob{(3^\p^) does not satisfy the Crémer- 
McLean condition, that is, it is impossible to write any row as a linear combination 
of the other rows. So with our structure it is impossible to obtain the first best 
solution as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In the continuous case, can take its values in two intervals depending on the 
realization of b, either in Ai — [a6 +  (1 — a)e,ab 4- (1 — o;)ë] or in A 2  ~  [ab 4- 
(1 — a)e,ab 4- (1 — o:)ë]. We consider in this paper the case where Ai  and A 2  
are disjoint (the observation of p^ reveals the value of b). The case of the non­
empty intersection is more difficult to treat because of the second order conditions of 
incentive compatibility. However, in the uniform case it is tractable, and the general 
results are similar to those obtained here; but, because of the non-monotonicity of 
the hazard rate, there is bunching at the optimum, see Auriol (1992), (1992).
So, for the sake of simplicity, we assume: a 6 4- (1 -  a)ë — « 6  4- (1 -  cx)e. This 
assumption imphes:
F(/)^|/y) =  -
and so  ^ =  0 almost every where.
Moreover, in order to have global monotonicity of we assume that:
and — are non-decreasing (local)
^  (global).
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B .5 Solution  of th e optim ization  program  under 
asym m etric inform ation
First it is necessary to integrate the incentive compatibility constraint:
Ù{0)  =  - q { 0 )
rp . Ç0/ [/(/)) = - /  =Jp Jp
-  [ -  /  =Jp
Jp
J b
"P pp
f
qp
'Ê.
pp 
'0
r>P
'Ë.
since U(P) = 0.
Then we need to integrate by parts the expected utility:
Jp Jp Jp
F(0) q{0)d0 - /  F(0){-q{0))d0 =Jp .  ^ Jp
-P 
'P
P
P
P
T 'PJBÈ
q{0)F{0)dp =  P  q { 0 ) ^ d F { 0 )
Since F{P)U{P) = 0, F{p)U{P) — 0 because F{p) = 0 and U{P) = 0, and
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d(3 = Substituting in the optimization program:
f  [ S iq u m )  + -  (1 +  A)(/3çm(/3) + K) -  A ^ ç (/3 )]d F (/3 )) Jp J \H)
under assumption Al, the first order conditions are sufficient to find the optimum:
J  [S ' iqMm +  AF'(?m(/3))?m(/3) +  AP(?m(/3)) -  (1 +  X)P -  X ^ ] d F { p )
since / f  dF{j3) =  1 and substituting S'{q{P)) = P{q{j3)), we get:
P W ) ) - / 3  =  ^ P W ) ) . ( / 3 )  +  ^ f g
Dividing by P{q{p))
P ( q { P ) ) - p _  -XP'{q(P))q{0)  X F(/3) 1
- rP{q{P)) 1 +  A P(q[0)) \ + X m P [ q { l 3 ) )
A 1 ^  A F(0)  1
1 +  A liW ))  l  + X m P { q { f i ) )
B .6  E xpected  u tility  under delegation
U{(3) = /  qM{P)dp =
r _  1{/(/?)“ [— / qM{P)d0\ ~ ^ Jo JH^3<y\a=<D)
f, I
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Since U{P) = 0  is binding. Then we need to integrate by parts^:
/ U{p)dF{p)  =JB
F[P)U{P)
Since F(P)U(P) =  0, F { 0 ) U{ Q  = 0, and dP = ^
B .7  A sym m etric inform ation and delegation
max
?(•)
|c J  [S(qM(.P)) + AP(9M(/9))?Ai(/3)
'P.
(l +  A)(j09M(,g) +  A:)dF(/?)
"P pP
fp Jp+ ( i - c ) f  f  [S{qM{P)) + XP{qM{P))qM{P)JB B
-  (1 + \){pqM(P) + K) -  \umjM^dF{p)dF(p)
subject to:
ù[p) =  -? m (0  
?«(■) < 0  
4m(o") > 9M(a'*') 
U[P) >  0
=  F{0), dv = dF(/3), u =  U{P) = JlJlgM(P)i^dpdP,  $  =  J»[-gu(P)^]dP  and 
the rule is f  udv = uv — f  vdu.
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Integrating the incentive compatibility constraint and substituting in the opti­
mization program we get the first order conditions as:
c fp/  +  >^P'{qMW))qM{P)Jp
+  ~  (1 +  A)/?)dF(/?)
r fP rP+  ( 1  -  C ) Jp Jp
=  0
Since the integral is with respect to dF{(3) and the derivatives are with respect 
to g, the first order conditions reduce to“^®:
c +  A-P'(gM(^))gM(/?) 
+  “  (1 +  A)/?
+ (1 - 0
— (1 +  A)/3 — AF(/3)l /((T,/)) =  0
Making S"(g(/?)) — P{q{f3)) and reorganizing terms the pricing formula becomes:
P {q \À P ) ) -P  A
+ 1 +  A S{0) P (* (/3 )) C /W /(/3) +  (1 -  ( ) /(? , A
'Since / | ( / |  d^dp\dF(fi) =  =  / |  dF{p) =  /|_ /{« d ,8  =  1
®For the hazard rate and the conditional we have: Ip Ip ~X j^^^^d0dF(p)  =
=  -Xji^Tf^ll l l lF{0)dFmdF{P)  
- X - ! i ^ 7 ^ S [ U l U [ m _ d l 3 m 0 ) d F m  =  s in ce  d P  =
f ( 0 ) d 0  =  1 /«  d F { p )  =  m d P  and d F ( p )  =  F ( P ) .
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B .8 D elegation  under m onopoly w ith  no effects 
in th e conditional expectations
We assume a three tier hierarchy supervision model (Congress®-regulator-firm(s)) as 
in Laffont & Tirole (1993) and Laffont (2000). The supervision technology (Laffont
(2000)) is as follows. The regulator observes a signal a — (3 with probability (  and 
a signal o- =  0, which means no information, with probability (1 —(). The regulator 
utility function is u =  s. It is the reward received by the regulator, not necessarily 
monetary income, for his report. In this section we assume a benevolent regulator, 
therefore he reports truthfully (r — <j) and receives a payment for his report which 
could be normalised to zero (s =  0). With this supervision technology we have two 
cases to analyse:
1 1Î r = a — P, with probability Congress is fully informed, therefore it
can implement the complete allocation mechanism, by solving the following 
optimization problem^, subject to U{p) = 0:
/  [% (/? )) + AF(«(/3))?(/3) -«’{•) Jp
{l + X){l3q{l3) + K ) - \ u m d F { l 3 )
The solution in this case is given by the pricing equation®:
P { q h ) - P *  A ^
Pi q h )  1 +  A g(gM)
2 If <j =  0 Congress is uninformed with probability (1 — (). However, poste-
®We follow Laffont & Tirole (1993) and Laffont (2000) in calling the principal “Congress” instead 
of “government”. Their justification is that this kind of model still requires a benevolent principal, 
therefore, Congress is more likely to appeal as impartial given its multiple political representation. 
See also the literature review.
^Where stands for welfare under full information.
®See appendix B.l for the solution and appendix B.2 for the incentive compatibility constraints.
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rior beliefs remain equal to prior believes® therefore, Congress optimization^® 
problem is given by:
rPm axW  =  /  [S{qM{P)) + ^P{qMW))qM{P)-'Z(-) J0
(1 +  A)(/9?m(/3) +  K ) ~  XUmdF{l3)
Subject to the following incentive compatibility, incentive rationality and a 
non-bunching constraints^^:
Ù{P) =  -?m(/3)
?m (/3) < 0 
U(0) > 0 
>  9m (o’*')
And the solution is given by'^:
P { q M ) - p _  A 1 A F{p) 1~rP{qM) (1 +  A) T}{qM) (1 +  A) /(/?) p(çm)
Prom the solution of the optimisation programme under asymmetric informa­
tion we have the now classical result (Laffont & Tirole (1993); Laffont (1994)):
1 Positive rents have to be given up to the most efficient firm due to asym­
metric information U{Q — qM{P)dp >0.
®The reason is that cr =  0 is not conditional in any realisation of /?.
glands for welfare under asymmetric information.
Except for qM{a~) > gMfa"*"), which is needed due to the discontinuity of the hazard rate 
of substitution (see appendix B.3 and B.4) at a, the rest of the constraints are the standard 
constraints, Auriol & Laffont (1992).
^^ See appendix B.5.
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2 Quantities and effort of the most efficient firm are not distorted =  
Qm { P )
3 Quantities and effort of the less efficient firms are distorted in order to 
cut rents ql^iP) > qM{P)
As in Laffont (2000) we check if it is worth to have a regulator at all. We have that
the expected welfare with a benevolent regulator is given by +  (1 — =
C[W^^ — Therefore, there is a social gain of having a benevolent
regulator given by AW =  which substituting in the welfare functions
becomes:
{ { S { q h m - S { q M m ) ]  +
A [ P ( & ( /3 ) ) & ( «  -  P(<7M(/3))9M(/3)l}dP(/3) +
/  {(1 + \)[PqM{P) -  P'ghiP)] +  AC/(/5)}dP(/î)} >  0+ '3
by the regulator are U[p)dF{p) and with a benevolent regulator they are (1 
OS!u(P)dF{P).
Another way to see this is that with no regulator the expected rents given up 
/?
rrfn\rîrrfn\
The key for this result is the non cooperative behavior between the two agents 
(Laffont & Tirole (1993); Laffont (2000)). However, there is scope for some discretion 
from the regulator. If the regulator receives a signal a = P he could report r  =  0, 
with this behavior the regulator provides an informational rent to the firm given by:
f/3
P{P)=  /  qM{P)dp>o
J B
As in Laffont (2000), this outcome could be characterized as Nash equilibrium 
between Congress and the regulator and between the firm and the regulator. An­
other Nash equilibrium (Laffont (2000)) is always to report r  =  0, in which case we
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are back to the model with no regulator. This last equilibrium is not robust, since 
with a small transfer e from Congress it is optimal for the regulator to tell the truth.
According to Laffont & Tirole (1993) and Laffont (2000) there are some facts 
to be considered: a) it is unrealistic the assumption of no communication between 
parties b) there are strong incentives for the parties to reach and agreement (even 
being illegal); c) there must be transaction costs in reaching such kind of agreements.
B .9 C onditions for th e  expected  u tility  under del­
egation  to  be lower than  th e exp ected  u tility  
under no delegation.
To have:
U( 3)  =  qM{0)dP > { 1 - 0 < à , { P ) ^ - J ^ ^ d p d P
we need:
J i - 1! - C W  ‘ ‘ J ’ I ’
That is : _ _ _
jg l l  <lM{P)-f 0 ^ ^ dpdp -  qu{P)dP ^
"0 I'd r,h ^
or
f l f l < l U P ) ^ d p d p
jg qu{P)dp ^  
! l ! j U P ) ^ ^ d p d p ~ ^
For (  e  [0,1],
Regulation by duopoly under political economy constraints 225
B.IO D uopoly: full inform ation
The regulator’s program is to maximize expected welfare:
rP
,^ax  / [S(q^ +  g )^ +  XP{q^ +  +  g )^
- (1  +  A)(/3'?' + K  + P W  + K ) ~  At/i -  \U'‘]dF(p\pO
subject to U'(fF) =  0 for i =  1,2 because of full information.
The first order conditions are:
rP
/  [S'{q  ^+  g )^ +  XP'{q  ^+  g^)(g  ^+  g )^ +  AP(g^ +  g )^ -  (1 +  X)p^]dF{p\p^) =  o
Prom =  1 because the
interior integral is the marginal.
Then:
-f g )^ +  XP'{q^ +  g^)(g^ +  q^) +  AP(g^ + (p) ~ (1 +  A)/3^ ] =  0 
and the same for firm 2 . ,
So, after making S'{q^ +  g )^ — F(g^ +  (p) and dividing by P(g^) the solution is 
given by equation (??):
P(g|j) -  min(/?\/?2) 1 1
P{ql)  IPAg(g^)
B . l l  Sam pling effect under full inform ation
From Auriol & Lafifont (1992): Because q%j{mm{p^,p^)) — g^(/?\/?^), =
/ /  -  H/d)] where W{q{p)) =  S{q) +  \P(q)q -  (1 +  \)Pq. In­
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tegrating by parts and using the first order conditions, we obtain immediately
f  d[F^in(P) -  F{P)]
Let: u = W{qM{p)),v =  [Fmin(/?) -  F{P)] dv =  [Pmm(^) -  F{p)]dp and du 
■(1 +  X)qdp. pb b pb
/ udv — UV — I vdu =J a a J O'
^ -  F{p)]dp =
- P m l . ( g )  +  f  (g )]  -  r  - | ^ & [ f » i „ ( / 3 ) - P ( ^ ) ] r f / 3  =
fP 
J 6
1 +  A
''P
'Ê.
FmmiP) denote the cumulative distribution of mm{P^,p^).
B .12 D uopoly  incom plete inform ation
First we have:
U\p^)  =  = j U % { 0 \ p O J^ jL^ p .dp^dp
Integrating by parts^® the expectation over U^(p^)dF{P^) 
we get:
=  F(/3>), dv =  dF(/?l),u =  q{P\0^)l%^d0^0\du =  -q(P\0'^)llf^d0'-d0'^
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Since U(J3)F{p) = 0, U (Q F(Q  =  0 and dF{p\ lP)  =  f {0 \0^)dp^dl ï ‘ 
So, the result is expressed as:
And the same for firm 2.
Substituting in the optimization program we get:
(9ff.).r(0) Jp
\ P { q \ p \ P O  + q‘{ 0 \P ' ^ ) W ( f i \P O  + q \ P \ 0 ^ ) ) ~  
(1 +  \ ) { p ^ q \p \p ^ )  + K  + P^q\P\P^) + K)]dF{P\p'^)-
_  f a if G AlWith /?(/? ) =  < . And similar for firms two.
[ p  if p ^ e À 2  
The first order conditions are:
S'iq^iP^P^) +  q \ P \ P O )  + \ P ' { q \ P \ 0 ^ )  + i { P \ 0 ‘) ) {q \P \0^)  + q \P \0 ^ ) ) +
X P { q \p \0 ^ )  + q \ p \ P ^ ) )  -  (1 + A)/3' -  -  0
An the same for firm two.
Substituting S'{q^{P^P'^)-f-q^{P^.P"^) — P{q^{P^,P'^) + q^{P^^P'^)) grouping terms 
and multiplying by and making (g^(/?S/?^)+ = qo we
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get:
P (gp ) -m in (^ \/?^ ) ^  1 1 1  P(min(/?\ /3^))P(g)
P{qo)  l - hXq i qn)  1 + A /(min(,9\/)2))P(g^)
Since the regulator chooses min(j0^, 0^^ ) at the optimum.
B .13 Level o f duplication of fixed costs under asym ­
m etric inform ation
Proposition 3: with assumptions^'^ Ai, A2 the level of fixed costs below which duopoly 
is favored under asymmetric information is:
Ja 1 +  A
+ \qM{P) +   ^_^  -gM (/5)^(y|^ )][P(m in(B )) — F(/3)]d/?
Where the first integral is the yardstick effect and the second integral is the 
asymmetric information effect.
We have:
W(g(/))) =  g(g) +  AP(g)g-A,0g
By the envelope theorem.
dp
Integrating by parts we have:
Jp
— —(1 +  X)q{P)
Assumption Al, concavity of the optimization program. Assumption A2, hazard rate of 
substitution.
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1 +  A -  /  -T ^ g (/? )^ (n iin (P ))d /5  =a J a  J- “T
Ç0
/  q{P)F{mm{B))dp 
J  a
[ F i n m { P ) W D { P )  -  F m in ( a ) W D ( a ) )
1 +  A
Integrating by parts the second term of the yardstick competition effect we have:
Va 1 +  A 1 +  A Ja
Summing up terms:
Ja 1+A
Fmin(;9)(M/D(?) -  ^  ,+1+ A  1+A
rP
/  [quiP)) -  gM(/0))P(min(P))dmm/? =  
J  a
For the sampling effect we have:
d[F(min(S)) -  F(^)l
The second term in the integral comes from the asymmetry of information. 
From appendix B .ll we have:
f P  
J p
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Substituting we have;
X / d m ) \ i [F(mm(B)) -  F{p)]dpdp J
Notice that the substitution for the second term comes from:
Fip)
A -  F(,5)]1 +  A \  dp J J^ 1 +  A
B .14  C ondition for the yardstick effect to  dom ­
inate th e sam pling effect under incom plete  
inform ation
From Auriol & Laffont (1992): Proposition 5: With Al, A2^ ® and if /(/?) is non­
decreasing, asymmetric information distorts the optimal market structure toward 
duopoly if:
( \q -M {P ) -q M m [F {T m n {B ) ) -F m d p  < f  [ q o { p ) - q ^ ] ( p ) ? ^ ^ J ^ d F ( m m { B ) )Jp Ja y(mm(Lfj)
Proof. Straightforward.
The condition can be read as follows: The weakening of the sampling effect on 
the production part caused by incomplete information (left term) must be less than 
the expectation of increases in production (weighted by the hazard rate) caused by 
yardstick competition (right term).
Assumption Al, concavity of the optimization program. Assumption A2, hazard rate of 
substitution.
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B . l 5 C onditions for th e sam pling effect under II 
to  dom inate C l
Prom Auriol & Laffont (1992): We focus on the first claim of Proposition 4, that is, 
the sampling effect increases under incomplete information when the price elasticity 
is small; the second claim is proved by symmetric arguments.
Denote the sampling effect under incomplete information and the du­
plication of fixed cost under complete information . Differentiation with
respect to A, for A close to 0, we get:
d{S^^ -
dX = /X=o J P LF'(&(/3))&(/3) dp
Because at A =  0, the first claim is true if;
d(S'" -
[ F{ mm( B) ) - F( p ) ] d0x=o
> 0
A=0dX
A sufficient condition for this to happen is that for any g > 0
,  ^ i | ^ ^ l F ( m i n ( B ) )  -  F(ff)]d/3 
jp  ^ [P (m in (B ) )  -  F{p)]dp
B .16 D uopoly  under delegation
The regulator is useful if;
>  0
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First notice we have:
WF'  =  f [ S { q \ p \ P ^ )  + q \ P \ P O )  +
P {q \P \P^)  + q \P \P ^ ) ) { q \P \P ^ )  +  q^(P\P^)) 
(1 +  \ ) \P^q \P \0^ )  +  K  + + K \ -
\ u l ^ M ) - x u l ^ ( P ^ ) \ d F [ p \ p ^ )
Second notice that;
= Jb_ L
P { q \ p \ p ^ )  + q \ P \ P O ) ( g \ l d \ f )  +  -
(1 +  X ) \ p ^ q \ p \ p 0  + K  + P \ \ P \ 0 ‘) + K ] -
Summing terms, we have:
r  {At^ i=0(:0') -  + \ U U ( f )  -  UU„{PO\dF(ld\0') \ > 0
Substituting and we obtain;
'B J0
gi(;Si ^2v^2F (a)  ^ ai\dJl2F(o)
m ) + r { 0 \  P i ­ r n ) jd F ( ;0 ', /3 +  > 0
This means that when both firms are in Ai  then the regulator is neutral, because 
there is no way to cut rents, due to the fact that there is no truncation of the hazard 
rate. For firm 1 or firm 2 or both in Ag, delegation is always useful, since the 
regulator provides information about correlation and it permits Congress to cut 
rents.
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B .17  D uopoly  welfare under asym m etric inform a­
tion
In general Congress has to revise expectations through Bayes’ Law, but in both 
cases rents remain the same, so that, expected welfare is defined as:
I Jb
1 - z  P
È
(1  +  ,0 ") +  A" +  /)") +  K] -
AP(a=o|ff=0)(/^ )^ “  AP‘(a=o|o-=0)(^ )^
Where:
I  Ul>ow=^){0ldF{Pl =
'0 rP . . rP'I JB sm JBP r  q ^ { p \ P l j ^ d F { p \ p l  =  f  % pW .ok=0)(,0 ')((F (^ ')
/ U^ooW~»)ildldF{Pl =Jp
f j \ \ P \ P l ^ d P { p \ P l  = ^ ' ’ c/(U|„0,(/3^)dF(/3^)
Rents are the same because under cr =  0 Congress cannot make expectations
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about a.
So expected welfare under asymmetric information becomes:
W AI -i: S { q \ P \ P l  + <P{P\Pl) +
(/?* , P 1  +  q \ P ,^ P i )  (?' (/3> , P l + q l P \ P l )  
(1 + X ) lP ^ q \P \P l  + K  + P W { p \ P l  + K ] ~
x u U i P l  -  x u U i P l d F { P \ P l
This event happens with probability (1 —
B .18 D uopoly  case: m axim ization o f th e exp ected  
welfare under a benevolent regulator
W em akeP  =  (/3\/32).
J b
max $z
(1 +  X ) l P l \ B )  + K  + P^ip{B) +  K\dF{B)  -
 ^ /■ ^„ i,m [F (/? ')-/A 2F (a)lX I  I <P{B)
' I  JÊ.
JB rBA
'B JB
JB
r  
/  /  i { B )  
J b  J b
f m
[F(IP) -  lA^Fja)] 
f i P l
dF(B)
dF{B) +
P l S { q \ B )  +  q \B ) )  + XP{q\B) + q l B ) ) { q lB )  + q \B ) )  -  
J b
(1 +  A)[/?V'(S) + K  + P Y { B )  + K]dF{B) 
■F rB
■dF{B)
'B Jb 
JB rB
B JB m )
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max I  f  [S{q\B) + q^B))  + 
+AP(g^(B) +  q^{B)){q^{B) +  q^{B))
(1 +  \ W q \ B )  +  /C +  P W B )  +  K]dF{B) 
JB rB
m a ? , , /  /  [S{q\B) + q lB ) )Jp Jp
+  XP{q\B) + q l B ) ) ( q \ B )  +  , f{B))
-  (1 +_X){P^qlB) +  F  +  +  K ) ] d P (P \P l
'P JP
And the first order conditions are:
S '{q \B)  + q lB ) )  + XP'(q^(B) + <f{B)){q\B) + q \ B ) )
+ A P(î'(B ) +  9^ ( B ) ) - ( l  +  A)/3i 
, [F (/3 i)-^zfA ,F (g)] ,
f i P l
S'[,P[B) +  9^(5 )) +  AP'(9 '(B ) +  q \B ) ) { q \B )  + q \B ) )
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+ A P ( î ' ( B )  +  q \B ) )  -  (1 +
A F {P 0 - i z IA 2 F {a )]  „
i m
Maldng S'(.) =  P(.) and considering that costs are linear then the pricing 
formula could be written as:
P(gp) -  (min(B)) ^  A 1 A F(min(^)) -  ^u7/ia(min(/)))F(n)
P{qo) 1 +  A?7(g y  1 +  A /(min(/?))
B .19 D uopoly  case: m axim ization o f th e expected  
welfare under capture
Notice: B = (/?^,/?2)
m ax /  f  [S{q\B) + (f{B))
+  AP(g‘(B) +  q \B ) ) { q \B )  +  q \B ) )
-  (1 +_X)(PW{B) + K  + 0 ^q \B )  +  K)\dF{B)
0^ rP
The first order conditions are:
S '{q \B)  +  g '(S )) +  AP'(gXB) +  g^(B)) 
+A P(g'(S) +  g ^ (B ) ) - ( l  +  A);0*
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,  (F (^‘) -  IA^Fia)
m  “
S '{q \B)  + q \B ) )  + XP'{q'{B) +  q \B ) )
+XP{q\B) + < f { B ) ) - { l  + X)P^ 
AF{Pl-^zIA2F(a)] _  JA^Fja)
m i  ^  f m
Making the usual substitutions we get:
P(gÿ) -  (min(B)) A 1
P(gÿ) 1 +  A?;(gÿ)
, A F(min(/3)) A (u7^g(min(/3))F(a). _
1 +  A f{mm{p))P{qÿ)  1 +  A /(min(/3))P(gÿ)
B .20 Level o f duplication o f fixed costs under asym ­
m etric inform ation and non-benevolent reg­
ulator.
What we intent is to rewrite Auriol and Laffont’s equation of duplication of fixed 
costs under asymmetric information provided in appendix B.13, in terms of the 
results for a non-benevolent regulator:
' ^ , w ÿ ’{p) -  w ÿ { p )j^nb _  f [!îliÉLÆyW]rijr(min(B)) +Ja 1 +  A
dp  vC /W /(/5) + (1 -  fd)
(F(min(S)) -  F{P))dp
We have again the yardstick competition effect expressed in the first integral and 
the sampling effect, second integral.
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Welfare now is defined under non-benevolent regulator so:
=  S(g"‘) +  AP(g"'')g”‘ -  A/3g"''
Applying the same procedure as in appendix B.13, we can express the yardstick 
competition effect in terms of quantities produced under non-benevolent regulator 
for each industry structure.
Under our framework, Congress confronts in reality monopoly quantities under 
non-benevolent regulator, so the sampling effect that Congress faces comes from our 
definition of above. The sampling effect is obtained by solving equation (3.19) 
for quantities, differentiating with respect to p, multiplying by and integrating 
over iP,P).
So the duplication of fixed costs under non-benevolent regulator could be ex­
pressed as:
W /  f i m )  
dp.  VaW/(/5) +  {l-C)/(<7./3)
(F(min(S)) -  F{p))dP
As we can see the equation is divided in two parte the yardstick competition 
effect, first integral and the sampling effect, second integral.
The sampling effect is divided in two parts as well, the quantity effect and the 
rent effect as in Auriol and Laffont.
To obtain the sampling effect we took the following derivative then we 
multiply by and finally we integrate.
dq'^ 1 , A[1 +  C[fc -  1]] /■ f{lT,P)
dP VC/W/(/3) +  ( l - C ) /K /3 )
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B .21 P ro o f for >  q i f i B ) .
We have:
_ A _ ^ M _ L  fi _  (1 +  c(k -  D) 1l  + X f { P )P { q ) P  +  >^ih{a)fiP) + { l - O m , p y
So we analyze the following cases:
1. For (  =  1; & =  0 the difference is ^  0.
2. For ^ =  1, A: =  1 the difference is 1 — > 0.
3. For C =  0) the difference is zero for any value of k.
B)4. For 0 < (  < 1 and 0 < A: < 1 we can make ((A:—1) =  ~w,  and (;h{(r)f {/)+{?-(:)f  {a 
X.  We need to have 0 < (^h{<r)fJ)il -^Ç)f{a,p) =  A" < 1 as well, so that 
1 — (1 — C(^ — 1))VC =  1 +  w X  — JA ^  0.
However, in general X  is not always less than or equal to one, so monopoly 
. quantities under asymmetric information could be greater than monopoly 
quantities under a non-benevolent regulator for certain values of the parameter 
k. That means that the sampling effect under asymmetric information could 
be greater than the sampling effect under non-benevolent regulator for certain 
levels of capture.
Prom the results for the probability distribution functions obtained in appendix
B.24, we can express a W ) m ï i U ) M
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1 For the exponential distribution function.
2 For the uniform distribution function.
1-/3*
C(-^og(l -  (7-)) +  (1 -  C)(ï : ^ )
Clearly both expressions could be bigger than one for certain values of the 
parameters.
B .22 Studying th e changes in th e param eters
We study the effects of changes in the parameters in the level of duplication of fixed 
costs.
First we explore the change in the duplication of fixed costs under non-benevolent 
regulator, due to a change in capture:
dk = 1 '
A
d f  (min(B))dk dk /(m in(B))
C *‘ +  + T [ i  +  C (fc - l) l“' '"1 +A  1+A
dp ^C/W/(/?) +  (1 -  C)/((T, P)
^^<f{<r)m+iU)f{o,B)) F{P)
dk
) +
dp f W ) l ][F(min(B)) -  F{P}]dp
We have:
(1 +  A) (/3 -  Fjÿ) F(P)HM ~ ------ :-----------T ../  rA P'{qt )  m )< h { a ) f [ P )  + ( l - O f { a p ) P ' { q t )
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and for quantities under duopoly:
«6 _  (1 +  A) (/3 -  Pg’) F(min(/?)) ^zlA^{mm{P))F{a) _
^ A P'iqÿ) f{mm{P))P'{qÿ) /(min(/?))F'(gÿ)
Therefore, given that F'(g) < 0 by assumption, the derivatives of q ^  and qÿ  
with respect to capture are:
#  _  m , m p )  \ c < n
dk f{P) + (1  -  o m , i d y  ~
and
dq'S izIA^Fja)  1 _
dk /(m m(B)) B'(gÿ) “
The total derivative is divided in two parts:
1. The change of the yardstick competition effect with respect to capture 
first integral in the equation.
Since both quantities are decreasing in k the change in the yardstick effect
could be positive if capture has a higher impact over monopoly quantities
than over duopoly quantities, that is, if |^g-| < |^ ^ | .  Notice that it could
be the case for ^ high and ^z small enough. And the converse is true for
1 ^ 1  > 1 ^ 1  \ dk \ \ dk \’
However, following the exercise of appendix B.24 we can write the derivatives 
as:
(a) For the exponential probability distribution function (pdf)
dqM _  C
dk C(^p+^(o^6~"^)) +  (1 ~  d
dk d
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The derivatives are highly nonlinear, by inspection we can see that for 
^  =  0  we have =  0 and < 0 , however for ^  oo both derivatives 
go to infinity. Prom our simulation we can see that converges at a 
higher speed.
(b) For the uniform pdf
In this case for /? =  0 we have =  0 and < 0 as before. However, 
ÎOV P ~  1 , ~  —1 and remains negative in a point between
(— < a <  0). In this case monopoly quantities are affected more severely 
by capture than duopoly quantities.
2. The change of the sampling effect with respect to capture ^ ^ ,th e  second 
integral in the equation.
is divided in two parts, a direct effect which is always lesser than or 
equal to zero and the change in the rent effect which could be greater, equal 
or lesser than zero. If the positive term in the parenthesis which
could be considered as an informational effect since an increase in k could give 
information about the likelihood of facing a better p  type, is greater than the 
negative terms, then > 0 .
That is if the informational effect is greater than the negative terms produced
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by an increase in capture:
1 + A ) +
d{ 3?) F{P)
dj3 m i [F(min(B)) -  F{p)\dp >
dp \ f { ( r ) m  + o . - o m p )  
àWf(pf+iî-<)f(<r.P) )
) +
/(-S) ][F(min(B)) -  F{p)]dp
then the derivative of the sampling effect with respect to capture is positive^®. 
It seems that for A high and (  high the condition holds, however for A small
enough Ç  is negative^" .^
Summarizing, could be greater, lesser or equal to zero depending on the sign
dkof ^ —1- dk
For instance for ^ — 1 and low, we have the derivative of the yardstick 
competition effect equal or greater than zero, and for A high enough, the derivative of 
the sampling effect greater than zero, so > 0. However, for (  =  0 the derivative 
of the yardstick effect with respect to capture is negative and the sampling effect is 
equal to zero, so < 0 .
We can conclude that the derivative of the duplication of fixed costs with respect 
to capture, could be positive, negative or zero for different values of the parameters.
^®Notice _that the second derivative of the sampling effect with respect to capture is negative
— Iff r^C^|^[-][F{min(S)) — F{P)]dP < 0 so, the informational effect provided by an
increase in capture decreases as capture increases.
Analyzing the sampling effect in isolation, A high (A ~  oo)implies that the cost of avoiding 
capture under monopoly structure is too high, that the increase in information provided by the 
increase in capture Afc, makes better to decide for the duopolistic structure. Of course the final 
decision must be based in both effects.
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in general for high values of (  and small values of it is positive.
Now we analyze the change in the duplication of fixed costs with respect to a 
change in
<  V. (K /min(/3
.  dp \ c m f { p )  + { i - o m p ) +
d{ ■wiinp)
dp
1 +  A
(  /(o ’. P ) { m f ( P )  -  /(<T, P)) 
dp V [ih{<^)P{P) +  (1 -  C)/(< .^ P)?
d( f{(T,0)(h(a)f{(3)-f(<T,p))[C/i(o-)F(/3)+(l-<)/((r,|0)]2 )F{p)
dp f {P) \ ][F (m in (B )) -  F{p)]dP
For the yardstick competition effect we have:
^ynb
" d T
 ^dq^ F{mm{B)) 
dC /(m in(B)) dF {m in(B )) <  0
m
+
since
_  F{P) 
d< ~  f(P)
[fc-1]
f{<r,P){h{(T)f(P) -  f{a,p))
lCh(a)F{P) + ( l - O m P W '  
m p ) > 0x m m + i i - o m p ) .
As expected, if there is a higher probability of facing a better p  type in the 
monopoly case, the yardstick competition effect is weakened. Facing a better P 
type in the monopoly case means that the difference in rents between monopoly and 
duopoly is smaller.
However, the sampling effect presents a more complex structure:
dC A I l  +  A 1 +  A ' dC
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[1 +  C{k -  1]]çm1 + A
dp
dp \ m a ) F { p ) + { i - o m p ) f
][F(mm(B)) -  F{p)]dp
+
f { P ) \
The direct effect is always greater or equal to zero. The rent effect, however 
contains positive end negative terms. So, if the positive terms dominate the negative 
terms we have Ç  > 0 for that, we need the following condition to holds:
A r d #m  ( f{cr, P)
1 +  A
/(q-,/3)______
dp m i
0  . r d m
dp  \Çf{<r)f(P) + { l - O f { c r , P )
)[F(min(B)) -  F{p)]dp
+
>
+
d/1 f ( p ) i l[F{min(B)) -  F{p)]dp
We have the following cases:
1 . The condition instantaneously holds for A small enough^®.
2 . A; =  1 , C =  1
/ W  , f _ ± _ .U+A rfc J (  f{<^ >P)dp \ m m +
d( m m ) F{P)
dP f { P ) i ][F(min(B)) -  F{p)\dp >
Notice that A =  0 permits the first best allocation in both cases (monopoly or duopoly) since 
capture not represents a cost for the society, however duopoly provides the probability of a better P type.
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_ T u n f [ f #  f m p m a ) m - f { a , p ) ) \
1 + A y , [ diS V [ h { a ) m w  ) +
dp m ][F(mm(B)) -  F{p)]dp
3. fc =  0, f  =  1
j \ ^ ] [ F { m m { B ) )  -  F{P)]dp 
-  j \q"^]{F(imn{B)) -  F{p)]dp
4. fc =  l, C =  0
p M t  . (  A d q ^ \J, ' d( ■^Vi+A d( y d ^ ldp
A r  ( m p m c ) f { p )  - m p ) ) \
i + A y  dB V (/{<t,b)p  y
r d #
d/1
L /3  [ m p ) f j
][F(min(B)) -  F(p)]dp
+
f { P ) \
5. k = 0, (^  = 0
f>,dq^ , f  A d q ÿ \
! > dC 1 +  A dC y dp ][F(min(B)) -  F{p)]dp >
+ ?ï? F f #  f m , P ) { h { a ) f { p ) - f i a , P ) ) \. dp \  i m p w  y
dp mi ][F(min(B)) -  F{p)]dp
Cases (2 ) to (5) represent extreme values of k and C to check the condition it is 
needed check for different values of A.
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Finally, for the change in with respect to we have: 
dK ’^  F  dqÿ  F{mm{B))
since
dgÿ IA2F{a) •[/c -  1] > 0d{^z) F{min{B))P'{qÿ)
The increase in the probability of being informed always increase the yardstick 
competition effect and with it the level of duplication of fixed costs.
Conclusions:
Preliminary conclusions:
1 . Introducing capture in Auriol and Laffont model produce a new set of pricing 
formulas that are affected by probabilities, conditional joint distribution func­
tions, marginal distribution functions and the parameter representing capture. 
For that reason, the ultimate effect of capture over quantities produced in each 
case depends on the relative values of those new elements.
2. For the analysis of the duplication of fixed cost in levels, we have that if 
equation above holds, there is a strengthening of the sampling effect under 
non-benevolent regulator relative to asymmetric information. However, the 
yardstick competition effect could be positive, negative or zero depending on 
the value of the parameters. For the yardstick competition effect being positive 
or zero. Congress decision is biased towards duopoly, for a negative yardstick 
competition effect, the final outcome depends on the sampling effect, if it 
dominates the weakening of the yardstick competition effect then Congress 
bias towards duopoly as well, other wise monopoly is chosen.
3. For the analysis of changes in the duplication of fixed cost we have:
(a) The change of capture k could have negative, positive or no effect over
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the duplication of fixed costs. It has a negative effect if the derivatives 
of yardstick and the sampling effects with respect to capture are both 
negative. That means that capture has a higher impact over duopoly 
than over monopoly.
If capture has a greater impact over monopoly than duopoly, it may be 
the case that capture could have a positive effect in the change of the 
duplication of fixed costs.
If both effects are neutral to capture, or if they cancel each other, the 
change of the duplication of fixed costs is equal to zero.
In any case it is needed to check the derivative for different values of the 
parameters and probability functions.
(b) The change in Ç the probability of finding a better type in the monopoly 
case has a negative impact over the yardstick competition effect, due to 
the fact that the closer /? to min(/?^,/3^), the smaller the rents that are 
cut by using the monopoly structure. However, the effect of a change in 
C over the sampling effect is ambiguous and depends on the parameters. 
It seems that the total effect over the duplication of fixed costs is negative, 
since the better the P type under monopoly the less useful to use yardstick 
competition.
(c) The change of the duplication of fixed costs with respect to the probability 
of being informed is unambiguously positive, since an increase in 
means that the probability of being informed is higher, and with it the 
probability of cutting rents is higher as well. That produces Congress to 
bias towards the duopoly structure.
Finally it is possible to say that capture increases the power of the yardstick 
competition effect as it affects more monopoly quantities than duopoly quantities. 
So that if the sampling effect under non-benevolent regulator dominated asymmetric
Regulation by duopoly under political economy constraints 249
information the final decision could bias industry structure towards duopoly. Oth­
erwise, if the conditions for the sampling effect under non-benevolent regulator to 
dominate asymmetric information are not hold Congress is better off with no delega­
tion and the monopoly structure may dominate. The reason apparently is that even 
with no delegation, under monopoly. Congress could continue forming expectations 
about the p  types which permits her to reduce the expected rents, whereas under 
duopoly she is totally uninformed.
B .23 Checking the second derivatives o f th e du­
plication of fixed costs w ith  respect to  th e  
param eters.
Checking the second derivatives we have:
dq'S IA^F(a)
Since
dkd{p,z) < 0
B .24 D erivation o f th e m arginal probability den­
sity  function (pdf) for a =  0
In this section we will derive the marginal pdf for o- =  0 for the cases when f{p) 
follows an exponential or a uniform pdfs. The exorcises are based in DeGroot (1989).
1) Exponential distribution function:
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Consider:
m )  =
o:e”“  ^ for (0  < a  < oo) 
and {0 < 0  < oo) 
0 otherwise
Then assume that for any {0 = b < 0)  with 6 > 0 exists a random variable 
cr =  0 with conditional pdf:
g{a = 0 |/? < 0) =
pQ-aficr for (0  < a  < oo)
and {0 < 0  < oo) and cr > 0 
0 otherwise
Then we have that f {a0)  —  f{0)g{cr\0 < 0) = a0e  with;
f for (0 < a  < oo)
/  (#0 ) =  and {0 < 0 < oo) and tr > 0
0 ‘ otherwise
We determine the marginal pdf for cr as:
poo
h{a) =  / d0Jo
To get the marginal pdf it is necessary to integrate by parts.
Make: u = a0\ du = ad0; dv =  and v = d0
We use: ( /  udv = uv ~  J  vdu) and substituting we have:
OL0 
cr(l +  cr)
a
o:(l +  cr)
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the first part of the expression above goes to zero after evaluating in the 
extreme values. Notice that (lim/3_^ oo =  0). Then by solving and
evaluating the integral we have:
L
Oi Oi
0 « (l +  cr) a ( l  +  cr)
g-a/3(l+a-) ^
Therefore h{cr) = and finally we need to check that in fact h{a) is in
fact a marginal pdf, so:
poo poo 1
H(a) = l  hicr)d^ = l  =  1
1The solution of the integral is H{a) =  c —  ^ ~  c +  -  =  1, therefore h{a)
is a marginal pdf for c =  1 — Where a is the parameter of the distribution 
function of 0  to which a is related.
2) Uniform distribution function.
Now suppose that 0  comes from a uniform distribution function in the interval 
(0 , 1) and that after 0 ~  0* < 0  has occurred, with (0  </?*</? )  a point a is 
chosen from a uniform distribution function on the interval (/)*, 1). We shall 
derive the marginal pdf for a.
, 1 f o r ( 0 < B < l )  /(P) =
0 otherwise
similarly, for any given value of ^  =  /?*, with (0 < < 1), the conditional
distribution g{a\0* < 0) is a uniform distribution function in the interval 
(/?*,!). Since the length of this interval is {1 — 0*), the conditional pdf of a
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given that {0 =  0*) will be;
g(a\0*) =  I  k r  (B' < (Z < 1)
I 0 otherwise
Then we have that f{cr0) =  f{0)9{<^\0*) — ( l ) ( iY ) -  Thus for (0 < cr < 1) 
the value of the marginal pdf of a will be:
^  f{(^P)d0 = Y - J *  ^
Furthermore, since cr cannot be outside of the interval 0 < a < 1 , h{cr) =  0 
for <7 < 0 or (7 > 1 .
Finally we check for the h{a) to be a proper pdf by solving for H{(t)\
H{a) = f  h{<j)da = — [  log(l — (r)da = 1 
Jo Jo
We require the use of integration formulas, therefore make {1 — a) = x] dx — 
—da and apply F{x) — —inti  log xdx =  —x log rc — æ +  c. Substituting in x we 
have:
F {a) =  “ [(1 — cr) log(l — cr) — (1 — cr) +  c]
Finally, evaluation the extreme values we have:—[(1 — 1) log(l — 1) — (1 — 1)] — 
[—(1 — 0 ) log(l — 0 ) — (1 — 0 ) +  c =  1 +  c =  1], therefore h{a) is a pdf for c — 2 .
g (  , , /M )  ' , )B .25 C onditions for c/ff<7)/(/3)+ji-c)/(o-/3)/. ^ q
J  f(^ 0) \First we obtain / as:
f{(J0)[Ch{a)f{0) +  (1 -  C)f{cr0)] -  f{a0)lCh{a)f{0)  +  (1 -  Qf{(r0)]
KK(^)fW)  +  (1 “
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Ch{a)[fia0)f{0) -  f  (/3)/(g/3)]
lCh{a)f{0) +  (1 -  C)f{(^PW
Prom the appendix B.24 we can obtain f'icrp) =  — a0[l  +  cr)),
therefore substituting the pdfs obtained in that appendix we get:
i f
Therefore for o;/0 (l +  cr) < 1 +  the derivative is positive. Since the term
o^cp(i+a) grows very fast it is likely for this derivative to be positive.
For the uniform pdf, we have that f '{a0) ~  0, therefore, making the substitutions 
we have; c(- log(l - o-))[(jz|^ (l) - 0]
[ f
Hence, due to the fact that 0  < cr < 1 the derivative is always positive.
B .26 Equations for th e  sim ulation
For the simulation we assume a linear demand function of the form P  =  c — dq. 
Fist we solve for quantities from the general price markup equation and second we 
substitute the demand function and the probability distributions functions. Our 
equations are:
1. Monopoly under a non-benevolent regulator
1 +  A m  d q \ h { a ) m  +  (1 -  Of{aP)
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and we obtain q as:
+  (1 -
2. Duopoly under a non-benevolent regulator
A F{mm{0)) A ^zIa  ^mm{P)F{a) +1 +  A /(min(/?)) 1 +  A f{mm{0))
and q ia obtained as:
ÛÎ 1 +  A /(m in(^)) /(min(;0))-
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APPENDIX C
Chapter 4: Appendices
C . l  D anas Solution  (Full Inform ation).
C.1.1 Danas programme under integration
Dana’s optimisation programme under integration:
m ax  ^ +
52(^ 2' ) /  +  S '2 ( g f  +  5 2 ( ? 2 " ) / '  +  S 2 ( « f  -
_  r p lh ^ lh  _  r p h l ^ h l  _  r jg h h ^ h h  ^
a{T“ -  -  492W ‘ +  “ [?’"* -  -  C2Î2'‘1'A"‘ +
- 4q^‘]<l>''‘ + a[T'‘'“ - cfçf'* - c jg f  + 
X[ [^T‘h - T'"'* - c'iîS'* - 0^4'* +  c'lrf'* +  4 ? “ ] + 
a5‘[t" - r'*'* - 44* - 44' + 44'“ + 44'*) + 
A'i'[T“ - T“ - 44 - 44 + 44' + 44'] + 
A'iiT" - T"“ - 44 - 44 + 44'' + 44'*] +
A'l'jT" - T'*'* - 44 - 44 + 44'* + 44'*] |  (c.i)
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The solution is given by:
5!(4r' = 4 (C.2)
s((4'‘)-‘" = 4 (C.3)
5^ (4)" = 4 (0 .4)
= 4 (0 .5)
= 4+ ^ (4 -4 ) (0 .6)
s'MY‘ = 4 + ÿ&(4 - 4) (0 .7)
s'MY’ — 4+ ^ ^ ( 4 - 4 ) (0 .8)
5^ (4'*)^ ' = 4+ ^ ^ ( 4 - 4 ) (0 .9)
As Dana states for the constraints to be binding we require:
1 . 7 ^  ^> 0
T'*'“ = 4 îf  + 44'‘ (c.io)
2. Af > 0
3. Aj' > 0
4. A? > 0
T"‘ = c'îf + + (4 -  4)4'* (c.n)
T« = 44'+ 44'+ (4-4)4'* (c.12)
T“ - 4 4  -  4 4  > (4 - 4)4 + (4 - 4)4'* (0.13)
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5. Xl‘ > 0
T “  -  4 4  -  4 4  >  ( 4  -  4 ) 4 ' “ +  ( 4  -  4 ) 4 ' “ ( c . i 4 )
T" -  4 4 ' -  4 4  > ( 4  -  4 ) 4 '“ +  ( 4  -  4 ) 4 '“ ( c . i s )
Which implies:
+ 4^ 2 +
max {(cf -  c{)q '^  ^+
( 4 - 4 k f '  +  ( 4 - 4 k ^ ,
(4 “  4)4‘^ + (4 ~ 4)4^ } (C.16)
Suppose Ai2 > 0 then equation (C.15) holds with equality. From equations 
(C.14) and (C.13) we have and q^  ^ < q^^. However, from the pricing
equations we have that > 0 and A§^  > 0, therefore equations (C.14) and (C.13) 
must hold with equality implying and g^ '^  — gj^.
C .l .2 D ana’s programme under decentralisation
The above programme is divided in two parts, for each fim:
. ■^ [«5'i(^ i) — Ti +  a[Ti — cigi] +  5'2(g2) “  Î 2 +  q:[T2 -  C2g2] (C.17)(91 +1),(93,2a)
subject to ex-post individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints for
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each firm. Prom the constraints of the previous problem Dana shows that all of 
them are biding except for the one associated to
The solution for firms 1, which is symmetric for for firm 2 is given by:
S[{q‘Y ’ = 4  (C.18)
s 'l i iY ' = 4 (C.19)
s 'M ‘Y  = c H | | ( 4 - 4 ) (c .20)
s ;  =  4  +  | L ( 4 _ 4 ) (C.21)
with:
T U = 44' + (4 -- 4)4'
T t h = 44"+ (4-- 4)4"
Ti“ = 44'
rp h h = 44" (C.22)
C.2 A sym m etric inform ation.
Under asymmetric information the optimization programme is: 
max W '  =  e w ‘ +  (1 -  e)W‘ =Ql>Q2,T
^Fi{qi) +  S2{q2) - T s - \ -  o:[Tg — cigi — €292] +
(1 — d){Si{qi) +  3 2 (9 2 ) “  77  +  a[Ti — Cigi — CgÇg] =
Si(qi) +  3 2 (9 2 ) ~  ^Td +  doi[Td — ciQj — 0 2 9 2 ] —
(1 — 6)Tj +  (1 — 9)a[Tj — Ci9i — 0 2 9 2 ] (C.23)
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Where:
1. is the expected welfare under asymmetric information.
2. is the expected welfare under separation.
3. is the expected welfare under integration.
4. 9 is the probability of p > p and (1 -  ^) is the probability of p < p, where p
and p are cost correlation parameters defined below.
5. S{q)\ consumer surplus, with P{q) =  S'(q),
6. Td and T/ stand for total transfers under decentralization and integration re­
spectively.
7. 0 < a  < 1: Congress income distribution preference.
8. Cl, cg: marginal costs of production for product 1 and 2 in the interval [c\c^],
where (I) stands for low cost and (h) stands for high cost.
9. ^(ci, C2): is the binary probability distribution function from Dana (1993), 
since there are only four possible realizations of [ci, C2] then <p is described by 
[(l)^ \ The marginal probability distributions satisfy the identities
r{ =  and rg =  So, rj +  rf  =  1 and [0^  ^+  =  1.
If the marginal distributions are symmetric r[ + ri, which means
10. gi,Ç2‘ quantities produced of of good 1 and 2 in the interval [q\q^] with four 
states as well.
11. p =  • the correlation parameter for ci,C2 given (p, when the
marginal distributions are symmetric it simplifies to p — ■
12. p = ' : the level of correlation beyond which decentralization is
preferred over integration.
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13. E: expectation operator.
Subject to:
Individual rationality constraints and incentive compatibility constraints under 
separation and integration.
The binding constraints are^:
Incentive rationality constraint under separation (1RS):
- c f î f  - 44'“] > 0 (C.24)
Incentive compatibility constraints under separation (ICS)^:
AfiT"* - T'*'* - c[q'^  -  44" + 44" + 44"] > 0 (C.25)
Ay[T" - r'"'* - 44' - 44' + 44" + 44"! > o (c .26)
x ‘j[T “ -  44 - 44 - (4 - 4)4' - (4 - 4)4'*] >  o ( c .27)
Individual rationality constraint under integration (IRI):
7 '*'‘[T'*'* - 44" -  4îf I > 0 (C.28)
Incentive compatibility constraints under integration (ICI):
Ai'*[T"* -  T'*'* -  44'* -  44" +  44"+ 44"] > 0 (c .29)
I^n order to build up the expected welfare under asymmetric information, we mixed the con­
straints of decentralization and integration. However, three of the constraints of the decentraliza­
tion programme a redundant, so we ended up with thirteen constraints. The twelve constraints 
Dana had under integration plus the constraint under decentralization. As in Dana only five of 
the integration constraints bind.
^Notice that constraints C.31, C.32 and C.33 can be written as: c[qi~0 2 ^ 2  —
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-  44“" - 44' + 44'* + 44'*] > o (c.3o)
A'i‘[T" - t" -  44 -  44 + 4?" + 44'] > o (c.si)
A?[T“ - r"* - 44 - 44 + 44'* + 44'*] > o (c.32)
A','4T" -  T'*'* - 44' -  4 4  + 4q"* + 44'*] > 0 (C.33)
Clearly the individual rationality constraints C.24 and C.28 are the same. The 
incentive rationality constraints only differ in state (11), since constraint C.25 is equal 
to constraint C.29 and constraint C.26 is equal to constraint C.30^.
So, we can rewrite the programme as:
^Notice that they are equal to: — (c^  — Ci)qi^ '' and — c^ q^  ^— CgÇg* —
(cÿ -  (4 )# .
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max ( S i( 4 ) /  +  Si(4"){»"* +  S i ( 4 ') / '  +  S i(4 '* )/'*  +
S2(q^Y ‘ + S2(g?),^"- +  S 2 (4 + " ‘ +  S îte " " ) /"  -
rp U ^ ll _  y l h ^ l h  _  r p h l^ h l  _  r jp h h ^ h h  _|_
a[T“ -  4 4  -  4 4 ] 4  +  a[T"* -  c[qf -  4 4 + " '  +
a[T " -  44' - 44+" + “IT'*'* -  44" -  44"]'^ "" +
^hh^rphh _  g&gM _  (.kgtkj
Afir"* -  T “  -  44'* -  44'* +  44'* +  44'*] +
a5'[t'*' -  T'*'* -  44' -  44' +  44'* +  4 4 '*] + 
e V  -  44 -  44 -  (4 - 4)4' -  (4 - 4)4"] +
(1 -  e )x ‘}[T “ -  T'*' -  4 4  -  4 4  +  44 '+ 44') +
(1 - 0)Ai'[T" -  T"* - 4 4  -  4 4 +44'* + 44'*] +
(1 -  «)a''2[ t"  -  T'*'* -  44' -  44' + 44'* +  44'*] 1 (c .3 4 )
The upper index refers to the state of the the cost (low or high), the sub-index
refers to the industry or good.
The first order conditions are:
'^ 1(91)^" “  — d X g é i  — (1 — 0 ) [ X i  +  Ag +  X i 2 ] c [  —  0 (C.35)
-  A^ /^ c^  +  (1 -  i9)Agc; =  0 (C.36)
-  A^ c^l" -  ^AiXcf -  c4) +  (1 -  6!)A^c; =  0 (G.37)
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S ' M Y ’'" -  “ 4 / "  +  +  A j'4  +  (1 -  SjA'/jc'i -  =  0 (C.38)
And the same set of equations for gg.
For the transfer payments we have:
-<t>“ +  aÿ" + e \ ‘‘ +  (1 -  ^)[A? +  +  A'l'J =  0 (C.39)
— +  0=4" +  A'i'* — (1 — )^Ag =  0 (C.40)
+  a ÿ "  +  Aj' -  (1 -  e)X‘i  =  0 (C.41)
+  a*/’"'* -  Af -  A^ ‘ -  (1 -  »)A|  ^+  7 " ' =  0 (C.42)
And the conditions for the multipliers and the constraints A*|[-] > 0  and 7 ^ [^.] >
0 .
Adding the three first equations of the first order condition for the transfer 
payments we get:
Xf +  A" +  (1 -  e)X‘‘^  + ffXi' =  (1 -  a )( l  -  (G.43)
and
7 “  =  (1 -  a) -  dX'J (C.44)
Using these results and making some substitutions we obtain the general solution:
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Si{q‘Y ‘ =  c[
s'MY'
= 4
s’iic&Y' — Cg
S'liq^ Y =  cj- +
S'MY' =  < ^ 4 -
S'liq^ Y' =  cf +
=  Cg +
+  (1  -  0)X‘l  Jfjfhl
(C.45) 
(C.46) 
(C.47) 
(C.48)
(cf -  4 )  (C.49)
(C.50)
(j)hh
[ 4 - à , )  (C.52)Ag^  +  (1 -  ^)Ai2 / / i  I(j)hh
We have the following effects of asymmetric information over quantities:
1. As expected, quantities produced by the most efficient firms are not distorted, 
so the solution for asymmetric information, equations C.45 to C.48, is equal to 
the one obtained by Dana (1993) for full information, equations A15 to A18.
2. Consider Ajg > 0 and 0 < ^ < 1 then (g^^)^^ > (gi^‘)^^, for ^ =  1, (gf^)^^ >
(gjih,)F/ its maximum level, for ^ =  0 , they are equal to each other at their
minimum level. So it is concluded that for for Aÿg > 0 and 0 <  0 < 1 , 
(^M)>ij > (gAk)f';+
3. Checking for gj*^ , we have that for Ajg > 0 and 0 < 0 < 1, taking into account 
constraints 4.5,4.9,4.10 and 4.11, (g^  ^ < gf^), in fact from equations^ C.49 to
C.52, (gff =
P^i’om here on the analysis done to q\ applies to 
®For any A" > 0 and /or A" > 0, Ag > 0
^Constraints 4.5,4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 can be written as: — CgÇg — (c% — — (cg — C g ) ,
T" -  c[q[^  -  4çg -  ( 4  -  4 )9^  -  ( 4  -  4 )4 ^ , T" -  -  4 4  -  ( 4  -  4 )4 ' '  -  ( 4  -  4 )4 '',
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So we have =  {g'l'')^'' and the same for gg. With
that in mind we conclude that for Ajg > 0 :
Why? In Dana (1993), when Aÿg > 0 the regulator prefers separation, how­
ever, under asymmetric information the regulator has to take into account the 
probability (1 — ^) of facing a situation in which p < p. So that, prices are 
reduced and quantities increased which means that a higher transfer is given 
up to the most efficient firm, than the one that would be given up by having 
full information about the correlation parameter p.
We still need to check two extreme cases:
a. 6 = 0. In this case the solution is Dana’s solution for the integrated case,
b.  ^ =  1. In this case we have ^  since A" =  (1 — a)(0^ and
A^ =  (1 — , we conclude that:
-  ^kh
Substituting in the numerator for the correlation parameter we have that:
Now the level of correlation required to decide for the decentralized struc­
ture is p =  0 , since 0 =  1 the constraints for the integrated structure do 
not play any roll in the solution.
T“ -  c[qi -  4 4  -  ( 4  — 4 )4 ' '  “  (4  “  4 )4 '' ,  respectively. So, if A^ g > 0 its associated constraint 
is binding then if the rest of the constraint are binding it must be the case that 4 '  =
^Prom equations C.39and C.40.
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4. Proceeding as in Dana (1993), using equations C.49, C.50, C.51 and C.52 
we will obtain the values for the multipliers when Aÿg > 0 and the level of 
correlation beyond which the decentralized structure is preferred.
First notice that the constraints under integration and decentralisation are the 
same but in state (II). Therefore our results depend on what happen when 
the constraints on this state are binding or not. First consider the associated 
constraints (C.27), (C.31) and (C.32), clearly (C.27) can be obtained by adding 
up (C.31) and (C.32). Therefore, as in Dana (1993) the relevant constraint is 
(C.33). The regulator makes its decision about industry structure depending 
whether this constraint is binding or not. Consider the case where Aÿg > 0 
therefore its associated constraint holds with equality in such a case gf^  < g^  ^
and gj' < gj'' the fact that Aÿ > 0 and Aÿ > 0 from the pricing equations 
above implies that the associated constraints also hold with equality, therefore 
qhi _  qhh qhi _  From this we can equalise (C.49) and (C.51) and the 
same for gg obtaining:
0A» +  (1 -  0)Ag _  Af +  (1 -  0)A«
(jyhl (pb’b.
BA“ +  (1-«)A « A^ ' +  (1 -  g)A&
(C.53)
(G.54)iplh
Using the first order conditions for the transfer payments we get®: 
„ _  (1 -  o : ) ( /  +  _  6
®Notice that the multipliers have changed with respect to the multipliers obtained by Dana, 
now they are affected by the multiplier of the separated structure and the probabilities.
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„ _  (1 -  -  ÿ'-V"! 9 „
(1 -  + 1^ "“) ■ " ( ! - « )  * '
So to have Aÿg =  0 it is needed:
(C..a)
In Dana’s paper the condition for Aÿg =  0 is:
=  (C.59)
The same procedure is applied in the rest optimisation programmes solved 
under delegation:
Prom the definition of p and p, according to equation C.58 under asymmetric 
information about the correlation parameter, the regulator requires a smaller 
level of correlation to decide in favor to the separated structure. Notice that
this is the case for any 0 < 0 < 1 .
Why? Notice that we are talking about the level of p that makes =  0, 
so under asymmetric information the regulator has to take into account the 
probability of p > p which is given by 0 .
A =  > f.AI ^  (l-g)^kA
When the regulator has asymmetric information about the correlation param­
eter p, he requires a smaller level of correlation to decide for the separated
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structure, compared to the level that he requires under full information about 
it. Asymmetric information about (p) limits the regulator to cut informa­
tional rents that would be cut having better information about the correlation 
parameter.
5. Now we have to check what happen with quantities and transfers when Aÿg =  0 
under asymmetric information:
(a) According to Dana (1993) for =  0, and to check
Dana’s result we need to look for the sign of and
the same for g% when Congress fixes =  0:
-  4)
Assume Ag = O'and Aÿ ~  0, then we have < S"(gi^)^^ so that
(gW)A/ ^  take® AJ > 0  and Aÿ > 0 , then < S'{qi^)^^ so,
(g^y^ > (gP)"^^ because constraints 4.5, 4.9, 4.10 must bind^°.
(b) To check if the transfer under asymmetric information is greater than or 
equal to the transfer under full information we need to check the difference 
in the quantities produced in each case:
i. For A12 =  0 we have:
s ' { q r r = 4 + ^ ( 4  -  4 )
ii. Under asymmetric information we have:
= 4 + ^ (4  - 4)
^Notice that from the full information optimal solution > 0 and > 0 programme. 
i°See in Dana (1993) appendix page 308. The constraints are: -  (c  ^— c[)q^  ^—
respectively.
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iii. So, with =  (gi^)^^- Combining this
result with the one obtained previously in (a) we can conclude that:
> {qiY ‘ = ( é y
iv. However as well, so we need to check for
the difference between and to conclude about the size
of the transfer payment to the most efficient firm.
s[{< i?r  -  s[(<ii‘r = -  4 )
For Aj =  0, iS'i(gi )^'^  ^ > S'J(g{' )^^  ^ and (gfO^^ < and for A" >
0; constraints 4.5, 4.9, 4.10 must bind as before and (g^ )^ =  (gf^ )^ in 
both cases.
Therefore we have:
( 4 ' ) "  >  ( 4 ' ) "  >  {<AY’ =
(c) Finally we conclude that: in the state of nature p > p for A^ g =  0, the 
expected transfer payment given up by Congress to the most efficient firm 
under asymmetric information, is greater than or equal to the expected 
transfer payment he has to give up to the most efficient firm under full 
information. The reason is that with A^ g = 0, Congress still has ex­
pectations given by ^ of p > p, so he cannot avoid the constraint for 
decentralization Ag to be considered in the optimization programme.
E[T^^] > E[T^^]
6 . Taking together the results we have that asymmetric information has the fol­
lowing effects on the optimal mechanism:
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(a) Quantities produced in the most efficient states are not distorted.
(b) Quantities produced in the less efficient states are distorted in order to 
cut informational rents. They are increased compared to the solution 
when there is full information about the correlation parameter. So, there 
is productive inefficiency.
(c) Since quantities are increased, transfers given up to the most efficient 
firms are increased as well. Given that for Congress income in the hands of 
the firms has less value than income in the hands of consumers 0 < o; < 1 , 
there is distributive inefficiency as well.
(d) The sum of productive inefficiency and distributive inefficiency produces 
a reduction of in the expected welfare under asymmetric information, 
compared to full information,
(e) The level of correlation beyond which decentralization is chosen is re­
duced. So, Congress is more likely to decide for decentralization when 
integration could be a better choice.
(f) The above results are driven by the fact that asymmetric information 
about the correlation parameter, impedes Congress to use informational 
economies of scope to cut rents, that could be cut by having better infor­
mation about the correlation parameter. That is, asymmetric information 
reduces amount of rents that could be extracted, compared to the rents 
extracted using yardstick competition.
General conclusions:
1. This model preserves Dana’s model structure, in particular, the results of 
introducing asymmetric information about the correlation parameter have to 
be checked against the benchmark case and the solution for the decentralized 
structure presented by Dana.
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The change done up to this point is the introduction of asymmetric information 
about the level of the correlation parameter, that induces the regulator to 
decide for the integrated structure.
Two basic results arise:
a. Under integration, asymmetric information makes the regulator to permit 
a higher level of q than the optimal level produced under full information. 
Since production of the most efficient firm is not distorted, the increase in 
q comes from the less efficient firm (inefficient production). That makes 
distributional (or social) costly transfers under asymmetric information 
to increase compared to the transfers under full information. As a result 
social welfare is reduced.
b. The level of correlation beyond which decentralization is chosen is re­
duced, due to the fact that asymmetric information limits the possibility 
of using informational economies of scope to reduce rents.
C.3 B enevolent regulator
C.3.1 State of nature p  <  p
With a benevolent regulator the optimization programme is:
m ax W^ ' =  c ( l  -  9)W ^' +  (1 -  C(1 -  8))W^^ =  
f ( l  -  e)W ’ +  (1 -  <(1 -  e))[0W ‘ +  (1 -  9)W^] =
(1 -  6){1 +  C«)VK' + g(l -  C(1 -  9))W^ =
i)W ’ +  (1 -  i i ) w ‘ (C.61)
By making (1 -  0)(1 +  = ip and 0(1 -  (0) =  (1 — i>)-
Regulation of multiproduct industries under political economy constraints 273 
Where:
1 . W^: expected welfare with a benevolent regulator.
2 . expected welfare under full information.
3. expected welfare under asymmetric information.
4. W^: expected welfare under separation.
5. W^: expected welfare under integration.
6 . 0: probability of p > p and (1 — d) is the probability of p < p.
7. (: probability for regulator to observe cr =  p and (1 — (), the probability for 
the regulator to observe cr =  0 .
8 . C(1 — ^): probability for Congress of being full informed about p < p.
9. (1 — C(1 — 0)): probability for Congress of non being informed about p.
10. if: probability for Congress of implementing the integrated structure given 
that the state of nature is p < p.
11. (1—■0) is the probability for Congress of implementing the decentralized struc­
ture given that the state of nature is p < p.
Subject to:
Individual rationality constraints and incentive compatibility constraints under 
separation and integration, which are the same constraints presented in appendix 
C.2.
With that in mind, we can rewrite the programme as:
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max  ^ +  5 i (g f  +qi,q2,T ^
+ s ^ i q ^ Y ’'’' -
rp U ^U  _  r j i lh ^ lh  _  r p h l^ h l  __ r j ih h ^ h h  _j_
a[T“ -  4 4  -  c jg ? ] /  + a\r'' -  4 g f  -  4 ‘g^ '‘]ÿ"“ + 
a[T'>' -  4qf -  + a[T'‘'‘ -  44'* -  452*'*]/'* +
A'i'‘[T"‘ -  T'*'* -  4g['‘ -  4g''* + 4g*'* + 4g*'*] +
A^‘‘[T*' -  T** -  4gi*' -  4gJ' + 4gf* + 44'*] +
(1 -  V)Ag[T" -  4g“ -  4g'' -  ( 4  -  4)4' -  (4 -  4)g?l +
^A «[t " -  T*' -  4g“ -  4g“ + 4g*' + 4g*'| +
A^''[r" -  T‘* -  4 4  -  4g“ + 4g‘* + 4g'*j +
V^ A'ilT" -  T'** -  4 4  -  4g« +  4g** +  4g"*] 1 (C.62)
The only change in this optimization programme compared to the programme 
presented in appendix C.2 comes from the change in the probabilities affecting the 
multipliers, so the variables are defined as in that appendix.
The first order conditions are:
~  — (1 — '0)Agc[ — ip [X i  +  Ag +  Ajgjci =  0 (G.63)
a;(g|*)ÿ'* -  «4 '^* -  A'*4 +  i p \ ^ c [  =  0 (C.64)
5 ;( g f ') / '  -  «4^'*' -  A"4 -  (1 -  V*)Ai'(4 - 4) + V*A'/4 =  0 (C.65)
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+  Xfd, +  A5'4 +  V’A'ic'i -  7'‘'*cf =  0 (C.66)
And the same set of equations for g2- 
For the transfer payments we have:
~(jf^ +  a(p^  ^+  (1 — if)Xs +  if{Xi +  Ag + Ajg] =  0 (C.67)
+ a<p‘'‘ + \ ‘^ -i> \^  = 0 (C.68)
- ÿ "  +  a ÿ "  +  Aj' -  i>\f = 0 (C.69)
- / *  +  aÿ** -  Ai* -  -  ii\% +  7 “  =  0 (C.70)
And the conditions for the multipliers and the constraints Ag[«] > 0 and 7 *^ [-] >
0 .
Adding the three first equations of the first order condition for the transfer 
payments we get:
Ai* +  AS' +  VA& + (1 -  =  (1 -  a )(l -  <t>Y (C.71)
and
7** =  (1 -  a) -  (1 -  (0.72)
Using these results and making some substitutions we obtain the general solution:
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s ' M f  = 4
S [ ( q [ Y  = 4
s M Ÿ  = 4
s ' M f  = 4
s;(4? = 4 +
s ' M Y  = 4 +
s ' M Y  = 4 +
= 4 +
(C.73) 
(0.74) 
(0.75) 
(G.76)
(4-4) (0.77)(f^ hl
' ' ■■^’ - ( 4 - 4 )  (0.78)(j)hl
“ ” :4-4) (0.79)f h^h \ 1
" " “ " ( 4 - 4 ) (0.80)(jyhh
Taking note that if > {1 — d) and {1 ~  ip) < 6, the effects over quantities and 
transfers are as follows:
1. Quantities produced by the most efficient firms, in the efficient states, as ex­
pected, are not distorted (equations C.73 to 0.76).
2. For Ai2 > 0, from equations C.79, 0.80, 0.61, 0.52 and Dana (1993), A.21 
and A .22  we have (gf^)^^ > (g{*^ )^  > (gf '^')^ .^
3. Ohecking (g f^ , (gg^ )^ . According to Dana (1993) for A^ g > 0, gf^  < gf^ 
and Q2  < gg ,^ to check Dana’s result it we can see that the same set of 
constraints apply to this problem and the problem solved in appendices 0 .2  
and ??. So, for Aÿg > 0 and 0 < -0 < 1, taking into account constraints 
4.5, 4.9, 4.10, (gf  ^ < < gf^ )^, however from equations 0.77 to 0.80,
(<11 = Qi^), ( #  =
^^Constraints 4.5, 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 can be written as: —- c[q{^ -  - (4 - - (4 - 4)4'* . - cW i -  4 4  - (4 - 4)?r - ( 4  -  4)4'*.respectively.
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So we have (gf')'' =  (4'*)'', and the same for gg.
And the relation among quantities is:
(.<11 Y  =  ( < i iY '  >  (01 f  =  (g^)" > (gf')"' = ( q ^ y
4. Prom the results above, we can conclude that for Aÿg > 0, in the state of 
nature p < p, a benevolent regulator reduces the level of the transfer payment 
given up to the most efficient firm, compared to the level that is given up by 
Congress under asymmetric information.
E[T^^] > E[T^] > E[T^^]
This result is contingent with the state of nature p < p. What the benevolent 
regulator is telling to the Congress is that integration is the best choice given 
that the state of nature is p < p. So, the benevolent regulator bias the decision 
towards the integrated structure.
With a benevolent regulator Congress expects a lower probability of facing 
p > p when the state of nature is in fact p < p so it makes Congress to permit 
lower levels of gf^  =  qÿ =  gj'* under integration since he is expecting with 
a higher probability the constraint for the integrated structure to be binding. 
That is quantities g^ ,^ gg'* under integration are the relevant quantities to 
calculate the transfer payments^®.
Why? As we saw in appendix C.2, in Dana’spaper, when A^ g > 0 the regula­
tor prefers separation, under asymmetric information the regulator has to take 
into account the probability (1 — 6) of being facing a situation in which p < p,
— 0 then as discussed in appendix C.2 if A" > 0 and/or A^  > 0 then gf^  =
under integration. However, decentralization gives g^ ' > g^  ^ so, jS[T(g)] < J5[T(gi) +  Tfgg)].
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however, with a benevolent regulator there is an improvement in the informa­
tion obtained by Congress ip. So, Congress now has a greater expectation of 
p < p when it is in fact smaller than or equal to p. Congress can reduce the 
level of since it has a higher probability of being binding. That is, when 
the state of nature is p < p, a benevolent regulator provides information that 
encourages Congress to decide for the integrated structure.
We still need to check two extreme cases:
a '0 =  1. In this case the solution is Dana’s solution for the integrated case,
h Ip — 0. In this case we have ^  since =  {I -  a)<p^  ^ and
=  (1 — we conclude that:
Substituting in the numerator for the correlation parameter we have that:
Again, the level of correlation required to decide for the decentralized 
structure is p =  0 , since -0 =  0 the constraints for the integrated structure 
do not play any roll in the solution.
5. Now we will study how the presence of a benevolent regulator, affects the level 
of correlation beyond which the decentralized structure is chosen.
Proceeding as before assume Ajg > 0, then constraint 4,11 holds with equality, 
but it means that gf* < gf^ and q^ < gj^ from constraints 4.9 and 4.10^ .^ 
Now we have that for A^  > 0 and/or Aj > 0, Ag > 0 , then gf^  =  gf' ,^ gg^  =  q^^.
^^Constraints 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 can be written as: -  4g2 ~  ( 4  ~  4)^1 ' “  ( 4  “  4)4'*>
T" -  c'lgf -  4 4 ' -  ( 4  -  4)4'* -  ( 4  -  4)4'*. T" -  4 4 ' -  4 4 ' -  (4* -  4)4*'* -  ( 4  -  4)4*'*.respectively.
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Proceeding as in Dana using equations, C.77, C.78,C.79 and G.80 we obtain:
(1 -  +  0 Aÿ Af +  ^Aÿg
fjpil ^hh (G.81)
(1 -  +  V’A^ ' A$' +  ÿA& ,
Using the first order conditions for the transfer payments we get:
.H +  ( l - V ' ) w i  / p o o ,
wi _  (1 - « ) ( /  +  (1 -  V*) ,11 ,p
,11 _  (1 -  a:)[(<|6"'A''* -  -  ÿ"(A"'] (1 -  V*) 11 ,
+  0 »*) V*
So to have A^ g =  0 it is needed:
( / p  -  t f - n  -  ^  y , t _ y + * * ' (C.86)
In Dana’s paper the condition for Aÿg =  0 is:
=  ^  (C.87)
Fl’om the definition of p and p, according with equation C.8 6 , and the fact 
that $ > (1  — -0 ), under a benevolent regulator it is needed a higher level of 
correlation to decide in favor to the separated structure, compared to the level 
of correlation required under asymmetric information. Notice that this is the 
case for any 0 < 0  < 1 .
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Why? This result is contingent to the state of nature p < p. That is, given 
that p < p Congress expects with a higher probability to be informed about 
the true correlation being p < p, which increases the probability of extracting 
rents by using the informational economies of scope.
So we have that in state of nature p < p:
A = _______  ^ -______ >
h _  ~~ ^
^ rn(44)^/^  (4 4 )^ 2
As it was discussed before, when Congress has asymmetric information about 
p, he requires a smaller level of p to decide for the separated structure, com­
pared to the level that he requires under full information about it. Asymmetric 
information about the correlation parameter limits the regulator to cut infor­
mational rents that would be cut having better information of it. On the other 
hand with a benevolent regulator, the possibility of cutting rents by the use 
of informational economies of scope is contingent to the state of nature of the 
correlation parameter. For the state of nature p < p it is required a higher 
level of correlation than the one that is required under asymmetric informa­
tion, for Congress to decide for the decentralized structure. The information 
provided by the regulator produces Congress to have a higher expectation of 
p < p and therefore of yardstick competition being less efficient to cut rents 
than the use of informational economies of scope.
6 . Now we check what happen with quantities and transfers when =  0:
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(a) According to Dana (1993) for =  0, gf' > g}*^  and gj' > gj^, to check 
Dana’s result we need to look for the sign of — S[{qi^)^ and the 
same for g2 when Ajg =  0 :
s u r f ?  -  S 'A q ^ f  = -  ^ ) ( r f  -  4 )
Assume A" =  0 and A" =  0, then we have 5"(gf')'’ < 5'(gi'*)'' so that 
(gfty > (gj* )^'’ take A“ > 0 and Aÿ > 0 then 5'(gf')'' < *S"(gi'*)'’ so, 
(gfV  ^  because constraints 4.5, 4.9, 4.10 must bind
(b) To check if the transfer under a benevolent regulator is greater than or 
equal to the transfer under asymmetric information, we need to check the 
difference in the quantities produced in each case:
i. First, from equations G.51, C.52, C.79, C.8G and Dana’s equations
A .21  and A.2 2 :
(rf'*)'’ =  (rf'*)'*' =  ( « ? ) "
ii. Second, from (a) and the solution of appendix C .2 we have that 
(gfO > (gf'*) in each case. So, we need to know the relationship 
between (gf')"^  ^ and (g^y, (gf')^^ and (g f^ , since from appendix 
C.2 we know that (gj*')"^  ^ >
We have:
s ;ti?  -  su rfr  = - 4)
and
'^^ See in Dana (1993) appendix page 308. The constraints are: T" -  -  C2Q2 ~ ( 4  ~ 4 )? i'
( 4  -  4)4*, -  4 4  -  4 4  -  ( 4  -  4 ) 4 '  -  (4  -  4 )4'* . -  4 4  -  4 4  -  ( 4  -  4)4'*( 4  “  4 ^ 2* .respectively.
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5 'U rf?  -  -  c[)
A. For =  0, > 51(gfy > with >
(gW)6 > (gf^)^^. Since ((1 — 0) -  < 0
B. For A|J > 0, we have Aÿ > 0 and Ag > 0 , so again the constraints
in (a) must bind with equality, which means that (gf') =  (g^'^ 
in each case. So, from i we have that (g fy  =  (g^y^ =  (gi')^^- 
We can conclude that:
i<AY’ > (rf? > (qif > {q^ Ÿ = iqiY’ = («")"■'
and the same for gg^ .^
(c) Finally we conclude that when Aÿg =  0 in the state of nature p < p the 
expected transfer payment given up by Congress to the most efficient firm, 
is smaller than or equal to the expected transfer payment he has to give 
up to the most efficient firm under asymmetric information, but greater 
than or equal to the transfer under full information. The reason is that 
with A'/g =  0 , under the state of nature p < p, the benevolent regulator 
has greater expectations given by 0  of p < p, and smaller expectations 
given by (1 — 0 ) of p > p, so constraint for decentralization A^  has a 
smaller probability of being binding.
E[T^^] > E[T^] > E[T^^]
7. Taking together the results, we have that when the state of nature of the 
correlation parameter is p < p, delegation to a benevolent regulator has the
Notice that this result produces higher transfers than the ones obtained in the solution for 
Ai'g > 0.
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following effects on the optimal mechanism:
(a) Quantities produced in the most efficient states are not distorted.
(b) Quantities produced in the less efficient states are distorted in order to 
cut informational rents. They are reduced compared to the solution for 
asymmetric information, but they are still greater than or equal to the 
solution under and full information. So, productive inefficiency is reduced 
compared to asymmetric information.
(c) Since quantities are reduced, transfers given up to the most efficient firms 
are reduced as well. Again due to the assumption that Congress values 
income in hands of the firms more than income in hands of consumers 
0 < ÛÎ < 1 , there is a reduction in the distributive inefficiency. This result 
contingent to the state of nature of the correlation parameter, since we 
are in the case of p < p, the reduction in rents is the way in which the 
benevolent regulator gives information to Congress for him to decide for 
the integrated structure.
(d) The sum of the reductions in productive and distributive inefficiency pro­
duces a increase in the expected welfare under delegation to a benevolent 
regulator compared to asymmetric information,
(e) Under a benevolent regulator, the level of correlation beyond which decen­
tralization is chosen is increased compared to its level under asymmetric 
information, p > > p^^. The increase in the level of correlation re­
quired to choose decentralization, is contingent to the state of nature of 
the correlation parameter, for it being p < p the benevolent regulator 
provides Congress with information that reduces his expectation of p > p 
and therefore there is a reduction in the expectation of yardstick com­
petition being more efficient to cut rents, tan the use of informational 
economies of scope.
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C.4 N on-benevolent regulator 
C.4.1 State of nature p  <  p
With a benevolent regulator the optimization programme is:
=  C(1 -  +  (1 -  f ( l  -  e ) )W ^ '  -  aC (l -  0)s =
({1 -  e ) w '  +  (1 -  c(i -  e )) [ew^  +  (i -  e ) w ' ]  -  aC(i -  e)s  =
(1 -  e)(i +  ç e ) w ‘ +  ${ i  -  c(i -  g ))W  -  aC(i -  0)s  =
i p w '  +  (1 -  1P)W'‘ -  aC(l -  0)s (C.89)
By making (1 — 0)(1 +  Ç8) = i p  and 0(1 — Ç(1 -  0)) =  (1 -  ip).
Where:
1 . W^: expected welfare with a benevolent regulator.
2 . expected welfare under full information.
3. expected welfare under asymmetric information.
4. W^: expected welfare under decentralization.
5. W^: expected welfare under integration.
6 . ((1 -  9): probability for Congress of being full informed about p < p.
7. (1 — C(1 — ^)): probability for Congress of non being informed about p.
8 . 0: probability for Congress of implementing the integrated structure given 
that the state of nature is p < p.
9. (1 - 0 ) is the probability for Congress of implementing the decentralized struc­
ture given that the state of nature is p < p.
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10. 9: probability of p > p; (1 -  0):probability of p < p; (: probability for the 
regulator to observe a : p; 1 —(: probabiHty for the regulator to observe cr =  0 .
11. s =  =  k[9U.^j{q^^) +  (1 — transfer that Congress has
to give up to the regulator to provide incentives for true telling.
12 . =  (cf — c[)qi^ +  ( 4  ~  4 )4 -^ profits under decentralization.
13. Profits under integration:
n '/(g^ ') =  m a x |( r f  -  +  (rf -  4 )92*',
(cf -  o‘ )g"  +  ( 4  -  4 ) g f  ;
(4-4)rf'‘ + (4-4)rf'‘}
14. k — present value of the incentive payment from Congress to the regula­
tor, with Ac exogenous transaction cost for the regulator of the side payment.
15. E: expectation operator.
16. «(I — 9)(s =  aC(l “  9)kE(n.^^{q^^)): expected cost of the incentive payment, 
because it occurs with probability (1 — 9)(^ .
Subject to:
Individual rationality constraints and incentive compatibility constraints under 
separation and integration, which are the same constraints presented in appendix
C.2.
With that in mind, we can rewrite the. programme as:
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max I Si(rf)/ + SMY"' + + ftlgl**)/* +
+ S2{qi‘)4’'“ +  %(g#*)<A'"' -
_  j i l h ^ l h  _  r jr h l^ h l  _  j i h h ^ h h
a[T“ -  c'g“ -  4 g « ] /  +  a[T"* -  cjg'* -  +
«[T" -  cfîi" -  +  «[r** -  rfgi** -  -
QfC{i — 0(4 — 4)rf*' + (4 — 4)92* +
(1 -  0) max I (4 -  4)9!*'* + (4 -  4 )92'*; 
(4 -  4)9  ^+ (4 -  4)9?;
(4*-4)9?+ (4 -4 )9 ? }
_ cAgM _  4 4 k]
+
A 'l'-fT '* -  r * *  -  4 ? ! *  -  4 9 '* +  4  9 ?  +  4 g ? ]  +W '  
A5‘[T" -  T"* -  4g" -  49*' + 4g? + 4g**] + 
(1 -  V)Ag[T" -  49'' -  49? -  (4 -  4)9i" -  (4 -  4)9?] + 
V^A''[T" -  r*' -  49" -  49“ + 49*' + 49*'] + 
iPX‘‘[T“ -  r'* -  49'' -  49“ +  49'* +  4g?] +  
V-A'i(T" -  T** -  49!' -  49" + 49? + 49?] j (C.90)
This optimization programme differs from the previous programmes in the defi­
nition of the probabilities affecting the multipliers, and the definition of the incentive 
payment from Congress to the regulator. The rest of the variables and parameters 
remain as before.
The first order conditions are:
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~  CKC20 '' — (1 — ip)Xgc[ — 0[Aj +  Ag +  AjgJc' — 0 (G.91)
. S ' ; -  A^% +  0Agc^ =  0 (G.92)
-A M -( l-0 )A » (c ^ -c ;)+ 0 A M -a C (l-g )A :(c ^ -(4 )  =  0 (G.93)
^;(?M 9!'^^-O !cy+A^X+A^c^+0A Ïgci-7 '*'*c^-a:C (l-^)® A:(c^-ci) =  0 (G.94)
And the same set of equations for 2^*
For the transfer payments we have:
—0'' +  0:0'' -f- (1 — 0)Ag +  0[Ai +  Ag +  Ajg] =  0 (C.95)
- 0 '^ * +  0:0"* +  A^ -  0Ag =  0 (G.96)
-0 '* ' +  0:0'*' +  A^ -  0A|' =  0 (G.97)
- 0 '*'* +  0:0 '*'* -  A}'* -  A^ -  0 A|^  +  7 '*'* =  0  (G.98)
And the conditions for the multipliers and the constraints A'J[*) > 0 and 7 '^ [^-] >
0 .
Adding the three first equations of the first order condition for the transfer 
payments we get:
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A? +  A" +  +  (1 -  V')A“ =  (1 -  a ) ( l  -  ÿ**) (C.99)
and
7 “  =  (1 -  a) -  (1 -  •0)A“ (C.lOO)
Using these results and making some substitutions we obtain the general solution:
(C.lOl)
(C.102)
(C.103)
(C.104)
(C.105)
4
a*?,?)"* = 4
s'2(4Y = 4
44?" = 4
sM Y  = 4 +
sMY” = cj +
siiq^Y =
SK4Y' = Cg +
-I '
(C.106)(j)hl
(phh
(j^ hh
(C.107)
(C.108)
Taking note that ip > {1 ~  d) and (1 — 0) < 6, the effects over quantities and 
transfers are as follows:
1. Quantities produced for the most efficient firms, in the efficient states, as 
expected, are not distorted (equations C.lOl to C.104).
2. Quantities produced by the less efficient firms are distorted in order to cut 
informational rents.
a. Checking for gj'*. Consider Ajg > 0, 0 < 0  < 1 and 0 < A; < 1 then
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(^ qhh'jnb < (gkky ^  ^qhh'jAi However, < {q^^Y < as well,
so we need to check versus
51(9*'*)"* -  5!(9**)"^ =  +  > Q
then > (g'*'*)'^ ,^ the condition for this to happen is A'/g <
b. Take Aÿg > 0, from the constraints^® 4.5, 4.9 4.10 and 4.11 we have 
(gW)n6 < (gf*)”'^ , and from equations C.105 and C.106 as it was dis­
cussed previously (gf*')”'' =  (q^^)'^ .^ So, to compare the effects of capture 
over quantities we need to check the effect of the size in the exogenous 
transaction cost:
i As we can see, for A; =  0 the transaction cost of capture is too high 
(Ac ~  co) that the regulator behaves as benevolent and
so any (1 — 0 )Aig > 0 drives the result.
ii However, for /c =  1 , the transaction cost of capture is too low (Ac ~  0), so 
that the regulator is totally captured, which makes the minimum value 
required for (1 — ip)Xi2  to be at its maximum level.
iv For any A'/g >  ^ the non-benevolent regulator is harmful because
he reduces the level of production even beyond the optimal level under 
full information.
c. We conclude that if the condition in a. holds, with a non-benevolent 
regulator:
{q iY ^  = {qi^y^ > {q^^f =  {q^^f > (gf')’^  ^ =  > {q^Y^ =
(^j./i)F/ the expected transfer that Congress has to give up to the
^^Constraints 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 can be written as*. — c[gi — Cg^ g ~  (4* — ~  (4  “
T" -  4 g i -  4gg -  ( 4  -  -  ( 4  -  4 ) # ,  -  4 ? i -  4 4 '  -  ( 4  -  4)4 '*  -  ( 4  -  4)4'*,respectively.
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most efficient firm under integration is smaller than or equal to the one 
he has to give up under a benevolent regulator. However, depending on 
the value of the parameters, the transfer under a non-benevolent regulator 
could be even smaller than the optimal transfer under full information.
E[T^^] > E[T^] > E[T^^] >
This result is contingent with the state of nature p < p. What the 
benevolent regulator is telling to the Congress is that integration is the 
best choice given the state of nature p < p. So the benevolent regulator 
bias the decision towards the integrated structure.
With a benevolent regulator Congress expects a lower probability of fac­
ing p >  p when the state of nature is in fact p < p so it makes Congress 
to permit lower levels of gf' =  gj*'*, gj' =  under integration, since he 
is expecting with a higher probability the constraint for the integrated 
structure to be binding. That is quantities g^ '*, gj'* under integration are 
the relevant quantities to calculate the transfer payments.
Why? As we saw in appendix C.2 , in Dana (1993), when Aÿg > 0 the 
regulator prefers separation, under asymmetric information the regulator 
has to take into account the probability (1 -  ^) of being facing a situ­
ation in which p < p, however with a benevolent regulator there is an 
improvement in the information obtained by Congress 0. So, Congress 
now has a smaller expectation of p > p when it is in fact smaller than p. 
Congress can reduce the level of q^^ since it has a higher probability of 
being binding. That is, a benevolent regulator provides information that 
encourages Congress to decide for the integrated structure.
As in Laffont (2000), Laffont k  Tirole (1993), and Tirole (1986), un­
der a non-benevolent regulator, quantities and transfers are reduced with
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respect to their levels under a benevolent regulator. The incentive pay­
ment that Congress has to give up to the regulator to make him to tell 
the truth, has a distributive (or social) cost, so that the optimal response 
for Congress is to reduce the stake of collusion by reducing the transfer 
payments he has to give up. Since both, the transfer to the firm and 
the incentive to the regulator depend on Congress reduces quanti­
ties in state hh. However, as long as quantities and transfers are not 
reduced beyond the full information levels the non-benevolent regulator 
remains useful, since it provides information about the state of nature of 
the correlation parameter to be p < p.
3. Now we will study how the presence of a non-benevolent regulator affects the 
level of correlation beyond which the decentralized structure is chosen.
Proceeding as before assume A'g > 0, then constraint 4.11 holds with equality, 
but it means that g f  < gf^ and < gj'  ^ from constraints 4.5, 4.9 and 4.10^ .^ 
Now we have that for A“ > 0 and/or A'/ > 0, A" > 0, then gf' =  gf'*, qlf^  = gg'b
Proceeding as in Dana using equations, C.105, C.106,C.107 and C.108 we 
obtain:
(1 — 0)Ag -f 0A'i +  o:((l — 9)k _  X f  -h 0Ai2 +  a ( ( l  — 9Yk
(phl fphh
(1 — 0)Ag T 0A2û:C(1 ~ „  A2' T 0Aj2 T <aC(f ~  9Yk^Ih ^hh
(C.lOO)
(C.llO)
'^^Constraints 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 can be written as: — CgÇg -  ( 4  — c [ ) q i ^  -  ( 4  ~ 4)4'*,
T" -  4 4  -  4 4  -  ( 4  -  4)4^* -  (4 -  4)4'*, T" -  4 4  -  4 4  -  (4* -  4 )4 '*  -  (4  -  4)4'*,respectively.
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Using the first order conditions for the transfer payments we get:
=  (1 -  Q:)(0“ +  +  Q^ C(1 -  0)k{p^\l - 9 ) -  0'*'*) __ (1 -  0) u
 ^ + <^") ip *
(C .lll)
=  (1 -  +  0'*')0"* +  q:C(1 -  )^A;(0"*(1 - 9 ) -  0'*'*) _  (1 -  0) yII
(C.112)
,, (1 — o:)[(0"0'*'* — 0 '‘'0 " ‘)0' '^*’ — 0^ '^0^N
+  ,^ »>) +
a ^ (l — ^)fc[(0 '*'(l — ^) — 0 ^^)(0 ^  +  0 "^ ) +  (0"*(1 — 0 ) — -i- 0 ^^ ')]
_j_ (jyhl'^ f^phh _j_ 0 i /i )
(C.113)
So to have A12 =  0 it is needed:
(0 V** -  0 *v'*) =  ^  +
a ( ( l  -  9)k[{(f)^^{l - 9 ) -  0'^)(0'*'* +  0"*) + (0"*(1 -  6>) -  0'^ '^ )(0'^ '‘ +  0 "^ )]
(1 —  a)0'^^
(1 -  0 )Aj'(0 '*'* +  0'*')(0'*'* + 0 "*)
(1 —
In Dana’s paper the condition for X% = 0 is:
(C.114)
(/(A"" -  ^  (C.115)
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If the expression in brackets is positive^®, > p^ , that is the non-benevolent 
regulator increases the range of correlation in which it is supposed that the 
informational economies of scope dominate yardstick competition. However, 
p > p'' as well, so it is necessary to check the relationship between p"'* and p.
Making (•)(•) =  + and [•] =  +  0"^) -|-
(0" ’'(1 ~ 6) ~  4- 0 '*')] we have:
( p - p n  = (1 —
So if:
yil ^  û;C(1 -  )^/c[-]
-  ^(1 -
then p > p^^ and p >  p ^  > p  ^ > p^^,
In which case we can conclude that in state of nature p < p:
<fjhh >
+
(rjr^Y/^irlr^y/^ >
,/4/
h^h h^h
(?i?2 ) (4 ^2)I^h^ hl h^h
>
(C.116)
®^For the expression to be positive we need — + + + >  0^^{20^  ^+
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for
then > p >  > p^^
If the expression in brackets is negative ([>] < 0), the level of correlation beyond 
which decentralization is chosen under a non-benevolent regulator is smaller 
than under a benevolent regulator p  ^ > p^^. However, p  ^ > p^^ as well so we 
need to check:
nb _  AI _  q:C(1 -  0)k[] + )
P P -  (1 -
Since we are assuming [•] < 0, for any C^A“(-)(>) > «((1 — then p >  p  ^ >
pnb >  pAl
Prom the definition of p and p, according with equation C.114 under a benev­
olent regulator it is needed a higher level of correlation to decide in favor to 
the separated structure, compared to the level of correlation required under 
asymmetric information. Notice that this is the case for any 0 < -0 < 1.
Why? This result is contingent to the state of nature p < p^  That is, given 
that p < p Congress expects with a higher probability to be informed about 
the true correlation being p < p, which increases the probability of extracting 
rents by using the informational economies of scope.
On the other hand if the expression in brackets multiplied by the capture 
parameter k is positive, the level of correlation required to decide for decen­
tralization is increased, compared to the level obtained under a benevolent 
regulator. In such a case, the optimal response for Congress in the presence 
of a non-benevolent is to increase the range in which integration is chosen.
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However, if the expression in brackets is negative the level of correlation to 
decide for the decentralized structure is even smaller than the level obtained 
under a benevolent regulator. Note; Need to check the implications.
As it was discussed before, when Congress has asymmetric information about 
p, he requires a smaller level of p to decide for the separated structure, com­
pared to the level that he requires under full information about it. Asymmetric 
information about the correlation parameter limits the regulator to cut infor­
mational rents that would be cut having better information of it. On the other 
hand with a benevolent regulator, the possibility of cutting rents by the use 
of informational economies of scope is contingent to the state of nature of the 
correlation parameter. For the state of nature p < it is required a higher 
level of correlation than the one that is required under asymmetric informa­
tion, for Congress to decide for the decentralized structure. The information 
provided by the regulator produces Congress to have a higher expectation of 
p < p and therefore of yardstick competition being less efficient to cut rents 
than the use of informational economies of scope.
For certain values of the parameters a non-benevolent regulator could still be 
useful as long as the correlation parameter lies between asymmetric and full 
information.
4. We still need to check two extreme cases:
a. =  1 if and only if 0 =  0. In this case the solution is Dana’s solution for 
the integrated case.
b. =  0. In this case we have ^  since =  (1 -  and
Ai^  =  (1 — we conclude that:
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Substituting in the numerator for the correlation parameter we have that:
P (rïri)i/2(r2r2%|*/2
Again, the level of correlation required to decide for the decentralized 
structure is p =  0, since -0 =  0 the constraints for the integrated structure 
do not play any roll in the solution.
5. Now we have to check what happen with quantities and transfers when A12 =  0 
under a non-benevolent regulator:
First according to Dana (1993) for A^ g =  0, and qÿ > gj^, to check
Dana’s result we need to look for the sign of and the same
for gg, when A^ g =  0:
Of / at ( J i h Ÿ  _  Y (^ "  V')A" +  V'Ai +  o:C(l -  0) k  A j‘ -f  a C ( l  -  d ^ k ^ ,  ^  j  \
^iKQi  ) ) -  { ÿw ÿâk
From equation C.95:
(1 -  V-)A“ =  (1 -  -  «[A“ +  A«1
and from equations C.96 and C.97we have'®;
A'i'‘ =  ( l - a ) ç i " ‘ +  V'A2 
=  (1 -  +  i> \‘‘
Notice that the multipliers are affected by the probabilities as well, in fact they are reduced 
compared to the ones obtained by Dana.
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So, doing the substitutions:
(phl(j)hh
And similar for (gg)''.
Under this circumstances if:
S'liqiT’ < 51 (gf)"'’
and
Similar for and Aj.
This result has to be consistent with the condition for p that makes A^ g =  0. 
So the maximum value for Ag is given by:
+ 4 : } - - ^ ,  ( Ï -  a)4,hi,--------------+
aC(l - e)k[{<t>’‘‘ { l  - 6 ) -  + ÿ"-) + (^ "“(1 -  «) -  +  0")]
(1 —
Solving for Ag
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aC(l -  9)k[{(f>^\l - Ô ) -  ^(1 - 9 ) -
So for any^  ^ Ag < [*]:
(1 —
a ( ( l  -  9) k [ { ( j ) ^ \ l  - 9) -  +  ( j f^ )  +  ((^'^(1 -  ^) -
(1 — a)( j)^^
and p < p„ Ajg =  0 with:
{qfY^ > {q^^Y^
If Ag > [•] then p > p, and Aÿg > 0 and we are back to the previous case where 
{Qi ^Y^ < (qrJ’^ )^f'.Note prove this.
Similar for and Aÿ.
Finally to check the transfer payments under asymmetric information with 
and without delegation when A^ g =  0, we need to check what happened with 
the quantities in both cases;
(a) From equations C.51, C.52, C.79, C.80, C.107, C.108 and Dana’s A.21 
and A.22, we have — {qi^Y ”  similar for
^^Recall that the multipliers are greater or equal to zero.
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(b) However, for g^, we have from previous results (appendix ??) that 
(gW^ A/ > (gr^y > (gf^)^^, also from equations C.77, C.78, C.105, C.106 
we have (g^y > (gfO” )^ so we need to check the relationship between
(gW)F/
Prom equation C.105 and equation C.49:
i. For Ajj ~  0, it is needed (1 — '0)Aj > a ( ( l  — 0)k for S[{qi^Y^ > 
S'i{qi^)^^ and (q^^Y^ < (gfO^^* This result, together with the one 
obtained in (a), produces further requirements for the expected trans­
fer payments under a non-benevolent regulator to be greater than or 
equal to the expected transfer payments under full information, so 
we need:
(9^ )"' + (gf'*)" < (giy + (g?'")”'’
or
which means:
{q iY ' -  (gf < (gf')"*' - (gj'f
(1 — — a((l — 8)^k  ^ (1 — yi)(A“ — Aj ) + aC(l - $)k
(j^ hh -  (phl
Since we are considering the case of Ajg — 0 and A^  =  0.
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-a C (l -  e y k  - (1  -  +  aC(l -  9)k
(j)hh — ^hl
or
aC(l -  -  aC(l -  ^ ,, _(j)hh^ hl —  ^ t ) I
If the condition is fulfilled then:
E{T^^] > E[T^] > E[T^^] > E[T^^]
ii. For Xg > 0, we have that constraints 4.5, 4.9 and 4.10 must bind 
with equality so -S'KgfO =  S[{qi^) and (gf^) =  (gf )^ in each case. 
From the result in (a) we conclude:
iiiY' = = (g?? = (g“)‘ = (qiV = (g“)''' > (g^ )"" = (gf')"‘
In this case the transfer payments are as follows:
E[T^] =  E[T^^] = E[T^^] > E[T^^]
So, capture reduces production beyond full information levels and 
hurts the firm by reducing the transfer payment beyond full infor­
mation levels as well. The firm is better off by not entering in side 
contracts with the regulator.
6. Taking together the results we have that when the state of nature of the 
correlation parameter is p < p, delegation to a non-benevolent regulator has
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the following effects on the optimal mechanism:
(a) Quantities produced in the most efficient states are not distorted.
(b) Quantities produced in the less efficient states are distorted in order to cut 
informational rents. They are reduced compared to the solution for the 
benevolent regulator, however to be greater than the ones obtained under 
full information, further restrictions are required on the parameters.
(c) If the restrictions on the parameters are fulfilled, then transfers given 
up to the most efficient firm are reduced compared to the benevolent 
regulator case, but those transfers are still greater than the ones obtained 
under full infoimation. If the restrictions are not fulfilled, then quantities 
and transfers could be even smaller than the ones obtained under full 
information.
This effect deserves a deeper explanation. Since the state of nature is 
p < p, under integration, a benevolent regulator decreases the transfer 
payment given up to the most efficient firm compared to the one given 
up under asymmetric information. With this mechanism the benevo­
lent regulator still information over the state of nature of the correlation 
parameter, and tries to bias the decision towards integration. On the 
other hand, the non-benevolent regulator reduces the transfer payment 
compared to the benevolent regulator solution. That is the case because 
Congress optimal response under capture is to reduce the stake of col­
lusion, he does it by reducing the transfer payment to the most efficient 
firm and the incentive payment to the regulator. As long as the expected 
transfer payment is greater than the one obtained under full information, 
the non-benevolent regulator is still useful, since it provides information 
regarding the state of nature of the correlation parameter and permits 
Congress to decide for decentralization. However, under certain values
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of the parameters, the non-benevolent regulator could be even harmful 
E[T^^] > E[T^% since the optimal response is to reduce quantities be­
yond optimal levels under full information. However in such a case is not 
clear that the firm would enter in a side contract.
(d) In conclusion, when the transfer payment under a non-benevolent reg­
ulator is smaller than the one under asymmetric information, the non- 
benevolent regulator is useful and permits Congress to decide for inte­
gration which increases welfare. If the transfer payment is smaller than 
the one obtained under full information, the regulator is harmful, since 
he bias the decision towards integration when decentralization is optimal, 
which reduces welfare. When both transfer payments are equal, Congress 
ends up paying an incentive payment to a regulator who is of no use, so 
welfare is reduced as well.
(e) Under a non-benevolent regulator, the level of correlation beyond which 
decentralization is chosen is increased compared to its level under a benev­
olent, By this mean the non-benevolent regulator tries to in­
crease the range over which integration is chosen, when decentralization is 
the optimal choice. However, in the case of the transfer payment for cer­
tain values of the parameters, the non-benevolent regulator is still useful 
if the since it provides information about the state of nature
being p > p. If both levels of correlation are equal the non-benevolent 
regulator is useless, and finally for p'^  ^> p^^ the non-benevolent regulator 
is harmful since it maximizes the range over which integration is chosen 
when decentralization is the optimal response.
(f) According to Laffont (2000), under capture Congress has three choices to 
make the non-benevolent regulator to tell the truth.
i. To give an incentive transfer payment to the regulator to tell the
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truth.
ii. To reduce the stake of collusion.
iii. To increase the transaction costs of capture.
In this model we have analyzed the first two, and the solution is consis­
tent with theory. Since as a response to capture, under the integrated 
structure, production levels are reduced the stake of collusion is reduced 
as well trough a reduction in the transfer payment given up to the most 
efficient firm and a reduction in the incentive payment given up to the 
non-benevolent regulator.
We have ((1 — ip) -  $) < 0 then for A" <  A", (5i(çj*))'^ >  and
(gf')" < (g i')" '.
In which case:
E[T^^] > E[T^^] > E[T^] > E[T^^]
Notice that for p < p, Aÿ > 0 and Ag > 0 always^^, so their associated 
constraints must bind. It means that the associated constraint to A“ also 
binds, if and only if =  q^hh'^ nb and the expected
transfer under a benevolent regulator is smaller than or equal to the expected 
transfer under asymmetric information^^. However if the associated constraint 
to Ag does not bind we must have Ag =  0, in which case from
^^From equations C.105, 0.106.22^qhi'^ nb _  (^ qhh^nb < g^hh^ Ai the Same for çg-
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equations C.49, C.50 and C.105, C.106. So, we get the stated result above^^.
C.5 Com paring profits
C.5.1 State of nature p  <  p  
We have^^;
So,
B[n“(g'’')] -  g[n"(g'')] =
en % q ^‘ ) -  (1 -  V')n2(g‘) + (i -  s)n“(g‘^ 0 -  ^n“(g‘) = (c. in)
^^Basically what we have is equal to 0 or equal to A^ . Notice that when A*^ > A^ ,^ {S[{qi^ ))^  ^ < {S[(qx )^Y^  and (qj*)”*’ > (qi^Y .^ However, for that to happen we need the constraints of the 
integrated case not to bind, therefore all the multipliers under integration are zero, which is not 
consistent with p < p, and with the fact that those constraints are interior constraints compared 
to the associated constraints to A”.
^^ For the substitutions we have ■^ =  (1 -  #)(! 4- (i9) and (1 -  ■0) =  <9(1 -  ((1 -  #)).
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(cf -  c ')[g((gl‘‘)'" -  ( q^ f )  + <;e{l -  s)(g“)'-] +
(4 -  4)[«((g?)'''' -  (g?)") + C«(i -  «)(g?)‘] +
max{(ef -  c'i)[(l -  9)((gJ'‘)'’^  -  (gf'*)'") -  C»(l -  0)(g(*)&] +
(4 -  4)[(i -  B){{àY’ -  (g?)') -  (9(1 -  9)(g'Yl;
(of -  c‘)[(l -  9)((gf')-^  -  (gf?) -  C9(l -  9)(g")''] +
(4 -  4)1(1 -  9 ) ( ( g f  -  ( g f ) ' )  -  (9 (1  -  9 ) ( g f
(4 -  4)[(1 -  9 ) ( ( g f ) '"  -  (g f )" )  -  (« (1  -  9 )(g f)''] +
(4 -  4)1(1 -  9)((4'')'" -  (gf )') -  (9(1 -  9)(gr)‘]} (C.118)
For p >  p we have Aÿg > 0 so:
max['l = (of -  4)1(1 -  9)((gf'‘)''' -  (gf'*)‘) -  (g(l -  g)(gj''‘)*]+
(4 -  4)1(1 -  e ]{ { q iY ' -  ( g f ) ' )  -  C9(l -  9)(gf'*)'l
since =  q^^ in any case.
And we have:
-  E[n"(g^)] =
(4 -  4)l(gf")''" -  (gf)‘ + (4 -  4)((gf)" -  (g“ )‘)l > o (c.119)
If we consider Aÿg — 0, then q^’- > jn any case, so:
max(-l = (4 -  4)1(1 -  e)({q^^Y -  (g f'f) -  (9(1 -  9)(gf)'']+
(4 -  4)1(1 -  9)((gf)" -  (g“)‘) -  (9(1 -  9)(gf)‘]
Regulation of multiproduct industries under political economy constraints 306
and/or
max[.] =  (cf -  4)[(1 -  9 ) ( ( g f r ' -  ( 4 ? )  -  (9(1 -  9)(gfT]+
(4 -  4)[{1 -  s M Y ’ -  (<àY) -  (9(1 -  9)(î"')‘]
in such a case, if we take the first equation as the the maximum then: 
Bln“(g''Ol -  B[n“(g'’)l =
(4 -  4)[9((gfr' -  (gf?) + (9(1 -  9)(g;")"|
+(4 -  4)[9(gf -  (g?)‘ + (9(1 -  9)(gf'*)'']
+  (4 -  4)[(1 -  9 ) (g f )"  -  (gf'‘)‘) -  (9(1 -  9)(gf )®1 
+ (4 -  4)[(1 -  0W2Y ’ -  HY) -  (9(1 -  9)(g?)’’] =
(4 -  4)[(1 -  9)[(gf'*)^ ' -  (gf")'] + (9(1 -  9)((gf')'' -  (gf)®)]
+ (4 -  4)[(g?)'’ -  (g|")'l > 0 (C.120)
Since > q^  in any case and q^  ^ > q^^ for Aÿg ~  0^ -^
®^See appendices C.2 and C.3.1.
APPEN D IX  D
Chapter 5: Appendices
D . l  Transaction costs econom ics; Som e applica­
tions and discussions.
D . l . l  TCE as a tool in restructuring the electricity sector
This section briefly discusses two approaches based on TCE, for the analysis of the 
electricity sector reform, the first approach Joskow (2000b) more microanalitic in 
nature describes the reasons for some problems that have faced the restructured 
industries and argue that had TCE been taken into account, those problems would 
have been diminished, if not eliminated. The second approach Newbery (2000) 
contains a mixture of micro and macroanalitical considerations that has to be taken 
into account for electricity reform, it shows implicitly how TCE play an important 
role in industry and regulatory design.
1. The standard model for electricity reform requires the vertical separation of
307
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the potentially competitive parts from the natural monopolistic parts Newbery
(2000); Joskow (2000b), so that, with such separation, competition forces op­
erate on production an supply, and regulation operates in transmission and 
distribution to align prices near to marginal cost whereas permitting the reg­
ulated sectors to recover their fixed costs.
It is a general agreement in the literature that this model has performed rea­
sonable well, however some problems related to local market power, manage­
ment of network congestion, market performance, when supplies of generation 
services are very tight, and coordination of transmission services have been 
present Joskow (2000b).
According to Joskow (2000b) view “there are very sound transaction costs eco­
nomics reasons why these industries^ evolved with vertically integrated struc­
tures”. So that, vertical restructuring to promote competition, necessarily 
faces a trade off between the benefits of competition and the “potential costs 
associated with contractual hazards arising from vertical disintegration”. The 
key is to get the right organisational arrangement that minimises the costs of 
vertical separation without eliminating the benefits of competition. In design­
ing such organisational arrangement, TCE plays an important role by helping 
to detect the incentives and problems that the industry could face when chang­
ing from one institutional arrangement to another.
So, how in the view of Joskow (2000b) TCE could have lead to recognise the 
potential problems caused by the reform?
(a) Local market power. When reformers vertically separated the electricity 
industry, issues related to the incentives that the new private produc­
tion firms would face weren’t taken into account in the first place. “For
I^n general network industries.
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instance restructured electricity sectors inherited sunk transmission and 
generation investments of the past. However, with the separation of trans­
mission and generation , unregulated generators located at such strategic 
locations on the network now had the incentive and ability to exercise 
local market power in the absence of mitigation mechanisms being intro­
duced as part of the reform process. Designing good local market power 
mitigation mechanisms has proven to be difficult and they have some­
times led to perverse results causing more costly problems than those 
they were going to fix.”
This strategic behaviour did not take place before reform, because a 
vertical integrated electric utility considered investment and operation 
decisions in generation and transmission jointly. That is the “vertical 
integrated utility did not talte into account market power considerations 
because it not had incentives to hold itself up”,
(b) Management network congestion. “When the industry was vertically in­
tegrated, utilities handled network congestion through the internal dis­
patching programmes which generally took congestion into account in­
ternally when generators were scheduled and dispatched. They had no 
incentive to generate congestion because there was no profit associated 
with doing so. Moreover, a great deal of potential congestion was not ac­
tually observed ex post. With vertical separation, the network operator 
must now always manage observed congestion which makes its incidence 
more visible and it must do so in a world where unregulated generators 
have an incentive to exploit any imperfections in the congestion manage­
ment protocols to their advantage. Again this is a legacy of long lived 
investments in generating and transmission capacity made under different 
governance arrangements.”
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(c) Market performance problems when supplies of generation service are 
very tight. “Under conditions when demand is very high and supply very 
inelastic, even small generators perceive that their bidding behaviour in 
spot markets can influence the market price. The result is a market 
power problem which can lead to a market clearing prices that almost 
unbounded in the absence of administrative price caps...”
“That kind of problem was never observed when firms were vertically in­
tegrated monopolies. In conditions of tight supply, a regulated vertically 
integrated firm did not have the ability to exploit such market power 
opportunities in sales to its regulated retail customers because the prices 
were fixed by regulation based on supply costs.”
It is worth to say that “even an small amount of price sensitive demand 
can significantly reduce generator market power under these conditions.” 
However, Joskow continues, “restructured electricity sectors inherited the 
stocks of metering and communications equipment from the past and of­
ten operate with transaction pricing policies that mute the incentives 
consumers have to chose price responsive contracts. Accordingly adapta­
tions to respond to market power problems that arise during tight supply 
conditions have been slow to develop.”
(d) Coordination of transmission and generation investments. “A vertically 
integrated firm which spanned a large enough geographic area could both 
coordinate generating and transmission investment and internalise poten­
tial network externalities.”
“In many countries that have implemented electricity sector reforms of 
this nature, it has proven to be difficult to stimulate adequate transmis­
sion investments in right locations to accommodate the entry and exit 
of generators and promote competition among existing generators over
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large geographic areas. The problems associated with simulating appro­
priate transmission investments in turn undermine the performance of 
competitive generation markets that rely on it.”
In summary, Joskow points out that for some reformers, it has been sur­
prising the difficulties faced to create competitive wholesale electricity 
markets that are not plagued of these, and other related problems. He 
makes a case for TCE in the cense that had the restructuring challenge 
been seen through the TCE framework, those problems most probably 
would have been identified with the possibility to adopt ex-ante mech­
anisms to fix them. “Instead restructuring programmes have gone for­
ward (a) assuming that there were no economic efficiency reasons for the 
vertical integration between generation and transmission was the way 
electricity sectors evolved everywhere in the earth and (b) ignoring the 
configuration of long-lived sunk investment in the existing system and 
its implications for the competitive markets. Had these factors played a 
more central role in the reform process, some of the most serious problems 
could have been avoided or they costs reduced.”
Finally he argues that there is still room for TCE to play a role providing 
suggestions for improving performance. “For instance it is becoming clear 
that unregulated wholesale electricity markets work well when transmis­
sion congestion and constraints do not place significant limitations on 
the number of generators which can compete to serve the demand and 
provide reliability to the network at specific locations. This suggests 
that the successful development of competitive wholesale markets require 
over-investment in transmission capacity, compared to the governance 
structure that relies on vertically integrated monopolies subject to regu­
lation. The costs of over-investment in transmission is a cost that must be
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paid to create competitive electricity markets that will lead to lower cost 
outcomes in other dimensions in the long run than did the institutions of 
vertically integrated monopoly.”
2. A more macro-oriented perspective of the TCE of reforming the electricity in­
dustry around the world is presented by Newbery (2000), his discussion centers 
in the multiplicity of factors to be considered for restructuring the electricity 
sector. Prom the standard model of vertical separation which privatisation, 
he recognises different situations in which this standard model could not be 
implemented and he makes a case for partial liberalisation.
In the answers about the difficulties to apply full liberalization of the electric­
ity sector in diffèrent countries, TCE explanations appear in several parts of 
the document. Transaction costs due to the structure of the industry, as in 
Brasil where most of the electricity production is hydro subject to complex 
coordination of the water reserves for different users, and where the conclu­
sion is that production may remain in the hands of the state. As well as 
transactions costs due to the formation of interest groups capable to block the 
reform, and/or due the nonexistence of sounded regulatory institutions capa­
ble to handle complex regulatory decisions due to the specific characteristics 
of the electricity industry^.
The paper reviews the reforms in different developing countries in Asia and 
Latin America, it recognises different problems faced to implement the reform 
due to the existence of interest groups, lack of institutions and sounded regu­
latory agencies, the dept of the reform is a function of how transaction costs 
operate. For instance in some countries only partial liberalization is possible 
due to the fact implementing privatisation could put in risk the whole liberal-
^The role of the regulator in the California crisis could be an example of this problem Joskow 
(2000a).
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isation programme. In other situations, liberalisation without the existence of 
the required regulatory and institutional framework could lead to non-intended 
results.
He concludes that “the logical sequence of events, some of which can hap­
pen simultaneously, is first to create the legislative and regulatory framework 
and institutions, and to restructure the state owned ESI. Unbundling and and 
corporatising the generation companies, national grids and distribution com­
panies, while they are still in public can precede the legislation and setting 
up the regulatory agencies, but privatisation cannot. Unbundling generation 
from transmission will require a restructuring of any contractual relationships 
between the two. A time table for tariff rebalancing is needed before the distri­
bution companies can be privatised, and the system of regulating transmission 
and distributions tariffs is critical to the success of the whole programme.”
After those steps have taken place, then privatisation of distribution companies 
and opening generation to private investment are the next steps. With full 
liberalisation of the system care has to be taken to restrain monopoly power 
from the generation companies.
In countries were full liberalisation is not possible setting the regulatory insti­
tutions and permitting limited participation of private investment in genera­
tion could be an option. The issue is to design clear and enforceable rules to 
construct a plain level field for the participants^.
^Note that the partial liberalisation of Mexico’s natural gas and electricity industries fit in this 
last case.
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D . l .2 Levy and Spiller: The impact of institutions over reg­
ulation and performance in the telecom munications 
industry
As commented by Williamson (1994), the world bank study on “Regulations, In­
stitutions and Commitment: Comparative Studies of Telecommunications” (Levy & 
Spiller (1997)) is one of the first works that have attempted to develop a methodol­
ogy, based in transaction costs economics, to study the design of regulatory institu­
tions and the performance of the regulated industries. Levy and Spiller's method­
ology, which is based in a microanalytic approach, is applied in the study to the 
analysis of the reform of the telecommunications industry in five countries: the 
United Kingdom, Jamaica, Chile, Philippines and Argentina.
For the authors, the core of their study is to see regulation as a design prob­
lem with two components, regulatory governance and regulatory incentives. Where 
governance refers to the processes and mechanisms a country (society) uses to re­
strain the discretionary scope of regulators and to resolve the conflicts to which the 
restraints give rise, and incentives, refers to the rules governing pricing, subsidies, 
competition and entry, interconnection and the like Levy & Spiller (1997).
According to the authors, regulatory governance and incentives are choice vari­
ables for policy makers, however both of them are constrained by the formal and 
informal set of institutions of a given nation. That set of institutions determines 
the type and degree of a country’s regulatory problem, and the options available to 
solve it. Regulatory incentives are also constrained by institutions and the gover­
nance framework.
They sustain that the main role that the study of the structure of regulatory 
incentives has played in most of theoretical work on regulation, which has lead 
to the neglect of the study of regulatory governance, has been fundamentally in­
adequate. “Though incentives affect performance, their full impact occurs only if
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proper regulatory governance is in place” Levy & Spiller (1997). So that, a coun­
try ’s regulatory framework is shaped by its institutions. The performance of that 
regulatory framework depends on how well governance mechanisms are aligned to 
those institutions. That explains the differences in performance for countries that 
had attempted to implement similar regulatory frameworks. That is, two impor­
tant factors in regulation to incentive investment are commitment and credibility, 
for Levy and Spiller the solution to achieve commitment and credibility in some 
kind of environments “run counter to the prevailing wisdom: achieving commitment 
may require and inflexible regulatory regime, and some times public ownership of 
utilities may be the only feasible alternative.” More flexible mechanisms that alow 
for private ownership, but require discretion from the regulator, may be inefficient 
in environments where the the country’s institutional framework does not permit 
to make a difference between useful regulatory discretion from arbitrary behaviour, 
resulting in low levels of investment despite private ownership.
In summary, the authors argue that: “the credibility and the effectiveness of a 
regulatory framework, and so its ability to encourage private investment and support 
efficiency in the production and use of services, vary with a country’s political and 
social institutions. Performance can be satisfactory under a wide range of regulatory 
procedures, so long as three complementary mechanisms are in place to restraint 
arbitrary administrative action: substantive restraints in discretionary actions by 
the regulator, formal or informal restraints on changing the regulatory system and 
institutions to reinforce the restraints.” Using this framework they develop a decision 
tree (figure (D.l)) that, taking into account the institutional endowment of a country, 
advices for the kind of regulatory framework that most probably warranty all those 
substantive restraints to be in place.
With this tools the study proceeds to analyse the regulatory history of the 
telecommunications industry of the countries mentioned before, the decision tree 
is used to characterise the regulatory framework prevailing in different periods and
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Figure D.l: Decision tree for regulatory design
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the alignment between that regulatory framework and the countries’ institutional 
environment. The main conclusion is that, in most of the cases, high levels of in­
vestment and good performance are present when regulation and institutions are 
aligned, with no regard of the type of ownership.
Spiller & Vogelsang (1997) apply the discussed framework to the study of regu­
lation, institutions and performance of the telecommunications sector in the UK.
According to their findings UK’s political system does not provide insurance 
against reversals in the regulatory framework, due that it is based in an unified 
parliamentary system, where the party with majority in the parliament controls the 
executive and the legislative branches of the government. So that, formal and infor­
mal institutions (norms) have evolved to restraint the potential for policy reversals 
and the government discretion.
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In their work they focus on three of the informal norms:
1. Permanent bureaucracy. Public service carrier provides bureaucratic stability 
that tends to limit the potential for rapid changes in policy.
2. White papers laying out the implications of major policy changes. The publi­
cation of a report provides the opportunity to lobby and make their positions 
known. “The process prevents hasty changes in policy, made without public 
and political consultation.”
3. And the delegation of substantive powers to regulators. Ministers have the 
power to change regulation, however they require the recommendation of the 
General Director of the regulatory office. Since, in general, the term ministers 
serve in office is smaller that the term directors of regulatory agencies serve, 
the delegation of substantive powers provides for a measure of policy stability, 
“ specially by limiting radical regulatory changes following minor shifts in 
electoral power.”
The informal norms are not sufficient to warranty policy stability, however their 
provide a bases for the design of formal regulatory institutions to reflect the realities 
of institutional commitment mechanisms.
The judiciary also restraints government discretion by two means: 1) protecting 
contracts, 2) through the review regulatory decisions (more used in the USA). The 
UK Courts have a trsong tradition in upholding contracts among private parties, 
reason why the regulation has been implemented through the use of licences, due to 
the fact that licences can specify both substantive restraints on regulatory discre­
tion and restraints on changing the system as well as regulatory incentives. “Such 
specificity makes procedural violations easier to identify and keeps from deviating 
too broadly.”
The Natural Gas Industry in Mexico: Structure, regulation and performance 318 |
D .1.3 Spiller & Vogelsang (1997) institutional check list i
Spiller & Vogelsang (1997) study the regulatory reform of the telecommunications 
industry in the UK. They follow the methodology developed by Levy & Spiller (1997) 
to check the alignment between the UK institutional endowment and the regulatory 
framework.
In their study they analyse three elements that restrain government discretion 
in the regulatory arena and limit the potential for policy reversals:
1. Formal institutions, conformed by:
(a) Political institutions. Basically the level of independency among the pow­
ers conforming the state.
(b) Governance structure. The written rules that allow different agencies to 
participate in the regulatory process.
2. Informal institutions or norms. They are interested in three of them, the same 
that are reviewed in the chapter:
(a) Permanent bureaucracy.
(b) White papers laying out the implications of major policy changes.
(c) Delegation of substantive powers to regulators.
3. The incentives in the regulatory framework:
(a) Use of licences.
(b) Attention to competition.
(c) Involvement of several agencies in the regulatory process.
(d) The detail of the incentive regulation such as price caps.
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D .1.4 TCE and the economic reform in M exico
This section presents the methodology followed by Williams (2001) and Thacker
(2000) to study market reform and trade liberalisation in Mexico. Both authors put 
coalition politics at the center of the explanation of how liberalisation is pursued 
and what are the determinants of its success. The first work: “Market Reforms in 
Mexico: Coalitions, Institutions, and the Politics of Policy Change” ., by Williams
(2001) develops a methodology that focuses in the formation of a winner reforming 
coalition, that is constrained by the institutional framework and the TCE of the 
coalition formation, to analyse Mexico’s privatization and regulatory reform. It 
makes an intensive analysis of the role played by the “technocrats” in the success of 
the reform. The second work: “Big business, the state and free trade. Constructing 
coalitions in Mexico”., by Thacker (2000), follows a similar approach in the analysis 
of coalition formation, but focuses intensively in the role of private sector free trade 
coalition as a key element in the NAFTA negotiations.
Although both studies focus in specific issues in policy making in Mexico, what 
make them not only comparable, but useful to analyse any reform is that both 
build on a solid methodology that puts coalition politics at the center of the reforms 
and from it they pursue a micro-analysis of the complex mosaic that describes any 
economic reform.
Some key questions answered in these studies are: What factors motivate reform? 
What determines coalition formation? What is the relationship between coalitions 
and institutions? What are the processes followed to implement the reform? What 
are the costs of the reform and the costs associated with coalition formation? What 
determines a winning coalition?
In its more general form economic reform starts from the government and the 
motivation for reform is to attract investment^. Some examples are the reform in
“^ According to the authors different factors put pressure for reform two of them are pressures
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the UK, where the public sector could no longer sustain financing public firms with 
deficit, Latin America, especially Mexico, where the economical crisis combined 
with the reduction in oil prices no longer permitted the country to finance not 
only investment, but also foreign debt, and the USA, also, where state governments 
looked to increase investment in public utilities by increasing competition^.
However, if that is the motivation, another issue is to explain why reforms take 
the specific forms they take in different countries or in different sectors in the same 
country. As well as to explain why some reforms even in the same country could be 
taken as successful stories and some of them as complete failures^.
According to both studies an answer for this could be found in coalition politics. 
That is, to implement a reform it is needed more than a government decree, so 
the reforming group needs to form a strong reforming coalition with the relevant 
players, within the state (bureaucracy), the private sector and the society. Then 
coalitions form in order to maximise profits or to minimise losses depending on 
the positions of their members^. However, coalitions do not operate in a vacuum, 
they are constrained by the institutional framework of a given country and it is the 
interaction among the contesting coalitions with this institutional framework what 
shapes the reform.
That is, processes matter and the way in which the final reform takes place 
depends on the capacity of the coalition to implement the required changes under the
from international agencies and even ideology. However what distinguish governments in capitalist 
systems is their dependence from investment so that, when they cannot afford more deficit, the 
call for private investment requires governments to give warranties to the private sector,
® Something to notice, is that the need for investment could be caused endogenously by the fact 
that with the status quo, the private sector could decide not to invest until warranties are settled 
in the playing field. Governments receiving this signal proceed to reform the economy in order to 
avoid economic stagnation Thacker (2000).
^Williams (2001) addresses this point when comparing the success of the Mexican government 
in the privatisation of public firms and trade reform compared to the failure in the reform of 
environmental policy in Mexico city
^The idea is that if the transaction costs of coalition formation are smaller than the profits then 
a coalition is organised. In some cases, some members of the coalition because of their position in 
the status quo only can minimise short term losses by joining the coalition, whit the expectation 
of some future profits (political or economical).
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institutional constraints, and some times on its capacity to create new institutions 
to implement and sustain the reform.
Without mentioning them specifically TCE appear along the way in these studies, 
aside of the costs associated with the reform by itself, there are TCE associated with 
coalition formation and institutional change and in the dynamics of the reform, the 
winner coalition learn those TCE and minimise them when possible®.
For Williams (2001) “a compelling explanation of successful policy change must 
do four things. It must capture the inherent difficulties of implementing a neoliberal 
project, explain how such obstacles are overcome, consider the influence institutions 
exert on actors’ capabilities and prospects for success and account for dissimilar 
outcomes (success/failure).
Each of those factors are summarised below:
1. Challenge of policy reform. The two main factors that explain the challenge 
of policy reform are:
(a) Pohcy feedback. The impact that past policies has over current politics. 
“It is the notion that prior policy choices have political consequences.” 
Some of the results of policy feedback that most likely complicate the 
reform process are: (1) the creation of strong political interests nested 
in prior policies, (2) the provision of significative incentives to protect 
those interests and (3) the promotion of policy “lock in” effects that can 
encourage governments not to forego alternative policy options.
(b) Reformers dilemma. This issue refers to the identifiability of the losers 
after a neoliberal reform. That is under this kind of reforms the negative 
impact of the new policy falls heavily on predictable groups. So, “losers
®The Mexican government learned those costs from the initial failure of privatising Cananea 
a mining firm by using the force and avoid to face a similar situation during the privatisation of 
Sicartsa a steel firm Williams (2001)
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know who they will be and each group has strong incentives to contest 
reform.”
2. The role of institutions. Institutions and institutional relationships play a fun­
damental role in constraining the way in which policy makers could deal with 
the effects of policy feedback and the reformer’s dilemma mentioned above. 
Institutions and institutional relationships have the capacity to structure po­
litical interaction in ways that limit what some actors can do, and enable 
others to do things they otherwise could not.
“With respect to market reforms the influence institutions exert on the reform 
process should not be minimized. Reform initiatives typically generate strug­
gles aver the policy agenda and policy content, and in the struggles patterns 
of governance matter.”
3. Solving the problems presented above depends on the organisational strength 
of the reforming coalition. This organisational strength depends on three 
factors:
(a) Organisational position. It refers to the strategic position of the mem­
bers of the coalition in the network formed by the bureaucratic matrix 
(“Network centrality”).
(b) Institutional innovation. It is the ability to change the institutional 
framework to make it more favourable to the reform process. This could 
be done by three means:
i. Rule-changing. Refers to the ability to change the rules of the ex­
isting institutions. That is, the possibiUty to alter in the coalition’s 
favour the institutional rules and procedures that structure a govern 
representation, contestation, decision making process, interagency
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relations, patterns of information gathering, processing and dissemi­
nation and legal jurisdiction over a policy domain.
ii. Instrument-creating. It is the creation of new bureaucratic entities 
whose sole purpose is to advance a particular pohcy.
iii. Strategising-behaviour. It is an important form of institutional in­
novation and it mean to be the ability of policymakers (coalitions) 
to use the instruments available to minimise conflict or the costs of 
conflict.
(c) Policy ideas and paradigms. Organisational strength can develope from 
policy ideas coalition members advance. The more closely some ideas fit 
the contemporary policy issues leaders face, the greater the prominence 
they assume. Also the cohesive set of ideas or policy paradigm the greater 
its political value in policy making contests.
For Thacker (2000) political coalitions make policy, and the state and and social 
actors form coalitions within a given international context. Coalition politics links 
economic policy to state institutions, society and the international system. The rela­
tions among the different actors are dynamic and interactive shaping and reshaping 
one another over time.
“Coalitions are a critical intervening variable, both cause and effect. As effect 
they result from the influence of international developments, social structures and 
state institutions. Shifts in these aspects strengthen one or another coalition com­
peting for power. As cause, coalitions control the actual process through which pol­
icy is made. The different interests and relative power balance between competing 
coalitions determine which policies will be implemented and successfully sustained. 
Finally, feedback loops exists between economic policy and the outlying variables 
over time. For example, trade opening or closure at one moment in time can alter 
a country’s social bases, state institutions and placement within the international
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system...These changes then induce realignments in the balance between competing 
coalitions, which in turn assert varying degrees of influence and control over future 
reforms.”
To address key questions abput the determinants of coalition formation that is: 
When, with whom and under which circumstances are policy makers likely to form 
coalitions? When and why do different groups within the busyness sector community 
seek to participate in policy coalitions? and the determinants of a winner coalition.
Thacker (2000) rests on three “analytical pillars” :
1. The international context. It provides constraints and opportunities for policy 
change. International shocks could create social instability that provides op­
portunity for reforming coalitions to take place. International agencies like the 
IMF and World Bank put pressure for economic reform implementation trough 
conditional financial lending. However, international financial resources that 
accrue to the reformer governments signify and opportunity for those govern­
ments to mobilise those resources to make the reform less painful.
2. Business leverage, preferences and strategies. This factors explain which groups 
among the private sector are more likely to to form a coalition with policy­
makers, which groups are expected to participate more actively.
(a) Business leverage. Busyness independency from the sate, the possibility 
of implementing a credible exit strategy (This is related to asset mobility).
(b) Preferences. Internal balance within the private sector which depends on 
de size, sector and asset mobility of different groups within the private 
sector and shifts in the relative weight of each group within the overall 
business community.
(c) Strategies. Political and economic strategies that the private sector en­
gages in to attempt to influence policy and participate in its formulation
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and implementation. (Exit and/or voice trategies).
3. State vulnerabilities, institutions, interests, and initiative. These aspects ex­
plain to which groups from the private sector, the state is more likely to form 
coalitions:
(a) Vulnerabilities. Structural vulnerabilities linked to the state’s dependence 
on private sector for investment (Susceptibility to the structural leverage 
exerted by the private sector). Non-structural vulnerabilities could come 
from electoral pressures and the dynamics of parti competition.
(b) Institutions and interests. Refer to the balance of power among state 
agencies and the identity and interests of key policy makers.
(c) Initiative. The initiative of state policy makers in forming coalitions with 
different private actors and the factors that determine the motivation for 
such alliances are crucial factors in the formation and shifting of policy 
coalitions.
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D .2 M ain privatisations in M exico
Year
Table D.l: Main privatisations in Mexico since
Company ______ Sector_____ Equity share Amount
1991 (US $ million )W
Purchaser
1991 Banca Cremi Banking 66.7 241 Multivalores
1991 Banamex Banking 70.7 3,131 Acciones y valores
1991 Gamesa Food-drinks 70.0 640 Pepsi Cola
1991 Bancomer Banking 51.0 3,154 Valores Monterrey
1991 Telmex Telecoms 20.7 5,663 G. Carso, France Telecom, Bell
1992 M. Comerm ex Banking 66.5 873 A. Legorreta Group
1992 Banco Int. Banking 72.0 480 Grupo Financiero Privado
1992 B. del Atlantiqo Banking 68.6 474 Grupo Bursatil Americano
1992 B. M. Somex Banking 81.6 605 Grupo Invermexico
1992 B. Serfin Banking 51.0 912 Grupo Financiero OBSA
1992 B.Mer. del Norte Banking 66.0 573 Grupo Maseca
1993 Aseg. Mex. Insurance 51.1 582 Brupo Mexival Banpais
1994 Chanels 7 and 13 Television 100.0 645 Grupo Electra
1994 Telmex Telecoms 53Q(*> —
Source Ramirez (2001). 
* Convertible ofFreing.
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D .3 Top ten  privatisations
Table D.2: Top Ten Privatisations during the First Two Years of the Salinas 
Administration (US $ millions)
Year Company Sector Amount Purchaser
1990 Telmex (18 entities) Teiecoms 1,760 G. Carso, Prance Telecom, Bell
1990 Cananea Mining Co. Coper mining 475.0 Mexicana de Cananea
1989 Aeronaves de Mexico Airline 268.0 Icaro Aérotransportés
1989 Co. Mexicana de Aviacion Airline 140 Grupo Xabre
1989 Fomente Azucaiero Sugar Ref. 89.0 Grupo Beta San Miguel
1990 CONASUPO Tilitlan plant Food 74.5 Unilever
1989 Grupo Dina Trucks, buses, mot. etc. 56.0 Consorcio “G” Cummins
1990 Sugar Refineries Sugar ref. 54.5 Corp. Ind. Sucrum
1990 Mexinox No identified 47.6 Ahorrinox
1989 Sugar refineries Sugar ref. 42.6 Anermex
Source Ramirez (2001). 
Convertible offreing.
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D .4  N atural Gas B alance 1970-1978 (M C FD )
Table D.3: Natural gas balance(^)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Producction 1,822.0 1,762.8 1,803.8 1,854.1 2,040.2 2,154.7 2,018.6 2,046.7 2,561.4
Flewered^* )^ 475.5 441.6 417.8 356.2 497.4 517.9 492.0 347.9 392.0
Process shrinkage 92.2 102.6 105.5 118.1 115.9 172.1 179.5 176.5 193.4
hosts - - - - - - n.d. 81.9 50.8
Linepack — — - - - - - n.d. n.d
Net production('^) 1,254.3 1,218.6 1,280.5 1,379.8 1,426.9 1,464.9 1,464.7 1,437.1 1,522.8
Statistic différence - - - - - - 13.9 46.5 77.8(®)
Imports^**) — - - — - — - - -
Total disposability 1,254.3 1,218.6 1,280.5 1,379.8 1,426.9 1,464.7 1,423.2 1,476.3 1847.4
Pemex consumption 365.7 333.8 409.7 448.4 520.6 532.1 539.8 574.1 788.0
Exports 119.0 59.6 23.5 4.6 0.7 - - 6.9 -
Internal demand 769.6 825.2 847.3 953.3 905.6 932.6 886.4 895.3 1,058.5
Industry 579.5 608.2 631.2 695.7 691.0 644.4 640.2 653.0 749.1
Electric sector 154.7 38.0 42.4 49.5 48.9 45.7 50.4 53.5 59.7
Households 35.4 38.0 42.4 49.5 48.9 45.7 50.4 53.5 59.7
“ Source Marquez (1989).
 ^ Reported by PEMEX until 1978, not reported by PEMEX in the statistical sources used.I is calculated as 
Production less Net production.
Sum of PEMEX consumption extraction and internal sales. The quantity is less than the one reported by PEMEX 
because the later includes loses due shrinkage,
 ^ Only PEMEX.
“ reinjections to fields.
 ^ For the period (1970-1775) data estimated from PEMEX internal documents.
® Includes CO2  relieved to the atmosphere.
 ^ Includes line packing
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D .5 N atural Gas B alance 1979-1985 (M C FD ).
Table D.4: Natural gas balauce(^)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Producction 
Sent to the
2,916.6 3,548.0 4,060.8 4,246.3 4053.6 3,752. 3,603.7
atmosphere(^) 363.9 426.9 665.2 638.1 434.3 302.5 277.6
Process shrinkage 256.0 329.6 412.6 461.6 496.4 465.5 526.3
hosts 35.5 39,2 5 4 m 103.08 1 1 2 .5 8 152.508 188.38
hinepack 10.7 0.8 2.3 - - _ -
Net production(^) 2,250.5 2,751.5 2,926,1 3,043.6 3,010.4 2,832.6 2,611.5
Statistic difference^®) 33.5 4.3 12.0 - -15.1 36.0 27.9
Imports^**) - - - - - - 6.5
Total disposability 2,217.0 2,755.8 2,914.1 3,043.6 3,025.5 2,796.6 2,585.6
Pemex consumption 944.6 1,082.2 1,238.7 1,400.0 1,511.1 1,433.2 1,365.7
Exports - 294.4 302.5 273.1 217.5 147.8 -
Internal demand 1,272.4 1,379.2 1,372.9 1,370.1 1,296.9 1,215.6 1,224.4
Industry 875.6 999.8 1,026.7 1,039.2 978.8 885.7 877.2
Electric sector 349.7 323.6 293,3 272.0 246.4 248.3 263.0
Households 47.1 55.8 52.9 56.2 68.5 81.6 84.2
Source Marquez (1989).
Reported by PEMEX until 1978, not reported by PEMEX in the statistical sources used.I 
is calculated as Production less Net production.
° Sum of PEMEX consumption extraction and internal sales. The quantity is less than the 
one reported by PEMEX because the later includes loses due shrinkage.
 ^ Only PEMEX.
° reinjections to fields.
 ^ For the period (1970-1775) data estimated from PEMEX internal documents, 
s Includes CO2 relieved to the atmosphere.
 ^ Includes line packing
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D .6 D ry natural gas balance
Table D.5: Dry natural gas balance (MGPD)(^)
Concept 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
O rigin 2,790 2,906 2,891 3,093 3,359 3,674 3,734 3,885 3,921
Production 2,396 2,458 2,376 2.614 2,798 2,816 2,709 2,791 2,804
Ethane to pipelines 118 112 101 76 44 82 114 98 101
Direct from fields 134 149 190 277 381 599 750 752 710
Imports 97 125 173 84 108 145 146 231 292
Other flux 45 61 50 42 27 32 14 13 14
D estination 2,782 2,907 2,907 3,099 3,319 3,609 3,653 3,859 3,581
PEMEX consumption 1,497 1,518 1,421 1,524 1,663 1,788 1,620 1,775 1,829
Exports 5 19 21 36 37 32 136 24 25
Internal sales 1,280 1,368 1,464 1,541 1,620 1,789 1,889 2,061 1,993
Industry 803 823 906 956 983 1,056 1,194^ 1,190(b) 984(b)
Electricity 385 466 494 492 538 639 705 871 1,010
Households 92 80 63 93 100 94 — - -
Gas in pipelines - 1 - -2 - - -1 -1 -1
Statistical difference 8 -1 -16 -6 40 66 80 26 71
Source PEMEX (1999a)
 ^ Includes sales to distribution companies (sales to households).
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D .7  N atural gas u tilisation  (M CF)
Table D.6: Natural gas utilisation
C oncapt________________________ 1983________ 1984________ 1985________ 1986________ 1987_______ 1 ^
Shrinkage 133,007 126,124 149,650 173,375 176,186 132,532 205,605 197,100
Slutnkage 48,173 44,249 42,450 45,041 51,501 41,852 50,730 49,275CO2  Sent to  the
atm osphere 7,483 6,661 6,716 6,680 7,629 5,001 6,077 6,045
G as sen t to  the
atm osphere 158,520 110,715 101,324 62,379 67,744 30,316 32,548 31,831
C ondensation  in
pipelines 33,580 48,976 62,014 43,946 42,569 20,874 88,578 99,864
In te rnal consum ption
before pipelines 155,490 138,860 102,638 112,895 103,550 53,673 105,115 103,832In te rnal consum ption
a fte r p lan ts 396,062 385,691 395,842 388,506 402,303 289,405 402,997 398,617D elivered for in ternal sales 473,369 444,910 444,553 411,428 418,108 280,160 435,846 434,131D elivered for exports 79,388 54,005
S ta tis tic a l difference -5,512 13.176 10,184 8,102 7,336 5,288 5,549
T o ta l  p r o d u c t io n 1,479,560 1,373,457 1,315,351 1,252,352 1,276,926 853,813 1,332,789 3,326,244
b Due to extraction of ethane and liquids. 
 ^Extraction of sour gases.
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D .8 Investm ent in the oil industry (mcfd)
Table D.7: Investment in the oil industry®
adjusted by the WDI conversion factor.
(1980-2002) Thousands of pesos
Year Total E xploration W heals M odification^ W ork in progress A quicition O ther
1980 83,530 0 0 0 21,028 62,475 26
1981 173,669 0 0 0 135,436 37,314 919
1982 143,018 0 0 0 61992 80,962 65
1983 166,089 5,205 66,093 9,642 68,226 13,700 3,224
1984 233,756 5,943 83,201 15,848 110,440 17,334 990
1985 300,609 11,057 126,333 22,586 99,975 40,226 3921985 312,369 12,143 166,022 10,247 72.592 49,530 1,836
1987 705,582 21,508 237,018 26,543 251,260 165,534 3,718
1988 1,651,336 37,947 563,617 42,588 660,706 311,467 35,010
1989 2,059,323 35,630 744,475 100,500 910,587 240,948 27,1841990 3,046,779 107,285 824,816 184,274 906,586 364,862 658,956
1991 4,854,215 203,792 1,355,886 372,484 1,804,682 458,472 658,900
1992 5,540,784 340,726 1,754,009 578,813 1,999,884 570,497 296,868
1993 5,873,099 502,174 1,730,370 720,116 2,150,084 542,854 227,501
1994 6,986,982 306,946 1,782,685 1,025,945 2,514,485 417,401 039,520
1995 7,359,061 288,113 1,822,703 1,196,103 2,539,802 352,544 1,160,2251996 16,195,121 357,518 3,525,743 2,594,059 3,284,660 1,042,860 5,391,091
1997 16,665,370 554,538 4,212,169 5,110,986 3,503,529 1,387,544 1,896,605
1998 17,888,417 572,315 4,810,693 5,232,317 3,316,290 1,570,611 2,386,191
1999 15,872,956 605,320 3,161,283 5,421,157 2,865,132 1,374,095 1,990,9692000 21,642,949 852,295 4,401,669 6,591,267 4,140,098 3,504,607 2,173,7542001 23,371,873 396,017 4,456,231 7,489,394 2.904,878 5,800,973 2,309,6392002 9,511,773 61,163 1,608,330 2,979,825 1,161,963 2,957,587 742,905
“ Source elaborated with information provided by SENER. 
b By contractors.
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D .9  Im plicit prices o f N atural Gas, LPG  and fuel 
oil
Table D.8: Mexico: Implicit prices of Natu­
ral Gas, LPG and Fuel GIF (1980-2002) (Pe­
sos per MBTU adjusted by the WDI conver­
sion factor.)
Year Natural Gas^ LPG Fuel Oil
1980 0.009 0.024 0.010
1981 0.013 0.030 0.014
1982 0.017 0.025 0.014
1983 0.059 0.040 0.035
1984 0.175 0.050 0.102
1985 0.313 0.050 0.167
1986 0.504 0.275 0.256
1987 1.015 0.653 0.528
1988 2.372 1.870 1.387
1989 3,908 2.240 2.201
1990 4.161 1.817 2.309
1991 3.997 2.381 3.009
1992 4.911 3.561 4.395
1993 6.320 5.415 4.742
1994 5.877 7.543 5.346
1995 5.664 7.317 6.273
1996 11.355 18.850 10.554
1997 15.568 18.178 14.434
1998 14.480 20.320 11.935
1999 17.954 22.049 16.789
2000 32.039 36.798 30.743
2001 37.105 41.149 26.528
2002 31.759 36.037 31.511
 ^ Estimated as ( totlThl it  aoTd ) internal sales, withinformation from SENER.
The Natural Gas Industry in Mexico: Structure, regulation and performance 334
D.IO Oil and gas drilling
Table D.9: Wheals drilling by government period
Period Pemex Contracts Total Increase % Success % Depth Change in proved reserves
1938-1940 6 - 6 - 50.0 8 -44
1941-1946 39 - 39 550.0 16.0 44 216
1947-1952 176 110 286 633.3 35.0 506 846
1953-1958 520 70 590 106.3 30.0 1,060 1,882
1959-1964 216 521 737 24.9 22.0 1,534 1,229
1964-1970 779 68 847 14.9 29.0 2,513 423
“■ Source Marquez (1989) .
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D . l l  Oil and gas drilling (B)
Table D.IO: Wheals drilling (1988-2001)^ ®'^
Period Drilled(b) Finished Exploratory Actives %Success% Development Active %Success Depth(®)
1988 132 144 33 6 23 111 90 82 3,715
1989 82 123 42 14 41 81 63 77 3,658
1990 132 106 43 14 33 63 59 93 3,928
1991 171 184 51 25 52 133 116 86 3,303
1992 121 129 41 24 59 88 83 94 3,561
1993 66 78 25 13 52 53 47 89 4,585
1994 72 63 16 6 38 47 42 91 3,898
1995 104 101 10 6 60 91 88 97 3,538
1996 118 114 10 6 60 104 97 95 3,730
1997 130 121 10 7 70 111 106 96 3,507
1998 230 203 21 13 62 182 178 98 3,907
Source PEMEX (1999a) . 
b Wheals drilled to the objective.
° Average depth to the objective (mtrs).
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D .12 E xploration and exp loitation  of oil w heals 
in M exico
Table D .ll: Exp oration and explitation of oil wheals (1980-
2002)W
D rilled 95Sucesa New flleds
T otal Exploration  D evelopm ent E xploration Dovelopmaiit_______ Oil
1980 432 73 349 42 S3 28 6
1981 405 62 312 38 87 10 11
1982 353 50 261 28 82 10 81983 305 54 194 28 88 11 6
1984 282 68 235 32 85 10
1985 288 78 225 41 81 5 2
1986 246 56 117 47 86 4 6
1987 103 27 94 36 85 2 11988 144 30 98 23 82 2
1989 123 24 58 41 77 6 4
1990 106 51 81 33 93 7 3
1991 184 45 126 52 86 6 6
1992 129 38 83 59 94 4 10
1993 78 19 47 52 89 8 1
1994 63 17 55 38 91 2
1995 101 10 94 60 97 1 0
1996 114 11 107 60 95 1 0
1997 121 15 115 70 96 0 1
1998 203 19 214 62 98 2 41999 234 28 206 41 91 0 5
2000 247 49 236 57 95 1 5
2001 459 45 404 53 91 2 21
2002=' 344 42 300 50 88 3 5
Source: SENER.
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D .13 M exico’s internal prices o f natural gas
Table D.12: Internal prices of natu­
ral gas^ ®") (1981-2001) (Pesos^ per Million 
BTU)
Industry Households
Year Non-border Border
1981 0.02 0.02 0.02
1982 0.03 0.03 .01
1983 0.08 0.08 0.08
1984 0.18 0.18 0.18
1985 0.42 0.42 0.42
1986 0.53 0.53 0.53
1987 1.65 1.65 1.65
1988 2.02 2.02 2.02
1989 3.18 3.18 2.58
1990 3.56 3.56 3.11
1991 3.91 3.91 3.88
1992 5.16 5.16 6.31
1993 5.10 5.10 10.43
1994 4.87 4.20 10.62
1995 6.84 6.03 12.16
1996 16.66 12.16 22.27
1997 13.34 12.91 21.46
1998 13.88 13.75 0.00
1999 14.24 14.54 0.00
2000 0.00 0.00 0.00
2001 0.00 0.00 0.00
2002=^ 0.00 0.00 0.00
® Source: SENER.
b Prices adjusted by the WDI conversion factor.
The Natural Gas Industry in Mexico: Structure, regulation and performance 338
D .14 N atural gas production  by source
Table D.13: Natural gas production 
by source® (MCFD) (1970-2003)
Year Associated Non-associated
1988 2,983 495
1989 2,782 541
1990 3,032 620
1991 3,040 594
1993 3,025 559
1994 3,093 484
1995 3,107 517
1996 3,154 605
1997 3,479 717
1998 3,630 836
1999 3,704 1,087
2000 3,526 1,246
2001 3,380 1,299
2002 3,240 1,271
2003 3,118 1,305
Associated and no associated to oil production. 
Source produce with information provided PE­
MEX oil indicators http://www.pemex.com .
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D .15 P articipation  o f taxes on the oil industry in  
M exico’s governm ent to ta l ta x  collection
Table D.14: Participation of taxes on the oil industry 
in Mexico’s government total tax collection(millions of 
Mexican pesos))^®)
Period Total tax collection Taxes on the oil ind. Participation%
1992 214,947 51,057.3 23.8
1993 193,746.2 52,970.4 27.3
1994 220,102,3 59,086.8 26.8
1995 280,144.4 99,500.8 35.5
1996 392,566.0 147,582.5 37.6
1997 508,743.8 181,479.8 35.7
Source INBGI (1988) .
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D .16 P E M E X  Tax B urden
Table D.15: PEMEX Tax Burden (mil­
lions of Mexican pesos) )(®)
Period Sales revenues(b) Taxes Tax burden%
1992 77,740 51,057.3 65.7
1993 84,202.0 58,970.4 62.9
1994 100,300.0 59,086.8 58.9
1995 161,547.0 99,500.8 61.6
1996 235,820.0 147,582.5 62.6
1997 269,507.0 181,479.8 67.3
 ^Source INEGI (1988) . 
b Internal sales and exports.
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D .17  P articipation  o f th e  oil industry in M exico’s 
governm ent incom e.
Table D.16: Participation of the oil industry in Mexico’s government income 
(millions of Mexican pesos)
Concept 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
T otal Incom e 65,506 90,204 117,710 117,617 212,221 194,813 215,301 283,195
Oil Incom e (b) 22,904 28,653 34,739 42,114 50,996 52,773 58,664 100,028
Contributions 13,450 17,985 25,995 31,003 34,870 35,033 31,136 72,866
lEPS(b) 7,277 7,987 5,162 6,763 12,212 13,400 21,777 17,447
IVA(®) 2,177 2,681 3,477 4,348 3,913 4,341 5,752 9,685
Non-oil Income 42,602 61,551 82,971 135,503 161,225 142,040 156,637 183,167
Oil Income/total (%) 35.0 31.8 29.5 23.7 24.0 27.1 27.2 35.3
 ^ For 1983-1988 source PEMEX (1999b). 
b Taxes applied to PEMEX.
° Consumption tax.
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D .18 M exico’s N atural gas production  and de­
m and
Table D.17: Natural gas demand and supply® (1980-2002) t -
MBTU’s
1980 1093.44 104.42 0 .0 0 507.97 1 2 .0 0.009
1981 1201.59 106.86 0 .0 0 497.87 16.4 0.013
1982 1258.33 101.26 0 .0 0 500.40 15.0 0.017
1983 1254.60 80.49 1.65 489.21 1 0 .0 0.059
1984 1161.41 55.03 1.78 460.97 8.5 0.175
1985 1164.25 0 .0 0 1.46 453.61 7.7 0.313
1986 1138.56 0 .0 0 1.92 409.41 10.7 0.504
1987 1145.47 0 .0 0 2 .1 2 411.51 8 .1 1.015
1988 1156.06 0 .0 0 2.36 400.80 3.5 2.372
1989 1194.76 0 .0 0 16.91 417.17 3.0 3.908
1990 1231.80 0 .0 0 16.09 469.79 2 .6 4.161
1991 1222.23 0 .0 0 60.86 513.11 2 .6 3.997
1992 1180.30 0 .0 0 91.34 507.54 2.7 4,911
1993 1161.21 1.72 35.82 474.58 3.5 6.320
1994 1182.37 7.12 46.37 507.32 3.3 5.877
1995 1160.41 7.96 64.11 542.73 5.1 5.664
1996 1199.58 13.47 31.11 572.82 9.5 11.355
1997 1237.63 15.98 42.62 600.53 13.6 15.568
1998 1322.65 14.78 56.78 676.10 13.6 14.480
1999 1307.49 51.34 55.22 704.07 10.3 17.954
2 0 0 0 1351.94 8.77 8 6 .0 1 766.12 9.8 32.039
2 0 0 1 1345.52 9.22 108.35 739.01 7.8 37.105
2 0 0 2 1389.77 1.63 233.51 918.08 6 .0 31.759
“ Source SENER, PEMEX and Marquez (1989) . 
b Excludes PEMEX consumption.
® As proportion of total production.
Calculated as: value of total sales divided by total energy sold and multiplied by the 
World Development Index WDI conversion factor.
Table D.18: Rate of growth® %
Production Internal salesb Implicit Price
1982-1988 -0.74 -1.92 43.04
1988-1994 0.19 2.05 7.88
1994-2000 1.164 3.58 14.73
1980-2000 0.16 0.97 17.28
 ^ Calculated from table D.17 . 
b Excludes PEMEX consumption.
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D .19 M exico’s oil production  by typ e
Table D.19: Mexico’s oil production by type)(®)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
T otal 2,505.6 2,513.3 2,548.0 2,675.8 2,667.7 2,673.4 2,685.1 2,617.2 2,858.3
Heavy 1,222.7 2,245.5 1,265.8 1,332.6 1,350.4 1,320.6 1,270.1 1,220.4 1,370.6
Light 653.6 673.2 706.5 756.9 756.9 735.3 790.6 890.0 864.1
Supper light 629,4 594.8 575.8 587.0 582.3 562.2 525.1 532.7 577.7
® Source PEMEX (1999a) .
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